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ABSTRACT
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) and game theory literature is mainly focused
on the expected cumulative reward and the expected payoffs in a game, re-
spectively. In contrast, the rewards and the payoffs are often random vari-
ables whose expected values only capture a vague idea of the overall distri-
bution. The focus of this dissertation is to study the fundamental limits of
the existing bandits and game theory problems in a risk-averse framework
and propose new ideas that address the shortcomings. The author believes
that human beings are mostly risk-averse, so studying multi-armed bandits
and game theory from the point of view of risk aversion, rather than ex-
pected reward/payoff, better captures reality. In this manner, a specific class
of multi-armed bandits, called explore-then-commit bandits, and stochastic
games are studied in this dissertation, which are based on the notion of
Risk-Averse Best Action Decision with Incomplete Information (R-ABADI,
Abadi is the maiden name of the author’s mother). The goal of the classical
multi-armed bandits is to exploit the arm with the maximum score defined
as the expected value of the arm reward. Instead, we propose a new defi-
nition of score that is derived from the joint distribution of all arm rewards
and captures the reward of an arm relative to those of all other arms. We
use a similar idea for games and propose a risk-averse R-ABADI equilibrium
in game theory that is possibly different from the Nash equilibrium. The
payoff distributions are taken into account to derive the risk-averse equilib-
rium, while the expected payoffs are used to find the Nash equilibrium. The
fundamental properties of games, e.g. pure and mixed risk-averse R-ABADI
equilibrium and strict dominance, are studied in the new framework and the
results are expanded to finite-time games. Furthermore, the stochastic con-
gestion games are studied from a risk-averse perspective and three classes of
equilibria are proposed for such games. It is shown by examples that the
risk-averse behavior of travelers in a stochastic congestion game can improve
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the price of anarchy in Pigou and Braess networks. Furthermore, the Braess
paradox does not occur to the extent proposed originally when travelers are
risk-averse.
We also study an online affinity scheduling problem with no prior knowl-
edge of the task arrival rates and processing rates of different task types on
different servers. We propose the Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm that utilizes
an exploration-exploitation scheme to load balance incoming tasks on servers
in an online fashion. We prove that Blind GB-PANDAS is throughput opti-
mal, i.e. it stabilizes the system as long as the task arrival rates are inside the
capacity region. The Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm is compared to FCFS,
Max-Weight, and c-µ-rule algorithms in terms of average task completion
time through simulations, where the same exploration-exploitation approach
as Blind GB-PANDAS is used for Max-Weight and c-µ-rule. The exten-
sive simulations show that the Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm conspicuously
outperforms the three other algorithms at high loads.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction and Contributions
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) and game theory literature is mainly focused
on the expected cumulative reward and the expected payoffs in a game, re-
spectively. In contrast, the rewards and the payoffs are often random vari-
ables whose expected values are vague representations of the overall distribu-
tions and do not capture the mean-variance trade-off that is associated with
the risk of taking a specific action. The focus of this dissertation is to study
the fundamental limits of the existing bandits and game theory problems in
a risk-averse framework and propose new ideas to overcome the issues. The
author believes that the human beings mostly behave in risk-averse man-
ners, so studying multi-armed bandits and games from a risk-aversion point
of view better captures reality. Risk-averse algorithms for MAB problems
and risk-averse equilibria for (congestion) games are introduced in this dis-
sertation, which are based on the notion of Risk-Averse Best Action Decision
with Incomplete Information (R-ABADI1).
Multi-armed bandits have a wide range of applications as diverse as config-
uring web interfaces, paging and caching, routing in both wired and wireless
networks, data structures, advertisement placement, dynamic pricing and
online auction mechanisms, experiment design, and recommender systems,
to name a few. A specific class of multi-armed bandits, called explore-then-
commit (ETC) bandits, is studied in Chapter 2. This class of bandits is
widely used in autonomous vehicles, clinical trial design, and investment
companies. The objective in classical multi-armed bandit problems is to ex-
ploit the arm with the maximum expected reward. However, the expected
reward does not capture the risk associated with arm rewards. As a result,
1Abadi is the maiden name of the author’s mother.
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if the objective of a player is not to maximize the cumulative reward, but to
have a balanced reward in each and every play of the arms, or if the player
only exploits one arm once after a pure exploration phase, then exploiting the
arm with the maximum expected reward may no longer be desirable. The
goal in explore-then-commit finite bandits is to identify the best arm after a
pure experimentation phase to exploit it once or for a given finite number of
times. In this setting, we observe that pulling the arm with the highest ex-
pected reward is not necessarily the most desirable objective for exploitation.
Alternatively, we advocate the idea of risk aversion where the objective is to
compete against the arm with the best risk-return trade-off. We propose a
class of hyper-parameter-free risk-averse algorithms, called OTE/FTE-MAB
(One/Finite-Time Exploitation Multi-Armed Bandit), whose objectives are
to select the arm that will most likely provide the greatest reward in a single
or finite-time exploitation. To analyze these algorithms, we define a new no-
tion of finite-time exploitation regret for our setting of interest. We provide
an upper bound of order ln
(
1
r
)
for the minimum number of experiments
that should be done to guarantee upper bound r for regret. In contrast to
the existing risk-averse bandit algorithms, our proposed algorithms do not
rely on hyper-parameters, resulting in a more robust behavior in practice. In
the case that pulling an arm in the exploration phase has a cost, a trade-off
between cost and regret emerges. We propose the c-OTE-MAB algorithm
for two-armed bandits that addresses the cost-regret trade-off by minimiz-
ing a linear combination of cost and regret, using a hyper-parameter, that
is called cost-regret function. This algorithm estimates the optimal number
of explorations whose cost-regret value approaches the minimum value of
the cost-regret function at the rate 1√
ne
with an associated confidence level,
where ne is the number of explorations of each arm.
The risk-averse R-ABADI equilibrium for stochastic games is studied in
Chapter 3. The term rational has become synonymous with maximizing
expected payoff in the definition of the best response in the Nash setting.
In this chapter, we consider stochastic games in which players engage only
once, or at most a limited number of times. In such games, it may not be
rational for players to maximize their expected payoff as they cannot wait
for the law of large numbers to take effect. We instead introduce probability
statements on the best response by defining a new notion of a risk-averse
best response that takes the payoff distributions into account. This results
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in a risk-averse R-ABADI equilibrium in which players choose to play the
strategy that maximizes the probability of their being rewarded the most in
a single round of the game rather than maximizing the expected received
reward, subject to the actions of other players. Note that the psychology of
risk-averse players is such that they do not often take the expected payoffs
into account, but consider the payoff distributions instead. A strategy with
high expected payoff may be less likely to have a higher payoff than another
strategy with lower expected payoff, which is shown in an illustrative example
in this chapter. The Nash equilibrium is such that no player has any incentive
to deviate from his/her strategy since all his/her strategies have the same
expected payoff given the other players’ strategies. In contrast, the risk-
averse R-ABADI equilibrium makes each player indifferent to his/her choice
of strategies by giving all strategies the same probability of rewarding more
than or equal to all the other strategies, given the other players’ strategies.
We show that the risk-averse equilibrium based on the mentioned probability
statement can be found by realizing the Nash equilibrium of a new game
whose payoffs are derived from the probability distributions of the payoffs of
the original game.
Stochastic congestion games are studied in Chapter 4. The fast-growing
market of autonomous vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fleets in gen-
eral necessitates the design of smart and automatic navigation systems con-
sidering the stochastic latency along different paths in the traffic network.
The longstanding shortest path problem in a deterministic network, whose
counterpart in a congestion game setting is Wardrop equilibrium, has been
studied extensively, but it is well known that finding the notion of an optimal
path is challenging in a traffic network with stochastic arc delays. In order
to address this issue, several researchers have attempted to take the uncer-
tainty in travel times into account when defining the notion of best response
in a stochastic congestion game by considering a safety margin to arrive on
time, the probability of being late/on time, or adding mean travel time and
an additional component related to the variance of travel time. However,
simplifying assumptions are made in these works such as considering the arc
delay distributions to be independent of their loads or adding independent
and identically distributed errors to nominal delays of arcs neglecting their
differences. In this chapter, we propose three classes of risk-averse equilib-
ria for an atomic stochastic congestion game in its general case where the
3
arc delay distributions are load dependent and not necessarily independent of
each other. The three classed are R-ABADI equilibrium, mean-variance equi-
librium (MVE), and conditional value at risk level α equilibrium (CVaRαE)
whose notions of risk-averse best responses are based on maximizing the prob-
ability of taking the shortest path, minimizing a linear combination of mean
and variance of path delay, and minimizing the expected delay at a specified
risky quantile of the delay distributions, respectively. We prove that for any
finite stochastic atomic congestion game, the risk-averse, mean-variance, and
CVaRα equilibria exist. We show that for risk-averse travelers, the Braess
paradox may not occur to the extent presented originally since players do
not necessarily travel along the shortest path in expectation, but they take
the uncertainty of travel time into consideration as well. Although the focus
of this work is not on deriving bounds on price of anarchy, we show through
some examples that the price of anarchy/social delay can be improved when
players are risk-averse and travel according to one of the three classes of
risk-averse equilibria rather than when travelers are risk-neutral/selfish and
travel according to the Wardrop equilibrium.
In Chapter 5, an exploration-exploitation scheme is used for load balanc-
ing with incomplete knowledge of the processing rates of tasks on servers.
Dynamic affinity load balancing of multi-type tasks on multi-skilled servers,
when the service rate of each task type on each of the servers is known and
can possibly be different from the others, has been an open problem for over
three decades. The goal is to do task assignment on servers in a real-time
manner so that the system becomes stable, which means that the queue
lengths do not diverge to infinity in steady state (throughput optimality),
and the mean task completion time is minimized (delay optimality). The
fluid model planning, Max-Weight, and c-µ-rule algorithms have theoretical
guarantees on optimality in some aspects for the affinity problem, but they
consider a complicated queueing structure and require either the task arrival
rates, the service rates of tasks on servers, or both. In many real-world ap-
plications, both task arrival rates and service rates of different task types
on different servers are unknown. To tackle this issue, we propose the Blind
GB-PANDAS algorithm which is completely blind to task arrival rates and
service rates. Blind GB-PANDAS uses an exploration-exploitation approach
for load balancing. We prove that Blind GB-PANDAS is throughput opti-
mal under arbitrary and unknown distributions for service times of different
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task types on different servers and unknown task arrival rates. Blind GB-
PANDAS aims to route an incoming task to the server with the minimum
weighted-workload, but since the service rates are unknown, such routing of
incoming tasks is not guaranteed, making the throughput optimality analy-
sis more complicated than in the case where service rates are known. The
extensive experimental results reveal that Blind GB-PANDAS significantly
outperforms existing methods in terms of mean task completion time at high
loads.
1.2 Related Work
We present the related work on multi-armed bandits, risk-averse stochas-
tic games, stochastic congestion games, and affinity load balancing in the
following subsections.
1.2.1 Budgeted Explore-Then-Commit Bandits and
Risk-Averse Algorithms
Explore-then-commit bandit is a class of multi-armed bandit problems that
has two consecutive phases called exploration (experimentation) and com-
mitment [1, 2]. The decision-maker can arbitrarily explore each arm in the
experimentation phase; however, he/she needs to commit to one selected arm
in the commitment phase. There are few studies on explore-then-commit
bandits in the literature that are summarized below. Bui et al. [1] studied
the optimal number of explorations when cost is incurred in both phases.
Liau et al. [3] designed an explore-then-commit algorithm for the case where
there is a limited space to record the arm reward statistics. Perchet et al. [4]
studied explore-then-commit policy under the assumption that the employed
policy must split explorations into a number of batches. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no cost-based study that considers risk-aversion in an
explore-then-commit bandit with finite exploitations, which is the focus of
this work. In the following, a review on bandits is presented that consid-
ers both arm rewards and the exploration-exploitation cost. The review is
followed by an overview of risk-averse bandits.
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A class of multi-armed bandit problems is associated with budget con-
straints where a player receives a reward with a cost by pulling an arm.
Two types of MAB with budget constraint have been mainly studied [5].
First, pulling an arm is associated with a cost or constrained by a budget
in both exploration and exploitation phases. Second, pulling an arm has a
cost constrained by a budget only in the exploration phase. This type of
MAB with budget constraint is called pure exploration or best arm identifi-
cation [6]. There are several studies of the first type. Tran-Thanh et al. [7]
proposed the -first algorithm for MAB with a limited budget imposed on
pulling arms, where pulling each arm has a different fixed cost. In the -
first algorithm,  of the budget is used for the exploration phase and the
remaining budget is used for the exploitation phase. The regret bound of the
-first algorithm is O
(
B
2
3
)
, where B is the budget value. The drawbacks
of this algorithm are the polynomial regret bound and that a large  assures
a more accurate exploration but with an ineffective exploitation, and vice
versa. In order to resolve these issues, Tran-Thanh et al. [5] used a knapsack
setting and improved the regret bound from O
(
B
2
3
)
to O (lnB). In another
study, Ding et al. [6] considered the cost of pulling arms as a discrete random
variable rather than a fixed cost and proposed the UCB-BV1 and UCB-BV2
algorithms. In the UCB-BV1 algorithm, the lower bound of the expected
costs needs to be known, but the UCB-BV2 algorithm estimates this lower
bound. The regret bound for both these algorithms is proven to be O (lnB).
Xia et al. [8] studied the limited budget setting in both multi-armed ban-
dits and linear bandits with continuous random costs. They proposed the
Budget-UCB and Budget-CB algorithms for MAB and linear bandit with
distribution-dependent regret bound O (lnB) and polylog(B), respectively.
Additionally, Xia et al. [8] studied the limited budget MAB with multiple
plays, where the player pulls multiple arms in each round. They proposed
the MP-BMAB algorithm that uses a multiple ratio confidence bound to
determine the best arms to play with a sublinear regret. Xia et al. [9] ap-
plied Thompson sampling to the limited budget MAB problem with random
cost associated for pulling an arm and proposed the BTS algorithm that
has a distribution-dependent regret bound of O (lnB). In another work,
Badanidiyuru et al. [10] studied the MAB problem with multiple budget
constraints where the budget consumption of pulling an arm is a random
multi-dimensional vector. They used the knapsacks model to address this
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problem and proposed the PD-BwK algorithm with a sublinear regret. The
above setting is called bandits with knapsacks and is extended in conceptual
bandits by [11] and [12]. In the second type, best arm identification, there
are several studies. Bubeck et al. [13] studied a case where a player explores
arms with a limited budget without concern about the received rewards in
order to identify the best arm after the pure exploration phase. To evaluate
the best identified arm, they defined simple regret as the difference between
the maximal expected reward and the expected reward of the best identified
arm. They find upper bounds for the simple regret for two cases. In the first
case, arms are played uniformly in the pure exploration phase and the best
identified arm is the empirical best arm. In the second case, a UCB-based
exploration is performed and the best identified arm is the most played arm.
Audibert and Bubeck [14] defined the probability of selecting a suboptimal
arm as regret for the pure exploration setting. They found upper bounds on
the regret for both UCB exploration and their own proposed SR algorithm.
Gabillon et al. [15] studied the best arm identification for each of the bandits
in a multi-bandit multi-armed setting. They defined regret as the maximum
error among all bandits, where error is defined as the probability of selecting
a suboptimal arm. They proposed the GapE and GapE-V algorithms for ex-
ploration and obtained upper bounds on their regret. The GapE algorithm is
UCB-based which takes into account the gap between the expected rewards
of the optimal arm and the best identified arm. The GapE-V algorithm is
also UCB-based and not only uses the gap but also considers the estimated
reward variances.
There are several criteria to measure and to model risk in the risk-averse
multi-armed bandit problem. One of the common risk measurements is
the mean-variance paradigm [16]. The two algorithms MV-LCB and Ex-
pExp proposed by Sani et al. [17] are based on the mean-variance concept.
They define the mean-variance of an arm with mean µ and variance σ2 as
MV= σ2 − ρ · µ, where ρ ≥ 0 is the absolute risk tolerance coefficient. In an
infinite horizon multi-armed bandit problem, MV-LCB plays the arm with
minimum lower confidence bound for estimation of MV. In a best-arm iden-
tification setting, the ExpExp algorithm explores each of the arms for the
same number of times and selects the arm with minimum estimated MV. This
approach is followed by numerous researchers in risk-averse multi-armed ban-
dit problems [18–21]. Another way of considering risk in multi-armed bandit
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problems is to use conditional value at risk level α, CVaRα, where it is the
expected policy return in a specified quantile. CVaRα is utilized by Galichet
et al. [22] in risk-aware multi-armed bandit problems. They presented the
Multi-Armed Risk-Aware Bandit (MaRaB) algorithm aiming to select the
arm with the maximum conditional value at risk level α, CVaRα. Formally,
let 0 < α < 1 be the target quantile level and vα defined as P(R < vα) = α
be the associated quantile value, where R is the arm reward. The condi-
tional value at risk α is then defined as CVaRα = E [R|R < vα]. CVaRα is
also followed by researchers in multi-armed bandit problems [18,23–26]. The
performances of both MV and CVaR are highly dependent on different sin-
gle scalar hyper-parameters, and selecting an inappropriate hyper-parameter
might degrade the performance substantially. The negative impact of hyper-
parameter mismatch is studied in Section 2.4.
1.2.2 Risk-Averse Equilibrium for Games
Since the seminal works of von Neumann [27], von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [28], and Nash [29], expected utility has emerged as the dominant
objective value within game theory as each player attempts to maximize
his/her expected utility given the actions of other players. This concept was
extended naturally into games of incomplete information (Bayesian games)
by Harsanyi [30], as players can still maximize their expected utility given a
distribution from which the game will be drawn. These games have received
a great deal of attention as they more accurately model real-world situa-
tions where not all parameters are known precisely, with later works such as
Wiseman [31] addressing how players sequentially refine their equilibria as
they learn the distributions and the more recent work of Mertikopoulos and
Zhou [32] addressing how players learn their payoffs with continuous action
sets. Another recent work by Sugaya and Yamamoto [33] considers the more
specific question of how firms in a duopoly should play when the payoff dis-
tributions are based on the market state, a random variable with possibly
unknown distribution.
Despite all the work that has gone into expected utility as the objective
value players wish to maximize, it is still questionable whether this is a good
assumption [34, 35]. Several papers have focused on adding a degree of risk
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aversion to player’s utility functions in specific games, with Angelidakis et
al. [36] and Bell and Cassir [37] analyzing variations of this in congestion
games, and Yamazaki [38] doing so in rent-seeking games, Harrington [39]
doing so in bargaining games. Additionally Goeree et al. [40] present an
empirical study of risk-aversion in the matching-pennies game, where they
observe marked deviations from Nash behavior (expected utility maximiza-
tion) as the payoffs/costs become larger. This is consistent with the concept
of prospect theory based on empirical observations across several experi-
ments in which the subjects deviate from actions which would maximize
their expected utility. Kahneman and Tversky [41] formulated the idea of
prospect theory, which states that consumers are naturally risk-averse when
addressing situations with potential gains and naturally risk-seeking when
facing situations with potential losses. Prospect theory has since been widely
studied, with an extension of the original paper provided in [42] to address
more general payoff/cost functions. Levy [43] provides a good overview of
classical prospect theory, particularly from a political perspective. Unsur-
prisingly, prospect theory has received a great deal of attention in financial
studies [44, 45], with Barberis et al. [46] using it for asset pricing. Prospect
theory is not without its critics; e.g., List [47] posits that the results of the
studies on prospect theory are due to inexperienced consumers, and designs
an experiment to show these behaviors disappear with experience. However,
experienced consumers are by definition consumers who engage in similar
trials multiple times, which means that for these consumers expected utility
is an appropriate metric. As we are explicitly interested in games which will
be played at most a small number of times, we do not need to be concerned
with this effect.
1.2.3 Stochastic Congestion Games
In this section, the literature on navigation for both deterministic and stochas-
tic networks is presented first, then the literature on deterministic and stochas-
tic congestion games is discussed in detail. The main focus of the literature
review is to motivate the necessity of risk-averse algorithms for navigation
and congestion games in a stochastic setting.
The problem of finding the shortest path in a transportation or telecom-
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munication traffic network is one of the main parts of the in-vehicle naviga-
tion systems. This problem has been studied well in deterministic networks
resulting in many efficient algorithms, e.g., the algorithms developed by Bell-
man [48], Dijkstra [49], and Dreyfus [50], also see [51–60]. Although finding
the shortest path problem is well understood in deterministic networks, the
definition of an optimal path and how to identify such a path is more chal-
lenging in the stochastic version of the problem. There have been multiple
approaches to define the optimal path in stochastic networks as summarized
below. The least expected travel time is studied by Loui [61] and is equiv-
alent to the deterministic case from the computational point of view. The
path with the least expected time may be sub-optimal for risk-averse travel-
ers due to its high variability and uncertainty; as the result, the probability
distributions of link travel times need to be considered explicitly to find the
most reliable path. In this manner, Frank [62] proposed the optimal path
to be the one that maximizes the probability of realizing a travel time that
less than a threshold, Sigal et al. [63] proposed the optimal path to be the
one that maximizes the probability of realizing the shortest time, and Chen
and Ji [64] proposed the optimal path to be the one with minimum travel
time budget required to meet a travel time reliability constraint. For more
variants of the mentioned algorithms, refer to [65–81].
In the context of route selection in a fleet of vehicles, a game emerges be-
tween all travelers where the action of each traveler affects the travel time
of the other travelers, which creates a competitive situation forcing travel-
ers to strategize their decisions. In a deterministic network, the mentioned
game is formalized by Wardrop and Whitehead [82], von Neumann [83], von
Neumann and Morgenstern [84], and Nash et al. [85]. However, it is not
realistic to consider the link delays to be known prior to making a decision
due to external factors that make the travel times uncertain. In order to
put this in perspective, several approaches have been adopted by researchers
to capture the stochastic behavior of the traffic networks. For example,
Harsanyi [86, 87] proposed Bayesian games that consider the incomplete in-
formation of payoffs, Ordo´n˜ez and Stier-Moses [88] modeled the risk-averse
behavior of travelers by padding the expected travel time along paths with a
safety margin, Watling [89] proposed an equilibrium based on the optimality
measure of minimizing the probability of being late or maximizing the prob-
ability of being on time, Szeto et al. [90] associated a cost with the travel
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time uncertainty based on travelers’ risk-averse behavior, Chen and Zhou [91]
proposed an equilibrium based on the optimality measure of minimizing the
conditional expectation of travel time beyond a travel time budget, and Bell
and Cassir [92] proposed to play out all possible scenarios before making a
choice. For more details in the context of traffic networks, we refer readers
to [93–105].
1.2.4 Affinity Scheduling Algorithms
There is a huge body of work on a specific class of affinity problems with
applications in scheduling for data centers considering data locality, which
can be divided into two main categories: (1) Heuristic scheduling algo-
rithms with no theoretical guarantees on throughput or delay optimality,
see e.g. [106–116]. Although some of these heuristic algorithms are being
used in real applications, simple facts about their optimality are not investi-
gated. Among these algorithms, the Fair Scheduler is the de facto standard
in Hadoop [108]. Other than map task scheduling for map-intensive jobs,
heuristic algorithms like [117–119] study the joint scheduling of map and re-
duce tasks. (2) Algorithms that theoretically guarantee throughput or delay
optimality or both [120–148]. The works by Harrison [120], Harrison and
Lopez [121], and Bell and Williams [122,123] on affinity scheduling not only
require the knowledge of mean arrival rates of all task types, but also consider
one queue per task type. In a data center, if a task is replicated on three
servers, the number of task types can be in the cubic order of number of
servers, which causes unnecessary and intolerable complexity of the system.
The MaxWeight algorithm (the generalized cµ-rule) by Stolyar and Mandel-
baum [124, 127] does not require the arrival rates, but still needs one queue
per task type. The JSQ-MaxWeight algorithm by Wang et al. [132] solves
the per-task-type problem for a system with two levels of data locality. The
JSQ-MaxWeight algorithm is throughput optimal, but it is delay optimal
for a special traffic scenario. The priority algorithm for near data schedul-
ing [133] is both throughput and heavy-traffic optimal for systems with two
locality levels. The weighted-workload routing and priority scheduling algo-
rithm [134] for systems with three locality levels is shown to be throughput
optimal and delay optimal in a larger region of the capacity region compared
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to the JSQ-MW algorithm with a further assumption on the processing rates.
A related direction of work on scheduling for data centers with multi-
level data locality, which is a direct application of affinity scheduling, is to
efficiently do data replication on servers in MapReduce framework to increase
availability. Increasing the availability is translated to increasing service
rates in the context of this dissertation which enlarges the capacity region
and reduces the mean task completion time. For more information on data
replication algorithms refer to Google File System [149], Hadoop Distributed
File System [106], Scarlett [150], and Dare [151]. Data replication algorithms
are complementary and orthogonal to the throughput and delay optimality
that is studied in this dissertation.
In addition to data-locality, fairness is another concern in task scheduling
which actually conflicts with delay optimality. A delay optimal load bal-
ancing algorithm can cooperate with fair scheduling strategies, though, by
compromising on delay optimality to achieve partial fairness. For more de-
tails on fair scheduling [152–154], see Zaharia et al. [108], Isard et al. [107],
and the references therein. A different line of work studies the performance
of load balancing algorithms under uncertainty of system parameters. It is
desirable to design algorithms that are robust to the changes in task arrival
loads, change of service rates, and other factors. Some robust policies are
studied in [155–159].
1.2.5 Applications of Affinity Scheduling in MapReduce
Framework
In large scale data-intensive applications like the healthcare industry, ad
placement, online social networks, large-scale data mining, machine learning,
search engines, and web indexing, the de facto standard is the MapReduce
framework. MapReduce framework is implemented on tens of thousands
of machines (servers) in systems like Google’s MapReduce [160], Hadoop
[106], and Dryad [161] as well as grid-computing environments [107]. Such
vast investments do require improvements in the performance of MapReduce,
which gives them new opportunities to optimize and develop their products
faster [150]. In MapReduce framework, a large data-set is split into small
data chunks (typically 64 or 128 MB) and each one is saved on a number of
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machines (three machines by default) which are chosen uniformly at random.
A request for processing the large data-set, called a job, consists mainly of
two phases, map and reduce. The map tasks read their corresponding data
chunks which are distributed across machines and output intermediary key-
value results. The reduce tasks aggregate the intermediary results produced
by map tasks to generate the job’s final result.
In MapReduce framework, a master node (centralized scheduler) assigns
map and reduce tasks to slaves (servers) in response to heartbeats received
from slaves. Since jobs are either map-intensive or only require map tasks
[162, 163], and since map tasks read a large volume of data, we only focus
on map task scheduling as an immediate application of our load balancing
algorithm. Local servers of a map task refer to those servers having the data
associated with the map task. Local servers process map tasks faster, so the
map tasks are preferred to be co-located with their data chunks or at least be
assigned to machines that are close to map tasks’ data, which is commonly
referred to as near-data scheduling or scheduling with data locality.
In contrast to the improvements in the speed of data center networks, there
is still a huge difference between accessing data locally and fetching it from
another server [164, 165]. Hence, improving data locality increases system
throughput, alleviates network congestion due to less data transmission, and
enhances users’ satisfaction due to less delay in receiving their job’s response.
There are two main approaches to increase data locality: (1) Employing
data replication algorithms to determine the number of data chunk replicas
and where to place them (instead of choosing a fixed number of machines
uniformly at random, which is done in Google File System [149] and Hadoop
Distributed File System [106]). For more details see the algorithms Scarlett
[150] and Dare [151]. (2) Scheduling map tasks on or close to local servers in
a way to keep balance between data-locality and load-balancing (assigning
all tasks to their local machines can lead to hotspots on servers with popular
data). These two methods are complementary and orthogonal to each other.
The focus of this dissertation is on the second method.
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Chapter 2
A COST-BASED ANALYSIS FOR
RISK-AVERSE EXPLORE-THEN-COMMIT
FINITE-TIME BANDITS
One of the classes of decision making models is the multi-armed bandit
(MAB) framework where decision makers learn the model of different arms
that are unknown and actions do not change the state of arms [166]. The
MAB problem was originally proposed by Robbins [167], and has a wide
range of applications in finance [168,169], communication and networks [170],
health-care [171], autonomous vehicles [172], dynamic spectrum access sys-
tems [173], and energy management [22,174,175] to name but a few. In the
classical MAB problem, the decision-maker sequentially selects an arm (ac-
tion) with an unknown reward distribution out of K arms. The noisy reward
of the selected arm is revealed and the values of other arms remain unknown.
At each step, the decision-maker encounters a dilemma between exploitation
of the best identified arm versus exploration of alternative arms. The goal
of the classical model of multi-armed bandit is to maximize the expected
cumulative reward over a time horizon.
In this chapter, the focus is on a setting where a player is allowed to explore
different arms in the exploration (or experimentation, used interchangeably)
phase before committing to the best identified arm for exploitation in one or
a given finite number of times. A preliminary treatment of this problem has
been introduced in [176]. Besides, pulling an arm in the exploration phase
can incur a cost. This setting of interest is motivated by several application
domains such as personalized health-care and one-time investment. In such
applications, exploitation is costly and/or it is infeasible to exploit for a
large number of times, but arms can be tested by simulation and/or based
on the historical data for multiple times with a relatively small cost [1].
The big step in personalized health-care is to provide an individual patient
with his/her disease risk profile based on his/her electronic medical record
Portions of this chapter were previously published in Yekkehkhany et al. [176] and
is used here with permission.
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and personalized assessments [177,178]. The different treatments (arms) are
evaluated for a person by simulation or mice trials for many times with a
low cost, but one personalized treatment is exploited once for a patient in
the end [179, 180]. Another example of one-time exploitation is one-time
investment where an investor chooses a factory out of multiple ones. Based
on experimentation on historical data, he/she selects a factory to invest in
once. The common theme in both above examples is to identify the best arm
for one-time exploitation after an experimentation phase of pure exploration.
This setting falls in the class of MAB problems called explore-then-commit
[1, 2].
Note that although pulling the arm with the maximum expected reward
is desirable in the settings with infinite exploitations, it is not necessarily
the best objective in the explore-then-commit setting with a single or fi-
nite exploitations. In such scenarios, players not only aim to achieve the
maximum expected cumulative reward, but they also want to minimize the
uncertainty such as risk in the outcome [18]. These approaches are known as
risk-averse MAB. We advocate a risk-averse approach in which the objective
is to select an arm that is most probable to reward the most. The previous
works [1,2,17,22,181,182] on explore-then-commit bandits, to the best of our
knowledge, try to identify the arm with an optimal risk-return criterion on an
expectation sense up to a hyper-parameter. The choice of hyper-parameter
is tricky which will be further elaborated by an illustrative example in Sec-
tion 2.1. We propose a class of hyper-parameter-free risk-averse algorithms,
called OTE/FTE-MAB, for explore-then-commit bandits with finite-time ex-
ploitations. We define a new notion of finite-time exploitation regret for our
setting of interest and obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of
experiments that should be done to guarantee an upper bound for regret that
are elaborated in Section 2.2.
In the mentioned single or finite exploitation explore-then-commit ban-
dit applications, although the exploration cost of arms is relatively small, a
trade-off between cost and regret emerges at large numbers of explorations.
Increasing the number of explorations decreases regret but increases cost and
vice versa. In order to capture this issue, we formalize this trade-off for a
two-armed bandit problem and propose an algorithm to determine an esti-
mation of the optimal number of explorations. The cost-regret trade-off is
studied in details in Section 2.3.
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The contributions of this chapter are summarized below. We propose a
class of hyper-parameter-free risk-averse algorithms (called OTE/FTE-MAB)
for explore-then-commit bandits with finite-time exploitations. The goal of
the algorithms is to select the arm that is most probable to give the player
the highest reward. To analyze the algorithms, we define a new notion of
finite-time exploitation regret for our setting of interest. We provide con-
crete mathematical support to obtain an upper bound of order ln( 1
r
) for
the minimum number of experiments that should be done to guarantee up-
per bound r for regret. As a salient feature, the OTE/FTE-MAB algorithm is
hyper-parameter-free, so it is not prone to errors due to the hyper-parameter
mismatch. We further study the case where the cost of pulling arms in the
exploration phase is not negligible, and as a result, a trade-off between cost
and regret should be considered. We propose the c-OTE-MAB algorithm for a
two-armed bandit that addresses this trade-off by minimizing a linear combi-
nation of cost and regret, using a hyper-parameter, that is called cost-regret
function. This algorithm determines an estimation of the optimal number of
explorations whose cost-regret value approaches the minimum value of the
cost-regret function at the rate 1√
ne
with an associated confidence level, where
ne is the number of explorations of each arm. The c-OTE-MAB algorithm
is designed for one-time exploitation that can be extended to finite-time ex-
ploitations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Subsection 1.2.1 discusses
related work. In Section 2.1, the one/finite-time exploitation multi-armed
bandit problem after an experimentation phase is formally described. We
define a new notion of one/finite-time exploitation regret for our problem
setup. An example is provided clarifying the motivation of our work. In Sec-
tion 2.2, we propose the OTE-MAB and FTE-MAB algorithms, and find an
upper bound for the minimum number of pure explorations needed to guaran-
tee an upper bound for regret. In Section 2.3, we propose the c-OTE-MAB
algorithm that determines an estimation of the optimal number of explo-
rations for a two-armed bandit problem, where exploring arms is associated
with a cost. In Section 2.4, we evaluate the OTE-MAB algorithm versus risk-
averse baselines and compare the minimum number of experiments needed to
guarantee an upper bound on regret for both the OTE-MAB and FTE-MAB
algorithms. Additionally, we show by an example that the expected value of
the estimated optimal number of explorations derived from the c-OTE-MAB
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algorithm converges to the optimal value of the number of explorations. For
conclusion of the chapter and a discussion of opportunities for future work,
refer to Chapter 6.
2.1 Formulation of Explore-Then-Commit Finite
Bandits
Consider arms K = {1, 2, . . . , K} whose rewards are random variables R1, R2,
. . . , RK that have an unknown joint distribution function f1,2,...,K
(
u1, u2, . . . ,
uK
)
with marginal distribution functions f1(u), f2(u), . . . , fK(u) with un-
known finite expected values µ1, µ2, . . . , µK and variances σ
2
1, σ
2
2, . . . , σ
2
K , re-
spectively. Note that a bandit with independent arms is a specific case of a
bandit with dependent arms since the joint distribution of arms in the former
case is given by f1,2,...,K(u1, u2, . . . , uK) = f1(u1)×f2(u2)×· · ·×fK(uK). The
goal is to identify the best arm at the end of an experimentation phase that is
followed by an exploitation phase, where the best arm is exploited for a given
number of times, M < ∞. In the experimentation phase, all arms are sam-
pled together for N independent times. Denote the observed reward of arm
k ∈ K at sample n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} of experimentation by rk,n. The uniform
exploration of all arms for the same number of times is a common practice
in bandit problems with pure exploration [13,17,183]. Note that if arms are
independent, rewards of different arms can be sampled independently from
each other. In Section 2.2, the cost of exploration is not considered, but in
Section 2.3, a two-armed bandit is studied where the cost of pulling the two
arms for n times is formulated by C(n) and limn→∞ =∞.
Let RMk = X
1
k + X
2
k + · · · + XMk , for k ∈ K, where (Xm1 , Xm2 , . . . , XmK )
for m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} are independent and identically distributed multivari-
ate random variables and (X11 , X
1
2 , . . . , X
1
K) ∼ f1,2,...,K . The optimal arm
for M exploitations in the sense that maximizes the hyper-parameter-free
probability of receiving the highest reward is
k∗ = arg max
k
P(RMk ≥ RM−k), (2.1)
whereRM−k = {RM1 , RM2 , . . . , RMk−1, RMk+1, . . . , RMK } and RMk being greater than
or equal to a vector means that it is greater than or equal to all elements
17
of the vector. The mentioned measure of optimality is called Risk-Averse
Best Action Decision with Incomplete Information (R-ABADI). Let pMk =
P(RMk ≥ RM−k) be the score of arm k. Given the above preliminaries, the
finite-time exploitation regret is defined below.
Definition 1. The finite-time exploitation regret, rM(∆p), is defined to be
the probability that the score of the selected arm kˆ, where kˆ is a random
variable, deviates from the score of the optimal arm by a tolerance threshold
0 < ∆p < 1; i.e.,
rM(∆p) = P
(
pMk∗ − pMkˆ ≥ ∆p
)
. (2.2)
Regret can also be defined hyper-parameter-free as rM = P
(
kˆ 6= k∗
)
,
in which case the theoretical results in Section 2.2 become distribution-
dependent, which is discussed in detail in that section. Note that the above
definitions of regret and arm optimality are different from the commonly
used regret and optimality criteria in bandit problems. In the following, an
example is presented that motivates the definition of the new notion of regret
as well as the new optimality criteria for the finite-time exploitation setting.
2.1.1 Illustrative Example
As mentioned in the Introduction, although the arm with the highest ex-
pected reward is the optimal arm for utilization in infinite number of ex-
ploitations, it is not necessarily the one that is most probable to have the
highest reward in a single or some finite number of exploitations. In the
following example, two arms are considered such that µ2 > µ1, but it is more
probable that a one-time exploitation of the first arm rewards us more than
a one-time exploitation of the second arm. Hence, arm arg max
k
µk is not
necessarily the ideal arm for one-time exploitation let alone the arm with the
maximum empirical mean, i.e. arg max
k
∑N
n=1 rk,n
n
.
Example 1. Consider two arms with the following independent reward dis-
tributions:
f1(u) = αe
−2(u−3)2 · 1{0 ≤ u ≤ 10}
f2(u) = β
(
3e−8(u−1)
2
+ 2e−8(u−8)
2
)
· 1{0 ≤ u ≤ 10},
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where α and β are constants for which each of the two distributions integrate
to one and 1{.} is the indicator function.
In Example 1, although the second arm has a larger mean than the first
one, µ2 ≈ 3.8 and µ1 ≈ 3, the variance of reward received from the second
arm is larger than that from the first one, which increases the risk of choosing
the second arm for a one-time exploitation application. In fact, the first arm
with lower mean is more probable to reward us more than the second arm
since P(R1 ≥ R2) ≈ 0.6 > 0.5. In general, a larger variance for the received
reward is against the principle of risk-aversion where the objective is to keep a
balance in the trade-off between the expected return and risk of an action [17].
Mean-variance is an existing approach to tackle this scenario. However, it
has some drawbacks that are explained in detail in the following.
The mean-variance (MV) of arm k is defined as σ2k − ρ · µk that depends
on the hyper-parameter ρ ≥ 0, which is the absolute risk tolerance coeffi-
cient. The arm with the minimum MV value is defined to be optimal in
this framework. The trade-off on ρ is that if it is set to zero, the arm with
the minimum variance is selected. On the other hand, if ρ goes to infinity,
the arm with the maximum expected reward is selected, which is the same
as classical multi-armed bandit approach. Although the behavior of mean-
variance trade-off is known for marginal values of ρ, it is not obvious what
value of the hyper-parameter ρ keeps a desirable balance between return
and risk. The choice of this hyper-parameter can be tricky and as will be
shown in Section 2.4; an inappropriate choice can increase the regret dramat-
ically. As a simple example, consider two arms with unknown parameters
µ1 = 10, σ
2
1 = 10, µ2 = 1, σ
2
2 = 1, and P(R1 > R2) = 1. The mean-variance
trade-off is formalized as σˆ2k − ρµˆk, where σˆ2k and µˆk are empirical estimates
of variance and mean of each arm. Note that the empirical means and vari-
ances converge to true values, so the second arm that is performing worse
with probability one is selected in limit if ρ < 1. The mean-variance frame-
work aims at keeping a balance on choosing an arm with low variance and
high expected reward. However, the limitation of this method is that high
variance is not necessarily against the player. This fact is presented in an-
other example depicted in Figure 2.1, where the blue arm, R1, rewards more
than the red arm, R2, with probability one, so a logical player would choose
the first arm to play. However, the mean-variance framework would choose
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Mean-Variance (MV):
1
𝑘∗ = argm𝑖𝑛
1≤𝑘≤𝐾
𝜎𝑘
2 − 𝜌. 𝜇𝑘
𝔼 𝑅1 > 𝔼 𝑅2
ℙ 𝑅1 > 𝑅2 = 1
If 𝜌 <
64
9
≈ 7.11, MV selects arm 2.
Figure 2.1: The example shows that mean-variance framework does not
necessarily behave in a risk-averse manner.
the second arm if ρ < 64/9. On the other hand, the CVaRα framework
has a local view on the bottom of the support of the marginal distribu-
tions, so it misses the opportunities on the top part of the support. This
fact is shown as an example in Figure 2.2, where the blue arm, R1, rewards
more than the red arm, R2, with probability 0.81, but the CVaRα selects
the second arm if α < 0.2081. In order to address these issues, we alterna-
tively propose the following best arm identification algorithm for One-Time
(Finite-time) Exploitation in a Multi-Armed Bandit problem (OTE/FTE-
MAB algorithm) that has concrete mathematical support for its action and
is hyper-parameter-free.
2.2 Risk-Averse Explore-Then-Commit Bandits with
One/Finite-Time Exploitations
In this section, we propose the OTE-MAB and FTE-MAB algorithms. The
OTE-MAB algorithm is a specific case of the FTE-MAB algorithm. Since the
proof of theorem related to the FTE-MAB algorithm is notationally heavy,
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Conditional Value at Risk Level 𝛼, CVaR𝛼:
1
𝑘∗ = argm𝑎𝑥
1≤𝑘≤𝐾
CVaR𝛼,𝑘, where CVaR𝛼,𝑘 = 𝔼 𝑅𝑘|𝑅𝑘 < 𝑣𝛼,𝑘 ,
ℙ 𝑅𝑘 < 𝑣𝛼,𝑘 = 𝛼, for 0 < 𝛼 < 1.
𝔼 𝑅1 > 𝔼 𝑅2
ℙ 𝑅1 > 𝑅2 = 0.81
If 𝛼 < 0.2081, CVaR𝛼 selects arm 2.
Figure 2.2: The example shows that the local view on the bottom of
support of reward distributions in the CVaRα framework misses the
opportunities on the top part of the support.
the OTE-MAB algorithm is proposed first in Subsection 2.2.1 and the FTE-
MAB algorithm is postponed to Subsection 2.2.2.
2.2.1 The OTE-MAB Algorithm
The OTE-MAB algorithm seeks to identify the arm that is most probable to
reward the most for the case M = 1 as
k∗ = arg max
k
P(Rk ≥ R−k), (2.3)
which is a specific case of Equation (2.1). For ease of notation, the M -
notation is eliminated in this subsection.
Remark 1. If there is any hard constraint on the minimum required reward
in the one-time exploitation, c, the hard constraint can be concatenated to
vector R−k as R−k = {R1, R2, . . . , Rk−1, Rk+1, . . . , RK , c}.
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Algorithm 1 The OTE-MAB Algorithm
Input 0 < r, ∆p < 1
choose N ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p2
Experimentation Phase:
for n = 1 to N do
rk,n is observed for all k ∈ K
end for
Calculate pˆk =
∑N
n=1 1{rk,n≥r−k,n}
N
One-Time Exploitation:
Play arm kˆ = arg max
k
pˆk.
Since the joint reward distribution of the K arms are not known, the
exact values of pk = P(Rk ≥ R−k) are unknown. Hence, estimates of these
probabilities, pˆk, are needed to be evaluated based on the observations in the
experimentation phase as follows:
pˆk =
∑N
n=1 1{rk,n ≥ r−k,n}
N
, (2.4)
where r−k,n =
(
r1,n, r2,n, . . . , rk−1,n, rk+1,n, . . . , rK,n
)
. The OTE-MAB algo-
rithm selects arm kˆ = arg max
k
pˆk as the best arm in terms of rewarding the
most with the highest probability in one-time exploitation. The one-time
exploitation regret for selecting arm kˆ, r(∆p), which is a specific case of
Definition 1, is
r(∆p) = P (pk∗ − pkˆ ≥ ∆p) . (2.5)
The OTE-MAB algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. The reason uni-
form exploration is utilized rather than a dynamic exploration in the pure
exploration phase of Algorithm 1 is the following. The score of any arm is
derived from the joint distribution of all arm rewards; as a result, stopping
the exploration of any arm results in ceasing the concentration of the other
arm scores. We next present a theorem on an upper bound of the minimum
number of experiments needed to guarantee an upper bound on regret of
Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. For any 0 < r, ∆p < 1, if all of the K arms are experimented
jointly for N ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p2
times in the experimentation phase, the one-time
exploitation regret is bounded by r, i.e. r(∆p) ≤ r.
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Refer to Appendix A.1 for the proof of Theorem 1.
According to Theorem 1 and using the law of total probability, the se-
lected arm by Algorithm 1, kˆ, satisfies E [pkˆ] ≥ (1− r) · (pk∗ −∆p) for any
0 < r, ∆p < 1, if all of the K arms are explored jointly in the experimen-
tation phase for N ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p2
times. Furthermore, pkˆ ≤ pk∗ , so pkˆ can get
arbitrarily close to pk∗ by increasing the number of pure explorations in the
experimentation phase.
Let p(1), p(2), . . . , p(K) be the ordered list of p1, p2, . . . , pK in descending
order. Note that arm (1) is actually arm k∗ defined in Equation (2.3). Define
the difference between the two maximum pk’s as ∆p
∗ = p(1) − p(2), where
without loss of generality is assumed to be nonzero. Having the knowledge
of ∆p∗ or a lower bound on it, a stronger notion of regret can be defined as
r = inf
∆p>0
r(∆p) = P
(
kˆ 6= k∗
)
, (2.6)
and have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. From the theoretical point of view, upon the knowledge of ∆p∗
or a lower bound on it, for any 0 < r < 1, the regret defined in Equation
(2.6) is bounded by r, i.e. r < r, if all of the K arms are explored jointly
for N ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p∗2 times.
Remark 2. If the K arms are independent, instead of estimating pk by
Equation (2.4), the following can be used:
pˆk =
∑N
n1=1
∑N
n2=1
· · ·∑NnK=1 1{rk,nk ≥ r−k,n−k}
NK
, (2.7)
where r−k,n−k =
(
r1,n1 , r2,n2 , . . . , rk−1,nk−1 , rk+1,nk+1 , . . . , rK,nK
)
. The above
estimation can outperform the one in Equation (2.7), which is a promising
future work. In the following, the challenge for obtaining a tighter confidence
interval for estimates of pk from Equation (2.7) versus Equation (2.4) is
presented. For the case of dependent arms, there is an N-tuple containing
the instantaneous observation of the K arm rewards as (r1,n, r2,n, . . . , rK,n)
for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, which is used for estimation of pˆk in Equation (2.4).
On the other hand, for the case of independent arms, any of the NK orderings
of the N observations of the K arm rewards can be used for estimation of
pˆk as is done in Equation (2.7). However,
(
pˆk − a2√NK , pˆk + a2√NK
)
cannot
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be used as confidence interval with confidence level 1 − 2e−a22 . The reason
is that, although pˆk is derived from N
K samples, not all those samples are
independent, but exactly N of the NK samples are independent. In fact,
the observed independent rewards can be classified as N-tuples of the K arm
rewards with independent elements in Nk−1×(N−1)k−1×· · ·×1k−1 = (N !)K−1
different ways. None of such N-tuples has any priority over the other ones
to estimate pk, so pˆk can be computed based on any of the N-tuples. The
estimate of pk derived from any of those N-tuples is in
(
pk − a2√N , pk + a2√N
)
with probability at least 1−2e−a22 , so the average of those estimations is again
in the mentioned interval with probability at least 1 − 2e−a22 . Note that the
average of estimates of pk derived from all of the (N !)
K−1 different N-tuples
is equal to pˆk derived from Equation (2.7) due to the following reason. An
element of an N-tuple is repeated for ((N − 1)!)K−1 times in all N-tuples.
Hence, averaging over the (N !)
K−1·N
((N−1)!)K−1 = N
K number of distinct elements of
N-tuples results in the same answer as the case of averaging the estimates of
pk derived from all of (N !)
K−1 different N-tuples. As a result, a
2
√
N
can be
used as the half width of the confidence interval for estimators obtained from
Equation (2.7) for independent arms.
2.2.2 The FTE-MAB Algorithm
Consider the case where an arm is going to be exploited for finite number of
times, M <∞. The best arm for M -time exploitations is defined in Equation
(2.1). Since the joint reward distribution is unknown, pMk ’s are needed to be
estimated based on observations in the pure exploration phase. Define the
vector RMk , that is not unique, with cardinality bNM c as
RMk =
{∑
n∈Si
rk,n for 1≤ i≤ bN
M
c s.t. Si, Sj ⊆ {1, . . . , N},
|Si| = |Sj| = M, and Si ∩ Sj = ∅, 1 ≤ ∀i 6= j ≤ bN
M
c
}
,
(2.8)
where rMk,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ bNM c are the different elements of RMk . Let the set Si
corresponding to rMk,j be used for generating r
M
k′,j for all k
′ ∈ K. Let pˆMk be
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Algorithm 2 The FTE-MAB Algorithm
Input 0 < r, ∆p < 1 and M ≥ 1
choose N such that bN
M
c ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p2
Experimentation Phase:
for n = 1 to N do
rk,n is observed for all k ∈ K
end for
Let RMk =
{∑
n∈Si rk,n for 1 ≤ i ≤ bNM c s.t. Si, Sj ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, |Si| =
|Sj| = M, and Si ∩ Sj = ∅, 1 ≤ ∀i 6= j ≤ bNM c
}
, where rMk,j for 1 ≤ j ≤
bN
M
c are the different elements of RMk . Let the set Si corresponding to rMk,j
be used for generating rMk′,j for all k
′ ∈ K.
Calculate pˆMk =
∑b N
M
c
j=1 1{rMk,j≥rM−k,j}
b N
M
c
M-Time Exploitation:
Play arm kˆ = arg max
k
pˆMk for M times.
the estimate of pMk that can be computed as
pˆMk =
∑b N
M
c
j=1 1{rMk,j ≥ rM−k,j}
bN
M
c . (2.9)
The FTE-MAB algorithm selects arm kˆ = arg max
k
pˆMk for M -time exploita-
tions. This algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2. We next present a
theorem for an upper bound of the minimum number of experiments needed
to guarantee an upper bound on regret of Algorithm 2 which is the general-
ization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. For any 0 < r, ∆p < 1, if all of the K arms are explored
jointly for N times in the experimentation phase such that bN
M
c ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p2
,
the finite-time exploitation regret is bounded by r, i.e. rM(∆p) ≤ r.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1, which can be
found in Appendix A.2.
Let pM(1), p
M
(2), . . . , p
M
(K) be the ordered list of p
M
1 , p
M
2 , . . . , p
M
K in descending
order. Note that arm (1) is actually arm k∗ defined in Equation (1). Define
the difference between the two maximum pMk ’s as ∆p
∗
M = p
M
(1) − pM(2), where
without loss of generality is assumed to be nonzero. Having the knowledge
25
of ∆p∗M or a lower bound on it, a stronger notion of regret can be defined as
rM = inf
∆p>0
rM(∆p) = P
(
kˆ 6= k∗
)
, (2.10)
and the following corollary follows.
Corollary 2. From the theoretical point of view, upon the knowledge of ∆p∗M
or a lower bound on it, for any 0 < r < 1, the regret defined in Equation
(2.10) is bounded by r, i.e. rM < r, if all of the K arms are explored jointly
for N times, where bN
M
c ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p∗M
2 .
Remark 3. We note that the need for the number of samples to scale linearly
with M in Theorem 2 may seem sub-optimal at first. This is a consequence
of having a distribution-independent statement of the theorem. We provide
an example in Section 2.4 that shows the linear scaling for M = 2. If M
converges to infinity, the problem becomes the classical multi-armed bandit
problem since arg max
k
P(RMk ≥ RM−k) is the same as arg max
k
P
(
RMk
M
≥ RM−k
M
)
and due to the law of large numbers
RMk
M
→ µk as M →∞. Hence, the FTE-
MAB algorithm selects the arm with maximum expected reward if the arm is
going to be exploited for infinitely many times and the cumulative reward is
desired to be maximized.
Remark 4. Let RMk =
{∑
n∈SK rk,n s.t. SK ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} and |SK| =
M
}
, where rMk,j for 1 ≤ j ≤
(
N
M
)
are the different elements of RMk . Let the
set SK corresponding to rMk,j be used for generating r
M
k′,j for all k
′ ∈ K. The
estimates of pMk can be calculated as
pˆMk =
∑(NM)
j=1 1{rMk,j ≥ rM−k,j}(
N
M
) (2.11)
or if the K arms are independent, pMk can be estimated as
pˆMk =
∑(NM)
j1=1
∑(NM)
j2=1
· · ·∑(NM)jK=1 1{rMk,jk ≥ rM−k,j−k}(
N
M
)K . (2.12)
An interesting future work is to obtain a tighter confidence interval for esti-
mates of pMk from Equation (2.11) or Equation (2.12) versus Equation (2.9).
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2.3 A Cost-Based Analysis for Risk-Averse
Explore-Then-Commit Two-Armed Bandits
Up to this point, the experimentation cost is not considered. However, if ex-
perimentation is time-consuming, there is a cost in postponing the exploita-
tion of the best identified arm. For example, for more experimentation, a
patient receives medication by delay or an investor keeps his/her money on
hold with zero interest, both of which incur costs. As explained in Section 2.1,
let such a cost be formulated by a function C(.), where C(n) is the incurred
cost of n joint experiments of all arms. Then, a trade-off between cost and
regret emerges, where increasing the number of explorations decreases regret,
but increases the incurred cost. Such a trade-off can be formalized using a
hyper-parameter by solving
N∗ = arg min
n
C(n) + α · r∗(n, pk∗), (2.13)
where α characterizes the cost-regret trade-off, r∗(n, pk∗) = P(kˆ 6= k∗), de-
fined in Equation (2.5) when ∆p = 0, is the regret when n experiments are
done, and pk∗ = max (P(R1 ≥ R2),P(R2 ≥ R1)), which is unknown. Define
Cr(n, p) = C(n) + α · r∗(n, p) as the cost-regret function. Note that upon
the knowledge of pk∗ , the regret can be formulated as
r∗(n, pk∗) =
n∑
i=bn
2
c+1
(
n
i
)
· (1− pk∗)i · pn−ik∗
+
1
2
·
(
n
n
2
)
· (1− pk∗)n2 · p
n
2
k∗ · 1{n is even}.
(2.14)
Deriving regret from the above equation meets simulation-based results for
regret of the OTE-MAB algorithm that is plotted in Figure 2.5 which is pre-
sented in Section 2.4. Figure 2.3 shows the cost-regret function Cr(n, pk∗) =
C(n) + α · r∗(n, pk∗) under Example 1 for C(n) = n10000 , α = 1, and when
the parameter pk∗ is known. As shown, the cost-regret function is minimized
at N∗ = 168. Note that the parameter pk∗ is unknown, which raises ques-
tions on how confident one can be on finding an estimate of N∗ based on an
estimate of pk∗ which is discussed in more detail below.
After ne number of joint explorations of arms, denote the estimates of
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Figure 2.3: Cost-regret trade-off is addressed by minimizing a linear
combination of cost and regret.
p1 = P(R1 ≥ R2) and p2 = P(R2 ≥ R1) by pˆ1(ne) and pˆ2(ne) that are derived
from Equation (2.4). The parameter ne should not be confused with sample
iteration that is denoted by n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . }. After the ne observations
of the joint arm rewards, the regret function r∗(n, pk∗) can be estimated as
r∗(n, pˆ∗(ne)), where pˆ∗(ne) = max (pˆ1(ne), pˆ2(ne)), and the optimal number
of experiments, N∗, can be estimated by a confidence level as
Nˆ∗(ne) = arg min
n
C(n) + α · r∗(n, pˆ∗(ne)). (2.15)
As a complementary method, we suggest to use the confidence interval
of pˆ∗(ne) in order to present an interval, I(ne), that includes the optimal
stopping point, N∗, with a confidence level. It is proved later that the interval
I(ne) shrinks towards N∗ as ne increases. For a confidence level 1 − 2e−a
2
2 ,
the estimate of pk∗ , pˆ
∗(ne), has the property that
P
(
pk∗ ∈
(
max
{
pˆ∗(ne)− a
2
√
ne
, 0.5
}
,min
{
pˆ∗(ne) +
a
2
√
ne
, 1
}))
≥1− 2e−a
2
2 .
(2.16)
Denote the lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval as pˆ∗l (ne) =
max
{
pˆ∗(ne)− a2√ne , 0.5
}
and pˆ∗u(ne) = min
{
pˆ∗(ne) + a2√ne , 1
}
, respectively.
Let Crl(n, ne) , Cr(n, pˆ∗u(ne)) and Cru(n, ne) , Cr(n, pˆ∗l (ne)). It is shown
later that Cr(n, p) is decreasing with respect to 0.5 ≤ p ≤ 1, and that is
why Crl(n, ne) is associated with pˆ
∗
u(ne) and Cru(n, ne) with pˆ
∗
l (ne) so that
Crl(n, ne) ≤ Cru(n, ne) for any n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }. Let the minimizer of
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Algorithm 3 The c-OTE-MAB Algorithm
Input a >
√
2 ln(2) and ne ≥ 1 experiments for the joint arm rewards as
rk,nk for k ∈ {1, 2} and 1 ≤ nk ≤ ne.
Parameter and function estimations:
Calculate pˆ1(ne) =
∑ne
n=1 1{r1,n≥r2,n}
N
pˆ∗(ne) = max{pˆ1(ne), 1− pˆ1(ne)}
pˆ∗l (ne) = max
{
pˆ∗(ne)− a2√ne , 0.5
}
pˆ∗u(ne) = min
{
pˆ∗(ne) + a2√ne , 1
}
Crl(n, ne) , Cr(n, pˆ∗u(ne))
Cru(n, ne) , Cr(n, pˆ∗l (ne))
N∗u = arg min
n
Cru(n, ne)
Exploration stopping iteration Nˆ∗(ne) and stopping interval I(ne):
Nˆ∗(ne) = arg min
n
C(n) + α · r∗(n, pˆ∗(ne))
I(ne) = {n : Crl(n, ne) ≤ Cru(N∗u , ne)}
the upper-bound function be N∗u = arg min
n
Cru(n, ne), then the following
interval is proposed that includes the optimal stopping point and shrinks
towards it as ne increases with the aforementioned confidence level:
I(ne) = {n : Crl(n, ne) ≤ Cru(N∗u , ne)} . (2.17)
Note that arg min{Cru(n, ne)} can have multiple solutions, so N∗u is not nec-
essarily a unique number. Hence, throughout this chapter, we set a conven-
tion as Cru(N
∗
u , ne) = Cru(n, ne) for any n ∈ N∗u . The cost-based algorithm,
called the c-OTE-MAB algorithm, discussed in this section is summarized in
Algorithm 3. The pictorial expression of this algorithm is depicted in Figure
2.4 for a non-monotonic cost function. In this figure, the minimum of each
plot is shown by a cross sign. In the following, we present a theorem on
Nˆ∗(ne) and I(ne) given by Algorithm 3.
Theorem 3. Possessing ne number of joint experiments for the two arms and
assuming that pk∗ ∈ [0.5 + p, 1] when p ∈ (0, 0.5] is an unknown parameter,
we have
Cr
(
Nˆ∗(ne), pk∗
)
− Cr (N∗, pk∗)
≤ Dp
2
√
ne
+∆Cr(Nˆ∗(ne), ne)
ne→∞−−−−→ 0
(2.18)
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Figure 2.4: The pictorial expression of the stopping interval I(ne) in
Algorithm 3.
and
max
n∈I(ne)
(
Cr(n, pk∗)− Cr(N∗, pk∗)
)
≤ Dp√
ne
(2.19)
with confidence level 1− 2e−a22 , where Nˆ∗(ne), N∗, and I(ne) are defined in
Equations (2.15), (2.13), and (2.17), respectively, Dp is a constant as Dp =
a·α·2(4δp+1−
1
2 ln 2)√
2δp ln 2
, where δp =
1
2
(−2− log2(0.5 + p)− log2(0.5− p)) > 0, and
∆Cr(n, ne) =
a·α·√n+2·2−δp·(n−2)√
ne
≤ Dp
2
√
ne
for any n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }.
Refer to Appendix A.3 for the proof of Theorem 3.
Using the proof results of Theorem 3, the following corollaries are followed.
Corollary 3.
lim
ne→∞
E
[
Nˆ∗(ne)
]
= N∗. (2.20)
Refer to Appendix A.4 for the proof of Corollary 3. We note that in
practice E
[
Nˆ∗(ne)
]
converges to N∗ relatively fast when the exploration
cost is relatively small as is shown by simulation in Section 2.4.
Corollary 4. The set of optimal stopping points N∗ defined in Equation
(2.13) is a subset of the set I(ne) defined in Equation (2.17) with the asso-
ciated confidence level, i.e. N∗ ⊆ I(ne) with confidence level 1 − 2e−a
2
2 .
Furthermore, I(ne) = N∗ with the mentioned confidence level for ne >
D2p(
Cr(N∗,pk∗ )− min
n/∈N∗
Cr(n,pk∗ )
)2 .
For the proof of Corollary 4 refer to Appendix A.5.
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of regret for OTE-MAB against the state-of-the-art
algorithms for Example 1.
2.4 Simulation Results
In this section, numerical simulations validating the theoretical results pre-
sented in this chapter are reported. The proposed OTE-MAB algorithm is
compared with the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) [184], Mean-Variance
based ExpExp [17], and CVaRα based MaRaB [22] algorithms. Consider two
arms with the reward distributions given in Example 1. The regret defined
in Equation (2.6) versus the number of pure explorations for each arm, N ,
is averaged over 100,000 runs. The result is plotted in Figure 2.5 and as it is
shown, OTE-MAB outperforms the state-of-the-art algorithms for the pur-
pose of risk-aversion in terms of the regret defined in this chapter. Note that
the UCB algorithm aims at selecting an arm that maximizes the expected
received reward, but in Example 1, the arm with higher expected reward is
less probable to have the highest reward for one-time exploitation, which is
why the UCB algorithm performs poorly in this example. However, in the
following example where the arm that rewards more on expectation is also
more probable to reward more, the UCB, ExpExp, and MaRaB algorithms
perform as well as the OTE-MAB algorithm.
Example 2. Consider two arms with the following unknown independent
reward distributions:
f1(u) = αe
−0.5(u−2)2 · 1{0 ≤ u ≤ 10}
f2(u) = βe
−0.5(u−1)2 · 1{0 ≤ u ≤ 10},
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of regret for OTE-MAB against the state-of-the-art
algorithms for Example 2.
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of probability of selecting the arm with higher
reward for OTE-MAB against the state-of-the-art algorithms for Example
1.
where α and β are constants so that the two probability distribution functions
integrate to one.
Note that in example 2, E[R1] > E[R2] and P(R1 ≥ R2) > 0.5. For
this scenario, the regret defined in Equation (2.6) versus the number of pure
explorations for each arm, N , averaged over 100,000 runs is plotted in Figure
2.6.
In another experiment, the multi-armed bandit is simulated for Example
1, where the probability that the selected arm has the higher reward is cal-
culated over 500,000 runs for different algorithms. The result is shown in
Figure 2.7. This result confirms the motivation of our study on risk-averse
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Figure 2.8: Regret of the ExpExp algorithm versus the hyper-parameter ρ
for two examples.
finite-time exploitations in multi-armed bandits.
In the above comparison of OTE-MAB with state-of-the-art algorithms,
three different choices of hyper-parameters for the ExpExp and MaRaB al-
gorithms are tested and the best performance is presented. However, note
that the performances of these algorithms depend on the choice of hyper-
parameter. In Figure 2.8, the sensitivity of the performance of the ExpExp
algorithm with respect to the choice of hyper-parameter ρ is depicted for
Example 1 and a third example where the variance of the best arm is larger
than the variance of the arm with lower expected reward. The two plots are
the averaged regret over 100,000 runs versus the value of ρ for the ExpExp
algorithm for two different multi-armed bandit problems when N = 100. As
depicted in Figure 2.8, a choice of ρ can be good for one multi-armed bandit
problem, but not good for another one. Due to our observations, the sen-
sitivity of the MaRaB algorithm to its hyper-parameter can even be more
complex. Figure 2.9 depicts the averaged regret over 100,000 runs versus the
value of MaRaB hyper-parameter, α, when N = 100. This figure is plotted
for Example 1 and a fourth example where reward of the first arm has a
truncated normal distribution with mean three and variance two over the
interval [0, 10] and the second arm is the same as the one in Example 1.
In another experiment, the minimum number of explorations needed to
guarantee a bound on regret is compared for two cases of one-time and two-
time exploitations. Theorems 1 and 2 suggest that for given K, r, and ∆p
∗ =
∆p∗M , the upper bound of minimum number of explorations needed for M -
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Figure 2.10: The minimum number of explorations needed to guarantee a
bound on regret for two cases of one-time and two-time exploitations.
time exploitations to guarantee that the regret is bounded by r is M times
that of one-time exploitation. We design two examples of two-armed bandits
such that ∆p∗ = ∆p∗2 = 0.28 and plot the minimum number of explorations
to guarantee bounded regret by r in Figure 2.10. The dashed line is the
plot of the OTE-MAB algorithm multiplied by two which is close to the one
related to the FTE-MAB algorithm for two-armed bandits. This observation
provides support to our theoretical results.
Theorem 3 states that the expected of Nˆ∗(ne) converges to N∗ as the num-
ber of explorations goes to infinity. In practice, it is observed that E
[
Nˆ∗(ne)
]
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[
Nˆ∗(ne)
]
versus ne for pk∗ = 0.54 and α = 1, where
N∗ = 587.
converges relatively fast. The distribution of pˆ∗(ne) for an odd ne is
P
(
pˆ∗(ne) = 1− j
ne
)
=
(
ne
ne − j
)
· pne−jk∗ · (1− pk∗)j +
(
ne
j
)
· pjk∗ · (1− pk∗)ne−j,
(2.21)
for 0 ≤ j ≤ ne−1
2
, and the distribution of pˆ∗(ne) for an even ne is
P
(
pˆ∗(ne) = 1− j
ne
)
=
(
ne
ne − j
)
· pne−jk∗ · (1− pk∗)j +
(
ne
j
)
· pjk∗ · (1− pk∗)ne−j,
(2.22)
for 0 ≤ j < ne
2
− 1 and P (pˆ∗(ne) = 12) = (nene
2
) · pne2k∗ · (1 − pk∗)ne2 . Equations
(2.15), (2.21), and (2.22) are used to plot Figure 2.11 that shows E
[
Nˆ∗(ne)
]
versus ne for pk∗ = 0.54 and α = 1. Note that the optimal stopping point
when pk∗ = 0.54 and α = 1 is N
∗ = 587 and E
[
Nˆ∗(ne)
]
is approaching this
value as depicted in the figure.
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Chapter 3
RISK-AVERSE EQUILIBRIUM FOR
STOCHASTIC GAMES
Since the seminal work of von Neumann and Morgenstern [28], the term ra-
tional has become synonymous with expected utility maximization. Whether
in game theoretic situations or simply decision-making under uncertainty, the
only agent who can be considered rational is the one who attempts to max-
imize their mean utility, no matter how many trials will likely be necessary
for the realized value to resemble the expected value. However, consider an
agent faced with multiple options, one of which is an opportunity with max-
imum expected utility, but it will bankrupt them with high probability if it
fails. In the event of failure, consider that the lack of funds will severely limit
any future options the agent may have. For such an agent the fact that the
opportunity has maximum expected value among the options cannot be the
only relevant factor in deciding whether to pursue the opportunity. If the
opportunity does not lead to success, the agent will not be able to pursue
any later actions, as they will not have the funds necessary to do so. As a
result, players should not solely rely on factors such as expected utility and
must instead also consider the probability of success for the opportunity.
This observation applies to almost all stochastic decision-making situa-
tions, including competitive situations best modeled through game theory.
To see this, consider a market composed of only a few large firms and a
smaller firm considering how to compete with large firms or whether to even
enter the market. We take as our example the smartphone industry, in which
large companies such as Apple, Samsung, Google, LG, Motorola, Amazon,
and Microsoft have all competed in recent years. While Apple and Samsung
are market leaders at the time of writing, both have undergone expensive
setbacks. Apple’s iPhone 5 was widely criticized due to issues with the Ap-
ple Maps application and Samsung had to recall its Galaxy Note 7 due to its
batteries catching fire, costing an estimated 3 billion USD [185], in what may
have been an attempt to improve on the criticized battery life of their Galaxy
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S6. Similarly, Google’s original Nexus line of phones dropped in popularity
to the point where the company went to the expense of creating a new line
of Pixel phones rather than continuing the Nexus. Amazon and Microsoft
were forced out of the market entirely, with Amazon’s Fire Phone lasting just
over a year (July 2014 - August 2015) between release and the cessation of
production, causing a loss of at least 170 million USD for Amazon’s 2014 Q3
alone [186]. Microsoft meanwhile acquired Nokia for 7.2 billion USD in an
attempt to become more competitive in the market [187], but ceased mobile
device production entirely only a few years later.
Despite the cost of the setbacks mentioned above, each of these companies
is still valuable with Apple and Microsoft having market caps of over 1 trillion
USD at the time of writing and Amazon recently passing that milestone as
well. Samsung is worth approximately 300 billion USD at the time of writing,
and while they are smaller LG and Motorola are quite valuable as well, worth
approximately 14.5 billion and 30 billion USD, respectively. Because of their
size, each of these companies was able to take risks to compete with each
other which, although expected to end in a positive outcome, resulted in
expensive losses. Indeed, Microsoft currently appears to be preparing for
another attempt to enter the smartphone market with the Surface Duo. In
other words, these companies are still able to compete with each other by
making products which maximize their expected values because they are large
enough that they can afford to wait for the law of large numbers to take
effect. This allows their competition to be modeled through a traditional
game theoretic framework.
In contrast, consider a company with a smaller valuation, say 500 million
USD, deciding whether to compete in the smartphone market. If such a
company attempted to do so, it would have to commit most if not all of its
resources to the attempt. Even if such a strategy has a large positive expected
value, it has a large risk of bankrupting the company, as seen with the scale
of the losses incurred by Samsung, Amazon, and Microsoft. More generally,
firms in markets where the cost of competition is a significant portion of
the value of the firm itself must consider more than just maximizing their
expected value. A misstep in such a setting means that the firm is out of
the market and unable to compete further. This highlights an important
facet of competition with random or unknown variables; i.e., it is not just
the expected value of a strategy that is important, it is how many times you
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get to compete.
In this chapter, we build a new framework to apply this observation to
game theoretic situations. We use a risk-averse best-response approach for
incomplete information games drawn from known distributions in which play-
ers engage once or for a given finite number of times. Because of the finite
number of times that players engage in these games, given the strategies of
all other players, expected utility may not be a suitable metric for a player
to attempt to maximize. Instead, we formulate a new definition of a risk-
averse best response, where given the strategies of all other agents, an agent
chooses to play the strategy that is most likely to have the highest utility
in a single realization of the stochastic game. We show that the risk-averse
equilibrium based on the mentioned probability statement can be found by
realizing the Nash equilibrium of a new game whose payoffs are derived from
the probability distributions of the payoffs of the original game. While the
mathematical particulars of this definition will be discussed in Section 3.2,
conceptually it can best be understood through the lens of prospect theory.
In its most basic form, prospect theory states that consumers prefer choices
with lower volatility, even when this results in lower expected utility. An
excellent example of this is retirement planning where there are many highly
volatile assets which in expectation provide a large return on investment, but
which also have a high chance of dropping in value due to their volatility.
Most individuals try to avoid investing too much in these assets, receiving
a lower average return in order to avoid the chance of a significant loss.
Similarly, a risk-averse best response as we have loosely defined it so far
would possibly limit the expected return of assets in order to maximize the
probability of making the most profit.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The problem statement
of stochastic games is provided in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 provides the for-
mal mathematical definition of the proposed risk-averse equilibrium, with
several subsequent sections detailing topics such as equilibrium properties
(Section 3.3), computation (Section 3.4), and worked-out examples (Section
3.5). Section 3.6 considers finite-time commit games and how the risk-averse
equilibria shift as the number of times the games are played increases. Sec-
tion 3.7 compares the classical Nash equilibrium and the proposed risk-averse
equilibrium through simulation. The concluding remarks as well as future
directions in which to advance this research are provided in Chapter 6.
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3.1 Problem Statement of Stochastic Games
Consider a game that consists of a finite set ofN players, [N ] := {1, 2, . . . , N},
where player i ∈ [N ] has a set of possible pure strategies (or actions, used
interchangeably) denoted by Si. A pure strategy profile, which is one pure
strategy for each player in the game, is denoted by s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN), where
si ∈ Si is the pure strategy of player i ∈ [N ]. Hence, S = S1×S2×· · ·×SN is
the set of pure strategy profiles. A pure strategy choice for all players except
player i is denoted by s−i, i.e. s = (si, s−i). The payoff of player i for a pure
strategy profile s ∈ S is denoted by Ui(s) (or Ui(si, s−i)), which is a random
variable with probability density function (pdf) fi(x|s) and mean ui(s). The
payoffs Ui(s) for i ∈ [N ] and s ∈ S are considered to be continuous-type
random variables that are independent from each other.
Remark 5. The same analysis holds for discrete-type random variables if
the analysis is treated with a bit more subtlety as discussed in the end of this
section.
For any set Si, let Σi be the set of all probability distributions over Si. The
Cartesian product of all players’ mixed strategy sets, Σ = Σ1×Σ2×· · ·×ΣN ,
is the set of mixed strategy profiles. Denote a specific mixed strategy of player
i by σi ∈ Σi, where σi(si) is the probability that player i plays strategy si.
If the [N ] \ i players choose to play a mixed strategy σ−i, the payoff for
player i if he/she plays si ∈ Si is denoted by U i(si,σ−i). Using the law of
total probability, the marginal distribution of U i(si,σ−i) has the probability
distribution function
f¯i(x|(si,σ−i)) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
(
fi(x|(si, s−i)) · σ(s−i)
)
, (3.1)
where σ(s−i) =
∏
j∈[N ]\i σj(sj) and sj is the corresponding strategy of player
j in s−i. Note that for si 6= s′i ∈ Si, the random variables U i(si,σ−i) and
U i(s
′
i,σ−i) are not independent of each other in a single play of the game.
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3.2 Risk-Averse Equilibrium
In a stochastic game where the payoffs are random variables, playing the Nash
equilibrium considering the expected payoffs may create a risky situation;
e.g., see [176] and [188] and the references therein for examples on multi-
armed bandits. The reason is that payoffs with larger expectations may
have a larger variance as well. As a result, it may be the case that playing
strategies with lower expectations is more probable to have a larger payoff.
This concept is mostly helpful when players play the game once, so they do
not have the chance to repeat the game and gain a larger cumulative payoff
by playing the strategy with the largest expected payoff. As a result, we
propose the risk-averse equilibrium in a probabilistic sense rather than in an
expectation sense as the Nash equilibrium. From an individual player’s point
of view, the best response to a mixed strategy of the rest of players is defined
as follows, which is based on the notion of Risk-Averse Best Action Decision
with Incomplete Information (R-ABADI).
Definition 2. The set of mixed strategy risk-averse best responses of player
i to the mixed strategy profile σ−i is the set of all probability distributions
over the set
arg max
si∈Si
P
(
U i (si,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
, (3.2)
where what we mean by U i (si,σ−i) being greater than or equal to U i
(
Si \
si,σ−i
)
when Si \ si 6= ∅ is that U i (si,σ−i) is greater than or equal to
U i (s
′
i,σ−i) for all s
′
i ∈ Si \ si; otherwise, if Si \ si = ∅, player i only has
a single option that can be played. The same randomness on the action of
players [N ] \ i is considered in U i(si,σ−i) for all si ∈ Si, and independent
randomness on actions is discussed in Appendix B.2. We denote the risk-
averse best response set of player i’s strategies, given the other players’ mixed
strategies σ−i, by RB(σ−i), which is in general a set-valued function.
Given the definition of the risk-averse best response, the risk-averse R-
ABADI equilibrium (RAE) is defined as follows. Note that the risk-averse
best-response/equilibrium and R-ABADI best-response/equilibrium are used
interchangeably throughout this chapter.
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Definition 3. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, . . . , σ
∗
N) is a risk-averse R-
ABADI equilibrium (RAE), if and only if σ∗i ∈ RB(σ∗−i) for all i ∈ [N ].
The following theorem proves the existence of a mixed strategy risk-averse
equilibrium for a game with finite number of players and finite number of
strategies per player.
Theorem 4. For any finite N-player game, a risk-averse equilibrium exists.
The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Appendix B.1.
3.2.1 Pure Strategy Risk-Averse Equilibrium
The pure strategy risk-averse best response is defined in the following as a
specific case of the risk-averse best response defined in Definition 2.
Definition 4. Pure strategy ŝi of player i is a risk-averse best response (RB)
to the pure strategy s−i of the other players if{
ŝi ∈ arg maxsi∈Si P
(
Ui (si, s−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si, s−i)
)
, if Si \ si 6= ∅,
ŝi = si, if Si \ si = ∅,
(3.3)
where what we mean by Ui (si, s−i) being greater than or equal to U i
(
Si \
si, s−i
)
is that Ui (si, s−i) is greater than or equal to Ui (s′i, s−i) for all s
′
i ∈
Si \ si. We denote the risk-averse best response set of player i, given the
other players’ pure strategies s−i, by RB(s−i) (overloading notation, RB(.)
is used for both pure and mixed strategy risk-averse best response).
Given the definition of the pure strategy risk-averse best response, the pure
strategy risk-averse equilibrium (RAE), which does not necessarily exist, is
defined below.
Definition 5. A pure strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, . . . , s
∗
N) is a pure strategy
risk-averse equilibrium (RAE), if and only if s∗i ∈ RB(s∗−i) for all i ∈ [N ].
41
3.3 Strict Dominance and Iterated Elimination of
Strictly Dominated Strategies
Probably the most basic solution concept for a game is the dominant strategy
equilibrium. In the following definition, the strict dominance is described.
Definition 6. A pure strategy si ∈ Si of player i strictly dominates a second
pure strategy s′i ∈ Si of the player if
P
(
Ui (si, s−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si, s−i)
)
>P
(
Ui (s
′
i, s−i) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i, s−i)
)
,∀s−i ∈ S−i.
(3.4)
A strictly dominated strategy cannot be the risk-averse best response to
any mixed strategy profile of other players due to the following reason. Con-
sider that s′i ∈ Si is strictly dominated by si ∈ Si for player i as is stated in
Definition 6. Then, for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i, we have
P
(
U i(si,σ−i) ≥ U i(Si \ si,σ−i)
)
(a)
=
∑
s−i∈S−i
(
P
(
Ui(si, s−i) ≥ U i(Si \ si, s−i)
)
· σ(s−i)
)
(b)
>
∑
s−i∈S−i
(
P
(
Ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ U i(Si \ s′i, s−i)
)
· σ(s−i)
)
= P
(
U i(s
′
i,σ−i) ≥ U i(Si \ s′i,σ−i)
)
,
(3.5)
where (a) is followed by using the law of total probability by partitioning
on the strategies of players [N ] \ i, σ(s−i) =
∏
j∈[N ]\i σj(sj) and sj is the
corresponding strategy of player j in s−i, and (b) is true by the assumption
that the pure strategy s′i is strictly dominated by the pure strategy si and
using Equation (3.4) in Definition 6 on strict dominance. By Equation (3.5)
and Equation (3.2) in Definition 2 on the best response to a mixed strategy
profile of other players, a strictly dominated pure strategy can never be a
best response to any mixed strategy profile of other players. As a result, a
strictly dominated pure strategy can be removed from the set of strategies
of a player and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies can be
applied to a game under the risk-averse framework.
42
3.4 Finding the Risk-Averse Equilibrium
The mixed strategy risk-averse equilibrium of a game can be found by choos-
ing players’ mixed strategy profiles in such a way that a player cannot strate-
gize against other players. In other words, under a mixed strategy risk-averse
equilibrium, all players are indifferent to their mixed strategies, so they use
a mixed strategy to make other players indifferent as well. If all players are
indifferent to their mixed risk-averse strategies, then no player has an in-
centive to change strategies, so we end up with a mixed strategy risk-averse
equilibrium. Formally speaking, a risk-averse mixed strategy is characterized
by σi(si) for all i ∈ [N ] and for all si ∈ Si, so there are
∑
i∈[N ] |Si| parameters
that should be found. Letting the mixed strategy profile for players [N ] \ i
be σ−i ∈ Σ−i, then in order for player i to be indifferent to his/her set of
strategies among a subset S ′i ⊆ Si, we need to have
P
(
U i (s
′
i,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i,σ−i)
)
≥P
(
U i (si,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
, ∀si ∈ Si, s′i ∈ S ′i.
The above equations reveal |Si| − 1 independent equations for each player i,
so in total
∑
i∈[N ] |Si|−N equations are derived. The remaining N equations
are provided by the fact that the mixed strategy of each player adds to one
for their set of strategies. As a result, if there is a mixed strategy risk-
averse equilibrium for which only a subset S′ = {S ′1, S ′2, ..., S ′N} of the pure
strategies, denoted as the support of the equilibrium, are played with non-
zero probability, this equilibrium is a solution of the following set of equations
for σ ∈ Σ:
P
(
U i (s
′
i,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i,σ−i)
)
≥ P
(
U i (si,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
, ∀si ∈ Si, s′i ∈ S ′i,∀i ∈ [N ],
∑
si∈Si σi(si) = 1,∀i ∈ [N ],
σi(si) = 0,∀si /∈ S ′i,∀i ∈ [N ].
(3.6)
Any solution to Equation set (3.6) is a risk-averse equilibrium, so we can
check if an equilibrium exists for any support S′ ⊆ Σ.
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Note that as is stated in Equation (3.5), we have the following by using
the law of total probability:
P
(
U i (si,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
=
∑
s−i∈S−i
(
σ(s−i) · P
(
Ui(si, s−i) ≥ U i(Si \ si, s−i)
))
,
(3.7)
where σ(s−i) =
∏
j∈[N ]\i σj(sj) and sj is the corresponding strategy of player
j in s−i. Hence, Equation (3.7) is polynomial of order N − 1 in terms of
σ(si) for si ∈ Si and i ∈ [N ]. We can define a risk-averse probability tensor
of dimension |S1| × |S2| × · · · × |SN |, where the i-th dimension has all pure
strategies si ∈ Si and each element of the tensor is an N dimensional vec-
tor defined in the following. The i-th element of the N dimensional vector
corresponding to the pure strategy profile (si, s−i) is defined as
pi(si, s−i) = P
(
Ui (si, s−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si, s−i)
)
. (3.8)
As a result, an equivalent approach for finding the risk-averse equilibrium
is to find the Nash equilibrium of the risk-averse probability tensor, as any
such Nash equilibrium must maximize the probability of playing a utility-
maximizing response to σ−i for each player i. In the following two sub-
sections, two illustrative examples are provided to make the concept of the
risk-averse equilibrium clear.
3.5 Illustrative Examples
In the following two subsections, two illustrative examples are provided to
shed light on the definition of the pure and mixed strategy risk-averse equi-
libria.
3.5.1 Illustrative Example 3
The following example is presented to shed light on the notion of pure strat-
egy risk-averse equilibrium.
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Example 3. Consider a game between two players where each player has
two pure strategies, S1 = {U,D} and S2 = {L,R}, with independent payoff
distributions specified as
(i) U1(U,L) and U2(U,L) are independent and have the same pdf as
f4(u) = α
(
3e−20(u−2)
2 ·1{3
2
≤ u ≤ 5
2
}+ 2e−20(u−7)2 ·1{13
2
≤ u ≤ 15
2
}
)
,
(ii) U1(U,R) and U2(U,R) are independent and have the same pdf as
f3(u) = βe
−20(u−3)2 · 1{5
2
≤ u ≤ 7
2
},
(iii) U1(D,L) and U2(D,L) are independent and have the same pdf as
f̂3(u) = γ
(
3e−20(u−1)
2 ·1{1
2
≤ u ≤ 3
2
}+ 2e−20(u−6)2 ·1{11
2
≤ u ≤ 13
2
}
)
,
(iv) U1(D,R) and U2(D,R) are independent and have the same pdf as
f5(u) = δ
(
7e−20(u−2)
2 ·1{3
2
≤ u ≤ 5
2
}+3e−20(u−12)2 ·1{23
2
≤ u ≤ 25
2
}
)
,
where α, β, γ, and δ are constants for which each of the corresponding distri-
butions integrate to one and 1{.} is the indicator function.
The above example is depicted in Figure 3.1. Considering the expected
payoffs in Example 3 as
E [U1(U,L)] = E [U2(U,L)] = 4,
E [U1(U,R)] = E [U2(U,R)] = E [U1(D,L)] = E [U2(D,L)] = 3,
E [U1(D,R)] = E [U2(D,R)] = 5,
the pure Nash equilibria of the game are (U,L) and (D,R), and the mixed
Nash equilibrium is that the first player selects U with probability two-thirds
and selects D otherwise and the second player selects L with probability two-
thirds and selects R otherwise. On the other hand, it follows by using the
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Figure 3.1: The payoff matrix of Example 3. The pure and mixed strategy
Nash equilibria are shown on the top-right and the pure strategy risk-averse
equilibrium is shown on the bottom-right.
payoff density functions that
P
(
U1(U,L) ≥ U1(D,L)
)
= 0.76,
P
(
U1(U,R) ≥ U1(D,R)
)
= 0.7,
P
(
U2(U,L) ≥ U2(U,R)
)
= 0.4,
P
(
U2(D,L) ≥ U2(D,R)
)
= 0.28,
which are used to form the risk-averse probability bi-matrix of the game de-
rived based on Equation (3.8). The risk-averse probability matrix is depicted
in Figure 3.1. According to Definition 5, (U,R) is a pure strategy risk-averse
equilibrium that is different from the Nash equilibria of the game. Taking
a close look at the payoff distributions, (U,R) is less risky than (U,L) and
(D,R) in a single round of the game.
3.5.2 Illustrative Example 4
In this subsection, the mixed strategy risk-averse equilibrium of a two-player
game proposed in the following example is computed.
Example 4. Consider a game between two players where each player has
two pure strategies, S1 = {U,D} and S2 = {L,R}, with independent payoff
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Figure 3.2: The payoff matrix of Example 4. The pure strategy Nash
equilibrium is shown on the top-right and the pure and mixed strategy
risk-averse equilibria are shown on the bottom-right.
distributions specified as
(i) U1(U,L) and U2(U,L) are independent and have the same pdf as
f4(u) = α
(
3e−20(u−2)
2 ·1{3
2
≤ u ≤ 5
2
}+ 2e−20(u−7)2 ·1{13
2
≤ u ≤ 15
2
}
)
,
(ii) U1(U,R), U2(U,R), U1(D,L), and U2(D,L) are independent and have
the same pdf as
f3(u) = βe
−20(u−3)2 · 1{5
2
≤ u ≤ 7
2
},
(iii) U1(D,R) and U2(D,R) are independent and have the same pdf as
f1(u) = γe
−20(u−1)2 · 1{1
2
≤ u ≤ 3
2
},
where α, β, and γ are constants for which each of the corresponding distribu-
tions integrate to one.
The above example is depicted in Figure 3.2. Considering the expected
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payoffs in Example 4 as
E [U1(U,L)] = E [U2(U,L)] = 4,
E [U1(U,R)] = E [U2(U,R)] = E [U1(D,L)] = E [U2(D,L)] = 3,
E [U1(D,R)] = E [U2(D,R)] = 1,
the pure Nash equilibrium of the game is (U,L) as depicted in Figure 3.2
with no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, it follows by
using the payoff density functions that
P
(
U1(U,L) ≥ U1(D,L)
)
= 0.4,
P
(
U1(U,R) ≥ U1(D,R)
)
= 1,
P
(
U2(U,L) ≥ U2(U,R)
)
= 0.4,
P
(
U2(D,L) ≥ U2(D,R)
)
= 1,
which are used to form the risk-averse probability bi-matrix of the game de-
rived based on Equation (3.8). The risk-averse probability matrix is depicted
in Figure 3.2. According to Definition 5, (U,R) and (D,L) are the pure strat-
egy risk-averse equilibria. In order to find the mixed strategy risk-averse equi-
librium, consider that the first player selects U with probability σU and selects
D otherwise. Given the first player’s mixed strategy (σU , 1−σU), with a little
misuse of notation, denote the random variables denoting the second player’s
payoffs by selecting L or R with L and R, respectively. The second player is
indifferent between selecting L and R if P (L ≥ R) = P (R ≥ L). Since pay-
offs are continuous random variables, P (R ≥ L) = 1−P (L ≥ R); as a result,
the second player is indifferent between the strategies if P (L ≥ R) = 0.5. By
using the law of total probability and independence of payoff distributions,
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P (L ≥ R) can be computed as
P (L ≥ R) = σU · P
(
U2(U,L) ≥ U2(U,R)
∣∣∣Player 1 plays U)
+ (1− σU) · P
(
U2(D,L) ≥ U2(D,R)
∣∣∣Player 1 plays D)
= σU ·
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
v
f4(u) · f3(v) dudv
+ (1− σU) ·
∫ ∞
∞
∫ ∞
v
f3(u) · f1(v) dudv
=
2
5
σU + (1− σU) = 1− 3
5
σU .
(3.9)
Letting P (L ≥ R) = 0.5, then σU = 56 , which determines the mixed strat-
egy risk-averse equilibrium. As a result, due to symmetry,
(
σ1(U), σ1(D)
)
=
(5
6
, 1
6
) and
(
σ2(L), σ2(R)
)
= (5
6
, 1
6
) form the mixed strategy risk-averse equi-
librium of the game in Example 4.
It is easy to verify that the game proposed in Example 3 does not have
any mixed strategy risk-averse equilibria. The game in Example 3 has both
pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria, but it only has pure strategy risk-
averse equilibrium. On the other hand, the game in Example 4 only has
pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but it has both pure and mixed risk-averse
equilibria. As can be seen, the distributions of payoffs can have a significant
impact on the behavior of players if they take risk into account when taking
their decisions.
Remark 6. As mentioned earlier in this section, the analysis for risk-averse
equilibrium holds for discrete-time random variables as well. For example,
consider random variables X, Y , and Z with distributions
P (X = 1) = 0.8, P (X = 2) = 0.2,
P (Y = 1) = 1,
P (Z = 1) = 0.5, P (Z = 2) = 0.5.
Denote the observations of the three random variables by triple (X, Y, Z) and
let {X ≥ (Y, Z)} be the event that X is greater than or equal to both Y and
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Z. Then
P
(
X ≥ (Y, Z)) = P({(1, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 2)}) = 0.4 + 0.1 + 0.1 = 0.6,
P
(
Y ≥ (X,Z)) = P((1, 1, 1)) = 0.4,
P
(
Z ≥ (X, Y )) = P({(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (2, 1, 2)}) = 0.4 + 0.4 + 0.1 = 0.9.
As can be seen, P
(
X ≥ (Y, Z))+P(Y ≥ (X,Z))+P(Z ≥ (X, Y )) = 1.9 > 1.
In order to resolve this issue, we can break ties uniformly at random as
P
(
X ≥ (Y, Z)) = 1
3
× 0.4 + 0.1 + 1
2
× 0.1 = 17
60
,
P
(
Y ≥ (X,Z)) = 1
3
× 0.4 = 2
15
,
P
(
Z ≥ (X, Y )) = 1
3
× 0.4 + 0.4 + 1
2
× 0.1 = 35
60
,
which results in P
(
X ≥ (Y, Z))+ P(Y ≥ (X,Z))+ P(Z ≥ (X, Y )) = 1.
3.6 Finite-Time Commit Games
The risk-averse framework discussed in Section 3.2 provides risk-averse play-
ers with pure or mixed strategies such that given the other players’ strategies,
risk-averse equilibrium maximizes the probability that a player is rewarded
the most in a single round of the game rather than maximizing the expected
received reward. On the other hand, for infinite rounds of playing the game,
given the other players’ strategies, selecting the strategy that maximizes the
expected reward guarantees maximum cumulative reward. However, the re-
wards may not be satisfying for a risk-averse player in each and every round
of playing the game. As a result, risk-averse players may even choose to play
the risk-averse equilibrium in infinite (or finite) rounds of games to have more
or less balanced rewards in all rounds of the game rather than have maxi-
mum cumulative reward in the end. Despite this fact, we present a slightly
different approach for finite-time games that aims to maximize not the ex-
pected cumulative reward but rather the probability of receiving the highest
cumulative reward. Note that the proposed equilibrium for finite-time com-
mit games in this section may be different from the Nash equilibrium or the
equilibrium presented in Section 3.2.
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Consider that the N players plan to play a game for M independent times
where all players have to commit to the pure strategy they play in the first
round for the whole game. The strategy in the first round of the game does
not have to be pure and can be mixed, but a player has to commit to the
randomly sampled pure strategy according to the mixed strategy forM times.
Let UMi (si, s−i) = U
M
i (s) = X
1+X2+· · ·+XM , where Xj for 1 ≤ j ≤M are
independent and identically distributed random variables and X1 ∼ fi(x|s).
If players choose to play s ∈ S for the whole game with M rounds, the
random variable UMi (s) denotes the cumulative payoff for player i ∈ [N ] in
the end of the M plays and UMi (s) ∼ fMi (x|s) = fi(x|s)~ · · ·~ fi(x|s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
M times
.
If the [N ]\ i players choose to play a mixed strategy σ−i in the first round
of the game and commit to it for M − 1 other rounds of the game, using the
law of total probability, the distribution of the cumulative payoff for player
i in the end of the game when he/she plays si, denoted by U
M
i (si,σ−i), has
the probability distribution function
f¯Mi (x|(si,σ−i)) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
(
fMi (x|(si, s−i)) · σ(s−i)
)
, (3.10)
where σ(s−i) =
∏
j∈[N ]\i σj(sj) and sj is the corresponding strategy of player
j in s−i. Note that for si, s′i ∈ Si, the random variables UMi (si,σ−i) and
U
M
i (s
′
i,σ−i) are not independent from each other in a single play of the
game. The risk-averse equilibrium for an M -time commit game can be de-
rived similarly to the derivations in Section 3.2 and is described below. From
an individual player’s point of view, the best response to a mixed strategy
of the rest of the players for an M -time commit game is defined as follows.
Definition 7. The set of mixed strategy risk-averse best responses of player
i to the mixed strategy profile σ−i for an M-time commit game is the set of
all probability distributions over the set
arg max
si∈Si
P
(
U
M
i (si,σ−i) ≥ U
M
i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
, (3.11)
where what we mean by U
M
i (si,σ−i) being greater than or equal to U
M
i
(
Si \
si,σ−i
)
is that U
M
i (si,σ−i) is greater than or equal to U
M
i (s
′
i,σ−i) for all
s′i ∈ Si \si; otherwise, if Si \si = ∅, player i has only a single option to play.
51
We denote the risk-averse best response set of player i’s mixed strategies for
an M-time commit game, given the other players’ mixed strategies σ−i, by
RBM(σ−i), which is a set-valued function.
Given the definition of the risk-averse best response for M -time commit
games, the risk-averse equilibrium (RAE) for M -time commit games is de-
fined as follows.
Definition 8. A strategy profile σ∗M = (σ∗M1 , σ
∗M
2 , . . . , σ
∗M
N ) is a risk-
averse equilibrium (RAE) for an M-time commit game, if and only if σ∗Mi ∈
RBM(σ∗M−i ) for all i ∈ [N ].
The following corollary is resulted directly from Theorem 4.
Corollary 5. For any finite N-player finite-time commit game, a risk-averse
equilibrium exists.
The pure strategy risk-averse best response for an M -time commit game
is defined in the following as a specific case of the risk-averse best response
defined in Definition 7.
Definition 9. Pure strategy ŝi of player i is a risk-averse best response (RB)
to the pure strategy s−i of the other players for an M-time commit game if{
ŝi ∈ arg maxsi∈Si P
(
UMi (si, s−i) ≥ UMi (Si \ si, s−i)
)
, if Si \ si 6= ∅,
ŝi = si, if Si \ si = ∅,
(3.12)
where what we mean by UMi (si, s−i) being greater than or equal to U
M
i
(
Si \
si, s−i
)
is that UMi (si, s−i) is greater than or equal to U
M
i (s
′
i, s−i) for all
s′i ∈ Si \ si. We denote the risk-averse best response set of player i for
an M-time commit game, given the other players’ pure strategies s−i, by
RBM(s−i) (overloading notation, BRM(.) is used for both mixed and pure
strategy risk-averse best response for M-time commit games).
Given the definition of the pure strategy risk-averse best response for anM -
time commit game, the pure strategy risk-averse equilibrium (RAE), which
does not necessarily exist, is defined below.
Definition 10. A pure strategy profile s∗M = (s∗M1 , s
∗M
2 , . . . , s
∗M
N ) is a pure
strategy risk-averse equilibrium (RAE) for an M-time commit game, if and
only if s∗Mi ∈ RBM(s∗M−i ) for all i ∈ [N ].
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3.7 Numerical Results
In this section, the classical Nash equilibrium is compared with the proposed
risk-averse equilibrium. To this end, the likelihood of receiving the higher
reward in a two-player game is evaluated under the two types of equilibria
for the following example.
Example 5. Consider a game between two players where each player has
two pure strategies, S1 = {U,D} and S2 = {L,R}, with independent payoff
distributions specified as
(i) U1(U,L) and U2(U,L) are independent and have the same pdf as
f1,1(u) =α
(
3e−20(u−1)
2 · 1{1
2
≤ u ≤ 3
2
}
+ 2e−20(u−a)
2 · 1{a− 1
2
≤ u ≤ a+ 1
2
}
)
,
(ii) U1(U,R), U2(U,R), U1(D,L), and U2(D,L) are independent and have
the same pdf as
f1,2(u) = βe
−20(u−3)2 · 1{5
2
≤ u ≤ 7
2
},
(iii) U1(D,R) and U2(D,R) are independent and have the same pdf as
f2,2(u) =γ
(
7e−20(u−2)
2 · 1{3
2
≤ u ≤ 5
2
}
+ 3e−20(u−a−2)
2 · 1{a+ 3
2
≤ u ≤ a+ 5
2
}
)
,
where α, β, and γ are constants for which each of the corresponding distribu-
tions integrate to one, a ≥ 0 is a constant, and 1{.} is the indicator function.
The Nash equilibrium in the above example depends on the value of the
constant a. If 0 ≤ a < 3.333, there are two pure Nash equilibria (U,R) and
(D,L) for the game in addition to a mixed Nash equilibrium. If 3.333 ≤
a ≤ 6, the pure strategy (D,R) is the only Nash equilibrium of the game. If
a > 6, pure strategies (U,L) and (D,R) are the two pure Nash equilibria of
the game in addition to a mixed Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, no
matter what the value of the constant a is, the game has a mixed risk-averse
equilibrium as well as two pure risk-averse equilibria, which are (U,R) and
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Figure 3.3: The mixed strategy Nash and risk-averse equilibria are
determined by the value of σ1(U) in Example 5. The mixed strategies
depend on the value of the constant a, where σ1(U) is plotted above as a
function of the constant a.
(D,L). The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the mixed strategy risk-
averse equilibrium depend on the value of the constant a. Note that the game
is symmetric from the perspective of the two players, so the mixed strategy
Nash and risk-averse equilibria are characterized by σ1(U) that is plotted in
Figure 3.3.
A game according to Example 5 is simulated for 106 rounds for a fixed
constant a. In each realization of the game, both Nash and risk-averse equi-
libria are played and their corresponding payoffs are compared for one of
the players to see which one is larger. The mixed strategies under Nash and
risk-averse equilibria are compared against each other and the pure strategies
under Nash and risk-averse equilibria, if different, are compared as well. Af-
ter the 106 games, the proportion of the games in which playing according to
the risk-averse equilibrium outperforms playing according to the Nash equi-
librium by having a larger payoff is computed and plotted in Figure 3.4 as a
function of the constant a. In the plot in Figure 3.4, the curves comparing
the Nash and risk-averse mixed strategies are dotted lines, the curve com-
paring the Nash equilibrium (D,R) and the risk-averse pure strategy (U,R)
(or (D,L)) is a solid line for a > 3.333, and the curve comparing the Nash
equilibrium (U,L) and risk-averse pure strategy (U,R) (or (D,L)) is a dash-
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Figure 3.4: The likelihood of the payoff of the risk-averse equilibrium being
greater than the payoff of the Nash equilibrium.
dotted line for a > 6. Note that the payoff distributions are the same for
pure risk-averse equilibria (PRAE) (U,R) and (D,L), and that is why pure
Nash equilibria (D,R) (PNE1) and (U,L) (PNE2) are compared with only
one of the PRAEs. For the interval 0 ≤ a < 3.333 the pure equilibria for both
risk-averse and Nash are the same under both approaches so neither of the
pure equilibria comparison curves are shown. Figure 3.4 demonstrates that
agents who play in a risk-averse manner are more likely to receive a higher
payoff than under the Nash equilibrium in any single play of the game.
55
Chapter 4
RISK-AVERSE EQUILIBRIUM FOR
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES IN
STOCHASTIC CONGESTION GAMES
The intelligent transportation systems are growing faster than ever with the
speedy emergence of autonomous vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, Ama-
zon delivery robots, Uber/Lyft self-driving cars, and such. One of the prin-
cipal components of such systems is the navigation system whose goal is to
provide travelers with fast and reliable paths from their sources to destina-
tions. In a fleet of vehicles, an equilibrium is achieved when no travelers
have any incentives in a certain sense to change routes unilaterally. In the
classical Wardrop equilibrium [82, 189], travelers have incentives to change
routes if they have an alternative route that has lower expected travel time.
In other words, the optimality metric is based on minimizing the expected
travel time in the Wardrop equilibrium. In the context of transportation
though, collisions, weather conditions, road work, traffic signals, and varying
traffic conditions can cause deviations in travel times [88]. As a result, the
path with the minimum expected travel time may not be reliable due to its
high variability. Similarly, in the context of telecommunication networks,
noise, signal degradation, interference, re-transmission, and malfunctioning
equipment can cause variability in transmission time from source to destina-
tion [88]. The empirical works by Abdel-Aty et al. [190], Kazimi et al. [191],
Lam [192], Lam and Small [193], and Small [194] also support the fact that
taking travel time uncertainty into account is indeed an essential criterion in
navigation systems.
As mentioned above, minimizing the expected travel time is inadequate in
scenarios involving risk due to variability of travel times. In order to address
this issue, we study a richer class of congestion games called stochastic con-
gestion games in an atomic setting, where the travel times along different
arcs of the network are random variables that are not necessarily indepen-
dent of each other and atomic games are those with finite numbers of players.
In this framework, we introduce probability statements regarding the Risk-
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Averse Best Action Decision with Incomplete Information (R-ABADI) of a
traveler given the choice of the rest of travelers in the network. We pro-
pose three classes of risk-averse equilibria for stochastic congestion games:
risk-averse R-ABADI equilibrium (RAE), mean-variance equilibrium (MVE),
and conditional value at risk level α equilibrium (CVaRαE), whose notions of
risk-averse best responses are based on maximizing the probability of travel-
ing along the shortest path (also known as Risk-Averse Best Action Decision
with Incomplete Information (R-ABADI)), minimizing a linear combination
of mean and variance of path delay, and minimizing the expected delay at
a specified risky quantile of the delay distributions, respectively. We prove
that the R-ABADI, mean-variance, and CVaRα equilibria exist for any finite
stochastic atomic congestion game. Note that two equilibria similar to the
mean-variance and CVaR equilibria exist in the literature and are discussed
in the related work section, but the probability distributions of travel times
are load independent or link delays are considered to be independent in the
literature, which is not the case in this work. It is noteworthy that most
studies on stochastic congestion games make use of simplifying assumptions
such as considering the arc delay distributions to be independent of their
loads or adding independent and identically distributed errors to nominal
delays of arcs neglecting their differences. In the Braess paradox [195], [196],
which is known to be a counterintuitive example rather than a paradox,
the risk-neutral/selfish travelers select the shortest path in expected travel
time, which maximizes the social delay/cost incurred by the whole society.
Although the focus of this chapter is not on deriving bounds on price of an-
archy, we study the Braess paradox in a stochastic setting under the three
proposed risk-averse equilibria and show that the risk-averse behavior of trav-
elers results in improving the social delay/cost incurred by the society; and as
a result, the price of anarchy is improved if travelers are risk-averse. As the
result, the Braess paradox may not occur to the extent presented originally
if travelers are risk-averse. Furthermore, we study the Pigou network [197]
in a stochastic setting and observe that the price of anarchy is also improved
if travelers are risk-averse in the senses discussed above. Note that the Pigou
networks are prevalent in traffic/telecommunication networks. Hence, pro-
viding travelers with risk-averse navigation can decrease the social delay/cost
in the real world applications.
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following way. The stochastic
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congestion game is formally defined in Section 4.1. The three proposed classes
of equilibria, i.e. risk-averse R-ABADI, mean-variance, and CVaRα equilib-
ria, are presented in Section 4.2 and their existences in any finite stochastic
congestion game are proven; detailed proofs can be found in Appendix C.
Numerical results including the study of the Pigou and Braess networks as
well as notes for practitioners are provided in Section 4.3. Conclusions and
discussion of opportunities for future work are provided in Chapter 6.
4.1 Problem Statement of Stochastic Congestion
Games
Consider a directed graph (network) G = (N , E) with a node set N = [N ] :=
{1, 2, . . . , N} and directed link (edge) set E with cardinality |E|, where the
pair (i, j) ∈ E indicates a directed link from node i ∈ N to node j ∈ N
in the directed graph. Denote the set of source-destination (SD) pairs with
K ⊆ N × N , where for the SD pair k = (sk, dk) ∈ K, sk 6= dk, the set
of simple directed paths from sk to dk in G is denoted by Pk, and let nk
be the number of players (travelers, vehicles, or data packages) associated
with source-destination k. Let P := ∪k∈KPk be the set of all paths. A
feasible assignment m := {mp : p ∈ P} allocates a non-negative number of
players to every path p ∈ P such that ∑p∈Pk mp = nk for all k ∈ K. As
a result, the number of players along link e ∈ E denoted by me is given by
me =
∑
{p∈P:e∈p}m
p.
The latency (delay or travel time) along link e is load-dependent which
is denoted by the non-negative continuous random variable Le(me) with
marginal probability density function (pdf) fe(x|me) and mean le(me). Note
that the number of players along an edge is determined by an assignment
m, so Le(m), fe(x|m), and le(m) can be used instead of Le(me), fe(x|me),
and le(me), respectively. Furthermore, the latency along links of the graph
can be dependent, in which case, the joint pdf of latency over all links is de-
noted by fe1,e2,...,e|E|(x1, x2, . . . , x|E||m1,m2, . . . ,m|E|), which can be denoted
as fE(x1, x2, . . . , x|E||m). Given the link latency defined above, the nominal
latency of player i along path pi ∈ P under a given assignment m is simply
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Li(m) :=
∑
e∈pi Le(m) with pdf
f i(x|m)
= ∂
(∫ ∫
· · ·
∫
{∑e∈pi xe≤x}
fE(x1, x2, . . . , x|E||m) dx1dx2 . . . dx|E|
)/
∂x
and mean li(m) =
∑
e∈pi le(m).
The stochastic congestion game consists of n :=
∑
k∈K nk players (trav-
elers), where player i ∈ [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} is associated with the corre-
sponding source-destination pair k(i) ∈ K. As a result, Pk(i) is the set of
possible pure strategies (actions) for player i. The pure strategy profile of
all n players is denoted by p := (p1, p2, . . . , pn), where pi ∈ Pk(i), that fully
specifies all actions in the game. The set of all pure strategy profiles is the
Cartesian product of pure strategy sets of all players which is denoted by
P := Pk(1) × Pk(2) · · · × Pk(n). Let p−i := (p1, p2, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pn) be
the pure strategies of all players except player i, so p = (pi,p−i). Given the
pure strategy profile p, the number of players on a path p ∈ P is given by
mp =
∑n
i=1 1{pi = p}, and the number of players on a link e ∈ E is given by
me =
∑
{p∈P:e∈p}
∑n
i=1 1{pi = p}. Let m(p) show the number of players on
all paths which is fully determined by the pure strategy p. As a result, given
the pure strategy profile p = (pi,p−i), the latency of player i by choosing
the path pi is the random variable L
i(m(p)) =
∑
e∈pi Le(m(p)) with pdf
f i(x|m(p)) and mean li(m(p)) = ∑e∈pi le(m(p)). For simplicity, instead of
using Li(m(p)), f i(x|m(p)), and li(m(p)), we use Li(p), f i(x|p), and li(p),
respectively.
The mixed strategy of player i is denoted by σi ∈ Σi, where Σi is the
set of all probability distributions over the set of pure strategies Pk(i), and
σi(p) is the probability that player i selects path p. The mixed strategy
profile of all n players is denoted by σ := (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn), where σi ∈ Σi.
The set of all mixed strategy profiles is the Cartesian product of mixed
strategy sets of all players which is denoted by Σ := Σ1 × Σ2 · · · × Σn. Let
σ−i := (σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σn) be the mixed strategies of all players
except player i, so σ = (σi,σ−i). The latency of player i by selecting path
pi when the other [n] \ i players select paths according to a mixed strategy
σ−i is denoted by the random variable L
i
(pi,σ−i) that has the following pdf
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using the law of total probability:
f¯ i(x|(pi,σ−i)) =
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
f i(x|(pi,p−i)) · σ(p−i)
)
, (4.1)
where σ(p−i) =
∏
j∈[n]\i σj(pj) and pj is the corresponding strategy of player
j in p−i, and the mean of the random variable is given as
l
i
(pi,σ−i) := E[L
i
(pi,σ−i)] =
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
li(pi,p−i) · σ(p−i)
)
. (4.2)
The expected average delay (latency) incurred by the n players in the
stochastic congestion game under the pure strategy profile p, also known
as the social cost or social delay in this context, is denoted by D(p) :=
1
n
∑n
i=1 l
i(p). The social delay under the mixed strategy σ is D(σ) :=
1
n
∑
p∈P
∑n
i=1 σ(p) · li(p), where σ(p) =
∏
i∈[n] σi(pi) and pi is the corre-
sponding strategy of player i in p. The (pure) optimal load assignment
denoted by o minimizes social delay among all possible (pure) load assign-
ments which might be in contrast with the selfish behavior of players. The
(pure) price of anarchy (PoA) of a congestion game is the maximum ratio
D(p)/D(o) over all equilibria p of the game. Throughout the chapter, we
follow the convention that y ≤ x means that y is less than or equal to all
elements of the vector x.
4.2 Risk-Averse Equilibrium for Stochastic Congestion
Games
In the following subsection, illustrative examples are provided with analysis
of their equilibria in classic and risk-averse frameworks which motivate the
novel risk-averse best-response approach for incomplete information conges-
tion games presented in this chapter.
4.2.1 Illustrative Examples
The Pigou network [198] is one of the simplest networks studied in conges-
tion games. We first use the Pigou network to clearly state the motivation
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of the current work in the first example. We then study the more contro-
versial network used by Braess [195] in the famous Braess’s paradox in the
second example. The two examples below set grounding for the risk-averse
equilibrium for congestion games proposed in this chapter.
Example 6. Consider the Pigou network with two parallel links between
source and destination as shown in Figure 4.1. There are n players (vehicles
or data packages) to travel from source to destination. The top and bottom
links are labeled as 1 and 2 with loads m1 and m2 = n−m1, respectively. The
travel times on links 1 and 2 are respectively independent random variables
L1(m1) and L2(m2) with expected values l1(m1) =
m1
n
and l2(m2) = 1 and
pdfs
f1(x|m1) = α
(
2 exp
(
− 100
(
x− m1
4n
)2)
· 1
{
0 ≤ x ≤ m1
2n
}
+ 3 exp
(
− 100
(
x− 3m1
2n
)2)
· 1
{
5m1
4n
≤ x ≤ 7m1
4n
})
,
f2(x|m2) = β exp
(−100 (x− 1)2) · 1{3
4
≤ x ≤ 5
4
}
,
where α and β are constants for which each of the two distributions integrate
to one and 1{.} is the indicator function.
The well-known Wardrop equilibrium [82,189], also Nash equilibrium [28],
for the Pigou network in Example 6 is that all the n players travel along the
top link since it is the weakly dominant strategy for any player as the expected
latency incurred along the top link is always less than or equal to the expected
latency incurred along the bottom link, l1(m1) =
m1
n
≤ 1 = l2(m2). As a
result, the Wardrop equilibrium for Pigou network is p∗W = (1, 1, . . . , 1) with
social delay DW (p
∗
W ) = 1. However, although the expected latency along the
top link is less than or equal to that of the bottom link, l1(m1) ≤ l2(m2), the
variance of travel time along the top link at full capacity is larger than that
along the bottom link, which increases the risk and uncertainty of traveling
along the top link. In fact, the bottom link with higher expected travel time
is more likely to have a lower delay than the top link at full capacity; i.e.,
P
(
L2(0) ≤ L1(n)
)
= 0.6 > 0.5. As a result, a risk-averse player selects the
bottom link for commute when the top link is at full capacity, especially if
it is a one-time trip, for which, as is shown later, the risk-averse behavior of
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Figure 4.1: The Pigou network in Example 6 with the load-dependent
latency pdfs and the corresponding means of links.
players decreases social delay for this example. As an example, consider a
traveler who wants to go from hotel to airport who has two options for this
trip: taking the highway that has lower expected travel time, but is more
likely to get congested due to traffic jams and crashes (top link in Pigou
network), or taking the urban streets with a higher expected travel time
and lower congestion (the bottom link in Pigou network). A risk-neutral
player travels along the top link with lower expected latency, but a risk-
averse player travels along the bottom link to assure not to incur a long
delay and miss the flight. Even in everyday commutes between home and
work, the expected delay over many days may not be a desirable objective
to minimize. No-one desires to arrive early to work some days but late on
others, and to be penalized accordingly. The Braess network, studied in the
next example, enforces the fact that minimizing the expected delay is not
desirable for risk-averse players.
Example 7. Consider the Braess network depicted in Figure 4.2. There are
n players (vehicles or data packages) to travel from source to destination.
Other than the source and destination, there are two nodes A and B in the
network. The directed links (S,A), (A,D), (S,B), (B,D), and (A,B) are
referred to as links 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 with loads m1, m2, m3, m4, and m5,
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Figure 4.2: The Braess network in Example 7 with the load-dependent
latency pdfs and the corresponding means of links.
respectively. The travel times on links 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are respectively
independent random variables L1(m1), L2(m2), L3(m3), L4(m4), and L5(m5)
with expected values l1(m1) =
m1
n
, l2(m2) = 1, l3(m3) = 1, l4(m4) =
m4
n
, and
l5(m5) = 0 and pdfs
f1(x|m1) = γ
(
exp
(
− 100
(
x− m1
2n
)2)
· 1
{
0 ≤ x ≤ m1
n
}
+ exp
(
− 100
(
x− 3m1
2n
)2)
· 1
{
m1
n
< x ≤ 2m1
n
})
,
f2(x|m2) = ζ exp
(−100 (x− 1)2) · 1{1
2
≤ x ≤ 3
2
}
,
f3(x|m3) = ζ exp
(−100 (x− 1)2) · 1{1
2
≤ x ≤ 3
2
}
,
f4(x|m4) = γ
(
exp
(
− 100
(
x− m4
2n
)2)
· 1
{
0 ≤ x ≤ m4
n
}
+ exp
(
− 100
(
x− 3m4
2n
)2)
· 1
{
m4
n
< x ≤ 2m4
n
})
,
where γ and ζ are constants for which the distributions integrate to one, 1{.}
is the indicator function, and P
(
L5(m5) = 0
)
= 1. There are three paths from
source to destination, (S,A,D), (S,A,B,D), and (S,B,D), that are referred
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to as paths 1, 2, and 3 with loads m1,m2, and m3, respectively, where the
difference between links and paths should be clear from the context. Note that
the link loads are related to path loads as m1 = m
1 +m2, m2 = m
1, m3 = m
3,
m4 = m
2 +m3, and m5 = m
2, and the delays along paths are related to link
delays as L1(m) = L1(m1)+L2(m2), L
2(m) = L1(m1)+L5(m5)+L4(m4) =
L1(m1) + L4(m4), and L
3(m) = L3(m3) + L4(m4).
The Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium for the Braess network in Example 7 is
that all the n players travel along path 2 since it is the weakly dominant path
for any player as the expected latency incurred along path 2 is always less
than or equal to the expected latency incurred along the other two paths 1
and 3,
l2(m) = l1(m1) + l5(m5) + l4(m4)
=
m1
n
+
m4
n
≤ m1n + 1 = l1(m1) + l2(m2) = l1(m),≤ 1 + m4
n
= l3(m3) + l4(m4) = l
3(m).
As a result, the Wardrop equilibrium for Braess network is p∗W = (2, 2, . . . , 2)
with social delay DW (p
∗
W ) = 2. However, although path 2 has latency less
than or equal to that of paths 1 and 3, l2(m) ≤ (l1(m), l3(m)), the variance
of travel time along path 2 at full capacity is larger than that along paths
1 and 3, which increases the risk and uncertainty of traveling along path 2.
In fact, path 1 (or 3) with higher expected travel time is more likely to have
a lower delay than the rest of the paths; i.e., P
(
L1(0) ≤ (L2(n), L3(0))) =
3
8
> 1
4
= P
(
L2(n) ≤ (L1(0), L3(0))). As a result, a risk-averse player selects
paths 1 or 3 for commute when path 2 is at full capacity, and as is shown later,
the risk-averse behavior of players decreases social delay for this example.
4.2.2 R-ABADI Equilibrium
In the classical Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium, the best response of player
i ∈ [n] to the mixed strategy σ−i of the other [n] \ i players is defined as the
set
arg min
pi∈Pi
l
i
(pi,σ−i).
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In other words, the best response for player i given σ−i is defined as the path
that minimizes the expected travel time. However, motivated by Examples
6 and 7, the path with minimum expected latency may have a high volatility
as well that causes risky scenarios for travelers. As a result, the classical
Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium that ignores the distribution of path latency
except for taking the expected latency into account, that does not carry any
information about variance and the shape of the distribution, falls short in
addressing risk-averse behavior of players. In this chapter, motivated by
Examples 6 and 7, we propose a Risk-Averse Best Action Decision with
Incomplete Information (R-ABADI) of a player to the strategy of the other
players in a stochastic congestion game as follows. Note that the risk-averse
best-response/equilibrium and R-ABADI best-response/equilibrium are used
interchangeably throughout this chapter.
Definition 11. Given the mixed strategy profile σ−i of players [n]\ i, the set
of mixed strategy risk-averse R-ABADI best responses of player i is the set
of all probability distributions over the set
arg max
pi∈Pi
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
, (4.3)
where what we mean by L
i
(pi,σ−i) being less than or equal to L
i
(Pi \pi,σ−i)
when Pi \ pi 6= ∅ is that Li(pi,σ−i) is less than or equal to Li(p′i,σ−i) for
all p′i ∈ Pi \ pi; otherwise, if Pi \ pi = ∅, player i only has a single option
that can be played. The same randomness on the action of players [n] \ i
is considered in L
i
(pi,σ−i) for all pi ∈ Pi. Given the mixed strategy σ−i
of players [n] \ i, the risk-averse best response set of player i’s strategies is
denoted by RB(σ−i), which is in general a set-valued function.
The risk-averse equilibrium for stochastic congestion games is defined as
follows.
Definition 12. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, . . . , σ
∗
N) is a risk-averse
R-ABADI equilibrium if and only if σ∗i ∈ RB(σ∗−i) for all i ∈ [n].
The following theorem, which is a special case of Theorem 4, proves the
existence of a risk-averse equilibrium for any stochastic congestion game with
finite number of players and pure strategy sets Pi for all i ∈ [n] with finite
cardinality.
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Theorem 5. For any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, a risk-
averse equilibrium exists.
The proof of Theorem 5 is provided in Appendix C.1.
As a direct result of Definitions 11 and 12, the pure strategy risk-averse
best response and pure strategy risk-averse equilibrium are defined as follows.
The pure strategy risk-averse best response of player i to the pure strategy
p−i of players [n] \ i is the set{
arg maxpi∈Pi P
(
Li
(
pi,p−i
) ≤ Li (Pi \ pi,p−i) ), if Pi \ pi 6= ∅,
pi, if Pi \ pi = ∅.
(4.4)
Given the pure strategy p−i of players [n]\i, the risk-averse best response set
of player i in Equation (4.4) is denoted by RB(p−i) (overloading notation,
RB(.) is used for both pure and mixed strategy risk-averse best responses).
As a result, a pure strategy profile p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
n) is a pure strategy
risk-averse equilibrium if and only if p∗i ∈ RB(p∗−i) for all i ∈ [n].
Strict dominance in the classical Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium is defined as
follows. A pure strategy pi ∈ Pi of player i strictly dominates a second pure
strategy p′i ∈ Pi of the player if
li(pi,p−i) < l
i(p′i,p−i), ∀p−i ∈ P−i.
The solution concept of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
can also be applied to the risk-averse equilibrium using the following defini-
tion.
Definition 13. A pure strategy pi ∈ Pi of player i strictly dominates a
second pure strategy p′i ∈ Pi of the player in the risk-averse equilibrium if
P
(
Li
(
pi,p−i
) ≤ Li (Pi \ pi,p−i) )
>P
(
Li
(
p′i,p−i
) ≤ Li (Pi \ p′i,p−i) ), ∀p−i ∈ P−i. (4.5)
Consider path pi ∈ Pi strictly dominates path p′i ∈ Pi for player i; then,
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for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
(a)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
P
(
Li(pi,p−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ pi,p−i)
) · σ(p−i)
)
(b)
>
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
P
(
Li(p′i,p−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ p′i,p−i)
) · σ(p−i)
)
= P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i) ≤ L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σ−i)
)
,
(4.6)
where (a) is true by the law of total probability, σ(p−i) =
∏
j∈[n]\i σj(pj)
and pj is the corresponding strategy of player j in p−i, and (b) is followed
by Equation (4.5) in Definition 13. By Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.3) in
Definition 11, a strictly dominated pure strategy cannot be a best response
to any mixed strategy profile σ−i ∈ Σ−i, so it can be removed from the set
of strategies of player i.
In order to find the risk-averse equilibrium for a stochastic congestion
game, we use support enumeration. For example, hypothesize that P ′ :=
{P ′1,P ′2, . . . ,P ′n} is the support of a risk-averse equilibrium, where P ′i is the
set of pure strategies of player i that are played with non-zero probability
and σi(pi) for pi ∈ P ′i indicates the probability mass function on the support.
At equilibrium, player i ∈ [n] should be indifferent between strategies in the
set P ′i, has no incentive to deviate to the rest of strategies in the set Pi \ P ′i,
and the probability mass function over the support should add to one. As a
result, if there is a risk-averse equilibrium with the mentioned support, it is
the solution of the following set of equations for σ ∈ Σ:
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i) ≤ L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σ−i)
)
≥ P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
,∀pi ∈ Pi, p′i ∈ P ′i,∀i ∈ [n],
∑
pi∈P ′i σi(pi) = 1,∀i ∈ [n],
σi(pi) = 0,∀pi ∈ Pi \ P ′i, ∀i ∈ [n].
(4.7)
As mentioned earlier in Equation (4.6), using the law of total probability,
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we have
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
P
(
Li(pi,p−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ pi,p−i)
) · σ(p−i)
)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
ti(pi,p−i) · σ(p−i)
)
,
(4.8)
where ti(pi,p−i) := P
(
Li(pi,p−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ pi,p−i)
)
is the i-th element of
an n-dimensional vector called t(pi,p−i). Construct a risk-averse probability
tensor of rank n where Pi forms the i-th dimension of the tensor. Let the
element associated with (pi,p−i) in the tensor be the vector t(pi,p−i). Equa-
tions (4.7) and (4.8) along with the definition of the risk-averse probability
tensor provide us with an alternative approach for deriving the risk-averse
equilibrium, which is to find the Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium on the risk-
averse probability tensor.
The mean-variance (MV) and conditional value at risk level α (CVaRα)
methods are two well-known frameworks to consider risk in statistics. In
the next two subsections, two new risk-averse equilibria based on these two
concepts are proposed.
4.2.3 Mean-Variance Equilibrium
As seen in Examples 6 and 7, the high variance of paths with lower expected
travel time can result in uncertainty and impose high latency for travelers.
The mean-variance framework in statistics addresses this issue by keeping
a balance between low latency and low variance. Applying this method
to the proposed stochastic congestion game setting, the mean-variance best
response and mean-variance equilibrium are defined as follows.
Definition 14. Given the mixed strategy profile σ−i of players [n] \ i, the
set of mixed strategy mean-variance best responses of player i is the set of all
probability distributions over the set
arg min
pi∈Pi
Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i), (4.9)
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where the variance Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
can be calculated using the pdf of the
random variable L
i
(pi,σ−i) provided in Equation (4.1) and ρ ≥ 0 is a hyper-
parameter capturing the absolute risk tolerance. Given the mixed strategy σ−i
of players [n] \ i, the mean-variance best response set of player i’s strategies
is denoted by MB(σ−i), which is in general a set-valued function.
Definition 15. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, . . . , σ
∗
N) is a mean-variance
equilibrium if and only if σ∗i ∈MB(σ∗−i) for all i ∈ [n].
The existence of the mean-variance equilibrium is discussed in the following
theorem.
Theorem 6. For any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, a mean-
variance equilibrium exists.
The proof of Theorem 6 is provided in Appendix C.2.
The pure strategy mean-variance best response of player i to the pure
strategy p−i of players [n] \ i is the set
arg min
pi∈Pi
Var
(
Li(pi,p−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,p−i), (4.10)
where
Var
(
Li(pi,p−i)
)
= Var
(∑
e∈pi
Le(pi,p−i)
)
=
∑
e∈pi
∑
e′∈pi
Cov
(
Le(pi,p−i), Le′(pi,p−i)
)
.
Given the pure strategy p−i of players [n]\i, the mean-variance best response
set of player i in Equation (4.10) is denoted by MB(p−i) (overloading no-
tation, MB(.) is used for both pure and mixed strategy mean-variance best
responses). As a result, a pure strategy profile p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
n) is a
pure strategy mean-variance equilibrium if and only if p∗i ∈MB(p∗−i) for all
i ∈ [n]. The strict dominance concept is straightforward among pure strat-
egy profiles in mean-variance equilibrium that is defined as follows. A pure
strategy pi ∈ Pi of player i strictly dominates a second pure strategy p′i ∈ Pi
of the player in pure strategy mean-variance equilibrium if
Var
(
Li(pi,p−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,p−i)
< Var
(
Li(p′i,p−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,p−i), ∀p−i ∈ P−i.
(4.11)
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However, due to the fact that variance is not a linear operator, strict dom-
inance may not be derived from Equation (4.11) for mixed strategy mean-
variance equilibrium as described below.
Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i)
(a)
= E
[(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)2]
−
(
l
i
(pi,σ−i)
)2
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i)
(b)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · E
[(
Li(pi,p−i)
)2])
−
 ∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(pi,p−i)
)2 + ρ ∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(pi,p−i)
)
(c)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · E
[(
Li(pi,p−i)
)2])
−
∑
p−i∈P−i
 ∑
p′−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · σ(p′−i) · li(pi,p−i) · li(pi,p′−i)
)
+ ρ ·
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(pi,p−i)
)
(d)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
σ(p−i) ·
(
E
[(
Li(pi,p−i)
)2]− li(pi,p−i)×
∑
p′−i∈P−i
(
σ(p′−i) · li(pi,p′−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,p−i)
)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
σ(p−i) ·
(
E
[(
Li(pi,p−i)
)2]− li(pi,p−i)×( ∑
p′−i∈P−i
(
σ(p′−i) · li(pi,p′−i)
)
+ ρ
))
,
(4.12)
where (a) is true by the definition of variance, (b) is followed by Equation
(4.2), (c) is derived by expanding the second term, and (d) is true by com-
bining the summation over p−i ∈ P−i and factoring σ(p−i). As can be seen
in Equation (4.12), since variance is a non-linear operator, it is not clear
whether Equation (4.11) can result in Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i) <
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i) for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i. As a result, use of strict
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dominance in the mixed strategy mean-variance equilibrium is not advised.
In certain circumstances though, we can propose conditions for strict domi-
nance; e.g., when li(p) ≤ ρ
2
for all p ∈ P and for all i ∈ [n] which is discussed
in the following definition or when li(p) ≥ ρ
2
for all p ∈ P and for all i ∈ [n].
Definition 16. Suppose li(p) ≤ ρ
2
for all p ∈ P and for all i ∈ [n]. Then,
pure strategy pi ∈ Pi of player i strictly dominates a second pure strategy
p′i ∈ Pi of the player in the mean-variance equilibrium if
li
(
pi,p−i
)
< li
(
p′i,p−i
)
, ∀p−i ∈ P−i, (4.13)
and
E
[(
Li
(
pi,p−i
) )2]
< E
[(
Li
(
p′i,p−i
) )2]
, ∀p−i ∈ P−i. (4.14)
Consider that path pi ∈ Pi strictly dominates path p′i ∈ Pi for player i as
defined in Definition 16; then, using Equation (4.13), for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i,
l
i
(pi,σ−i) =
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(pi,p−i)
)
<
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(p′i,p−i)
)
= l
i
(p′i,σ−i).
(4.15)
Note that l
i
(pi,σ−i) ≤ ρ2 for all pi ∈ Pi, for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i, and for all i ∈ [n]
as a result of li(p) ≤ ρ
2
for all p ∈ P and for all i ∈ [n]. Hence, using the
fact that the function −f 2 + ρ · f is increasing for f ≤ ρ
2
, for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i
we have
−
(
l
i
(pi,σ−i)
)2
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i)
<−
(
l
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)2
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i).
(4.16)
On the other hand, using Equation (4.14), we have
E
[(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)2]
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · E
[(
Li(pi,p−i)
)2])
<
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · E
[(
Li(p′i,p−i)
)2])
= E
[(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)2]
.
(4.17)
Finally, Equations (4.16) and (4.17) conclude that Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ ·
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l
i
(pi,σ−i) < Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i) for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i.
In order to find the mean-variance equilibrium for a stochastic conges-
tion game, we use support enumeration. For example, hypothesize P ′ :=
{P ′1,P ′2, . . . ,P ′n} to be the support of a mean-variance equilibrium, where P ′i
is the set of pure strategies of player i that are played with non-zero prob-
ability and σi(pi) for pi ∈ P ′i indicates the probability mass function on the
support. At equilibrium, player i ∈ [n] should be indifferent between strate-
gies in the set P ′i, has no incentive to deviate to the rest of strategies in the
set Pi \P ′i, and the probability mass function over the support should add to
one. As a result, if there is a mean-variance equilibrium with the mentioned
support, it is the solution of the following set of equations for σ ∈ Σ:
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i)
≤ Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i),∀pi ∈ Pi, p′i ∈ P ′i,∀i ∈ [n],
∑
pi∈P ′i σi(pi) = 1,∀i ∈ [n],
σi(pi) = 0,∀pi ∈ Pi \ P ′i,∀i ∈ [n].
(4.18)
4.2.4 CVaRα Equilibrium
The conditional value at risk level α (CVaRα) is another framework in statis-
tics to measure risk and to address the risk-averse behavior. Applying this
method to the proposed stochastic congestion game setting, the CVaRα best
response and CVaRα equilibrium are defined below.
Definition 17. Given the mixed strategy profile σ−i of players [n]\ i, the set
of mixed strategy CVaRα best responses of player i is the set of all probability
distributions over the set
arg min
pi∈Pi
CV aRα
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
= arg min
pi∈Pi
E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)] , (4.19)
where viα(pi,σ−i) is a constant derived by solving the equality P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i) ≥
viα(pi,σ−i)
)
= α and the constant 0 < α ≤ 1 is a hyper-parameter depicting
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the risk level. Given the mixed strategy σ−i of players [n] \ i, the CVaRα
best response set of player i’s strategies is denoted by CB(σ−i), which is in
general a set-valued function.
Definition 18. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, . . . , σ
∗
N) is a CVaRα equilib-
rium if and only if σ∗i ∈ CB(σ∗−i) for all i ∈ [n].
The existence of the CVaRα equilibrium is discussed in the following the-
orem.
Theorem 7. For any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, a CVaRα
equilibrium exists.
The proof of Theorem 7 is provided in Appendix C.3.
The pure strategy CVaRα best response of player i to the pure strategy
p−i of players [n] \ i is the set
arg min
pi∈Pi
CV aRα
(
Li(pi,p−i)
)
= arg min
pi∈Pi
E
[
Li(pi,p−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,p−i) ≥ viα(pi,p−i)] , (4.20)
where viα(pi,p−i) is a constant derived by solving the equality P
(
Li(pi,p−i)
≥ viα(pi,p−i)
)
= α and the constant 0 < α ≤ 1 is the hyper-parameter de-
picting risk level. Given the pure strategy p−i of players [n] \ i, the CVaRα
best response set of player i in Equation (4.20) is denoted by CB(p−i) (over-
loading notation, CB(.) is used for both pure and mixed strategy CVaRα
best responses). As a result, a pure strategy profile p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
n) is a
pure strategy CVaRα equilibrium if and only if p
∗
i ∈ CB(p∗−i) for all i ∈ [n].
A pure strategy pi ∈ Pi of player i strictly dominates a second pure strategy
p′i ∈ Pi of the player in pure strategy CVaRα equilibrium if
E
[
Li(pi,p−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,p−i) ≥ viα(pi,p−i)]
< E
[
Li(p′i,p−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,p−i) ≥ viα(p′i,p−i)] , ∀p−i ∈ P−i, (4.21)
where viα(pi,p−i) and v
i
α(p
′
i,p−i) are constants derived by solving the equa-
tion P
(
Li(pi,p−i) ≥ viα(pi,p−i)
)
= α and P
(
Li(p′i,p−i) ≥ viα(p′i,p−i)
)
= α,
and the constant 0 < α ≤ 1 is the risk level hyper-parameter. However, sim-
ilar to the mean-variance equilibrium, strict dominance may not be derived
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from Equation (4.21) for mixed strategy CVaRα equilibrium as described
below. Using Equation (4.1) that provides the pdf function of the random
variable and P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
)
= α, the distribution of the ran-
dom variable
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)) is ∑
p−i∈P−i
(
f i(x|(pi,p−i)) · σ(p−i)
)/
α
 · 1{x ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)} . (4.22)
As a result,
E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)]
(a)
=
1
α
·
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
(
x · f i(x|(pi,p−i)) · 1
{
x ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
})
dx
)
(b)
=
1
α
·
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · P
(
Li(pi,p−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
)×
∫ ∞
viα(pi,σ−i)
(
x · f
i(x|(pi,p−i))
P
(
Li(pi,p−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
))dx)
=
1
α
·
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · P
(
Li(pi,p−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
)×
E
[
Li(pi,p−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,p−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)]
)
,
(4.23)
where (a) is true by using the pdf of the corresponding random variable in
Equation (4.22) and switching the order of summation and integral and (b)
is true by multiplying and dividing by the term P
(
Li(pi,p−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
)
.
As can be seen in Equation (4.23), it is not clear whether Equation (4.21)
can result in the equation of interest E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)]
< E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σ−i) ≥ viα(p′i,σ−i)] for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i. As a result, use
of strict dominance in the mixed strategy CVaRα equilibrium is not advised
due to its complication.
In order to find the CVaRα equilibrium for a stochastic congestion game, we
use support enumeration. For example, hypothesize P ′ := {P ′1,P ′2, . . . ,P ′n}
to be the support of a CVaRα equilibrium, where P ′i is the set of pure
strategies of player i that are played with non-zero probability and σi(pi)
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for pi ∈ P ′i indicates the probability mass function on the support. At equi-
librium, player i ∈ [n] should be indifferent between strategies in the set P ′i,
has no incentive to deviate to the rest of strategies in the set Pi \P ′i, and the
probability mass function over the support should add to one. As a result, if
there is a CVaRα equilibrium with the mentioned support, it is the solution
of the following set of equations for σ ∈ Σ:
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σ−i) ≥ viα(p′i,σ−i)]
≤ E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)] ,∀pi ∈ Pi, p′i ∈ P ′i,∀i ∈ [n],
∑
pi∈P ′i σi(pi) = 1, ∀i ∈ [n],
σi(pi) = 0, ∀pi ∈ Pi \ P ′i,∀i ∈ [n].
(4.24)
Remark 7. It is noteworthy that the polynomial terms in Equation (4.7) for
the risk-averse equilibrium are of degree n− 1 while the polynomial terms in
Equation (4.18) for the mean-variance equilibrium are of degree 2(n− 1) for
n number of players. On the other hand, it is more complicated to solve for
Equation (4.24) as the top α quantile of distributions should be calculated.
4.3 Numerical Results
The risk-averse, mean-variance, and CVaRα equilibria are numerically ana-
lyzed for Examples 6 and 7 in this section. The price of anarchy for each of
the mentioned equilibria is calculated as well. In the end, extra examples are
presented to shed light on the corner cases of each one of the equilibria and
to provide insight on how to tackle such circumstances.
In order to find any of the three types of pure equilibria for the Pigou
network in Example 6 with n players, hypothesize that m1 players choose
link 1 and m2 = n−m1 players choose link 2 and check whether any players
has any incentive in the corresponding sense of the equilibrium of the interest
to change route, given the pure strategy of the other players. If none of the
players has any incentive to change route given the pure strategy of the rest
of players, (m1, n −m1) is a pure equilibrium, where (m1,m2) denotes that
m1 players select link 1 and m2 players select link 2. By varying m1 from zero
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to n and taking the above procedure, the pure equilibrium is found if any
exists. Given a fixed number of players m1 that choose link 1, it is obvious
that they all have the same incentive to change to link 2 or stay in link 1,
and all of the m2 = n−m1 players have the same incentive to change to link
1 or stay in link 2. As a result, if a specific player out of the m1 players has
no incentive to switch to link 2 given the pure strategy of the other players,
and a specific player out of the m2 players has no incentive to switch to
link 1 given the pure strategy of the other players, (m1,m2 = n −m1) is a
pure equilibrium. In other words, (m1,m2 = n − m1) is a pure risk-averse
equilibrium if 
P
(
L1(m1) ≤ L2(m2 + 1)
) ≥ 0.5,
P
(
L2(m2) ≤ L1(m1 + 1)
) ≥ 0.5, (4.25)
where the first inequality is true since each player has two options, link 1
and link 2, so P
(
L1(m1) ≤ L2(m2 + 1)
) ≥ P(L2(m2 + 1) ≤ L1(m1)), and
since random variables are continuous we have P
(
L1(m1) ≤ L2(m2 + 1)
)
+
P
(
L2(m2 + 1) ≤ L1(m1)
)
= 1, which results in P
(
L1(m1) ≤ L2(m2 + 1)
) ≥
0.5. The second inequality is true due to a similar reasoning. By varying m1
from zero to n, if Equation (4.25) holds for (m1,m2 = n −m1), it is a pure
risk-averse equilibrium.
Similar to the above approach, (m1,m2 = n−m1) is a pure mean-variance
equilibrium if
Var
(
L1(m1)
)
+ ρ · l1(m1) ≤ Var
(
L2(m2 + 1)
)
+ ρ · l2(m2 + 1),
Var
(
L2(m2)
)
+ ρ · l2(m2) ≤ Var
(
L1(m1 + 1)
)
+ ρ · l1(m1 + 1).
(4.26)
Again, by varying m1 from zero to n, if Equation (4.26) holds for (m1,m2 =
n−m1), it is a pure mean-variance equilibrium. Similarly, (m1,m2 = n−m1)
is a pure CVaRα equilibrium if
E
[
L1(m1)
∣∣L1(m1) ≥ v1α(m1)] ≤ E[L2(m2 + 1)∣∣L2(m2 + 1) ≥ v2α(m2 + 1)],
E
[
L2(m2)
∣∣L2(m2) ≥ v2α(m2)] ≤ E[L1(m1 + 1)∣∣L1(m1 + 1) ≥ v1α(m1 + 1)],
(4.27)
where P
(
L1(m1) ≥ v1α(m1)
)
= P
(
L2(m2 + 1) ≥ v2α(m2 + 1)
)
= P
(
L2(m2) ≥
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Figure 4.3: The pure risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ = 1), CVaRα (α = 0.1),
and Nash equilibria of the Pigou network in Example 6 are denoted for
different numbers of players.
v2α(m2)
)
= P
(
L1(m1 + 1) ≥ v1α(m1 + 1)
)
= α. By varying m1 from zero
to n, if Equation (4.27) holds for (m1,m2 = n − m1), it is a pure CVaRα
equilibrium.
Note that the equilibrium in the Pigou network in Example 6 is char-
acterized by m1, since m2 can be derived given m1. The pure risk-averse,
mean-variance (ρ = 1), and CVaRα (α = 0.1) equilibria are found for the
mentioned Pigou network and the proportion of players who select link 1; i.e.,
m1
n
, is depicted in Figure 4.3 for different values of n. Under the Nash equi-
librium, no matter what the probability distributions of latency over links
look like, all players select link 1 as it has less or equal latency in expectation.
Hence, (n, 0) is the Nash equilibrium for all n, which corresponds to m1
n
= 1
as depicted in Figure 4.3.
The social delay/latency defined as the expected average delay/latency
incurred by the n players in the Pigou network in Example 6 under the pure
strategy (m1,m2) is D(m1) =
1
n
(
m1 · m1n + (n−m1)
)
=
(
m1
n
)2 − m1
n
+ 1,
which is minimized when m1 =
n
2
for an even n, and m1 = bn2 c and m1 = dn2 e
for an odd n. As a result, it is socially optimal that about half of the
players take the top link and the rest take the bottom link to travel from
source to destination in the Pigou network, which results in a social latency
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Figure 4.4: The prices of anarchy for the risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ = 1),
CVaRα (α = 0.1), and Nash equilibria of the Pigou network in Example 6
are plotted for different numbers of players.
close to 3
4
for n  1. If players are risk-neutral and seek to minimize their
expected latency given the strategy of the rest of players, which is how the
Nash equilibrium models games, the social latency in the mentioned Pigou
network equals to one for the Nash equilibrium (n, 0). In contrast, if players
are risk-averse in the different senses discussed in this chapter, the social
latency decreases compared to when players are risk-neutral; as a result, the
price of anarchy decreases as depicted in Figure 4.4. In this example, it is
to the benefit of the society if players are risk-averse, which is the case as
numerous studies in prospect theory discuss the fact that players in the real
world often behave in a risk-averse manner.
Considering the Pigou network in a non-atomic setting, which corresponds
to the case with infinite number of players, the socially optimal strategy is
(0.5, 0.5) with social latency of 3
4
, where (u1, u2) corresponds to u1 fraction
of players traveling along link 1 and u2 = 1− u1 fraction of players traveling
along link 2. We numerically calculate that the risk-averse equilibrium is
(0.7303, 0.2697) with PoA = 1.0707, the mean-variance equilibrium with
ρ = 1 is (0.7750, 0.2250) with PoA = 1.1008, the CVaRα equilibrium with
α = 0.1 is (0.6822, 0.3178) with PoA = 1.0442, and the Nash equilibrium is
(1, 0) with PoA = 4
3
.
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In the Braess network in Example 7, there are three paths from source
to destination, p1 = (1, 2), p2 = (1, 5, 4), p3 = (3, 4), where links SA, AD,
SB, BD, and AB are denoted with 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. In order to
find the three types of pure equilibria for the Braess network with n players,
hypothesize that m1 players select path p1, m
2 players select path p2, and
n − m1 − m2 players select path p3, then check whether any players has
any incentive in the corresponding sense of the equilibrium of the interest
to change route, given the pure strategy of the other players. If none of
the players has any incentive to change route given the pure strategy of the
rest of players, (m1,m2, n − m1 − m2) is a pure equilibrium. As a result,
(m1,m2, n−m1 −m2) is a pure risk-averse equilibrium if
P
(
L1 ≤ {L2, L3}) ≥ {P(L2 ≤ {L1, L3}), P(L3 ≤ {L1, L2})}, where
L1 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L2(m
1), L2 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L4(n−m1 + 1), and
L3 = L3(n−m1 −m2 + 1) + L4(n−m1 + 1),
P
(
L2 ≤ {L1, L3}) ≥ {P(L1 ≤ {L2, L3}), P(L3 ≤ {L1, L2})}, where
L1 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L2(m
1 + 1), L2 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L4(n−m1), and
L3 = L3(n−m1 −m2 + 1) + L4(n−m1),
P
(
L3 ≤ {L1, L2}) ≥ {P(L1 ≤ {L2, L3}), P(L2 ≤ {L1, L3})}, where
L1 =L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) + L2(m
1 + 1), L2 =L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) + L4(n−m1),
and L3 = L3(n−m1 −m2) + L4(n−m1).
(4.28)
By varying m1 from zero to n and m2 from 0 to n −m1, if Equation (4.28)
holds for (m1,m2,m3 = n−m1 −m2), it is a pure risk-averse equilibrium.
Similar to the above approach, (m1,m2, n − m1 − m2) is a pure mean-
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variance equilibrium if
Var(L1) + ρ · E(L1) ≤ {Var(L2) + ρ · E(L2),Var(L3) + ρ · E(L3)}, where
L1 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L2(m
1), L2 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L4(n−m1 + 1), and
L3 = L3(n−m1 −m2 + 1) + L4(n−m1 + 1),
Var(L2) + ρ · E(L2) ≤ {Var(L1) + ρ · E(L1),Var(L3) + ρ · E(L3)}, where
L1 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L2(m
1 + 1), L2 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L4(n−m1), and
L3 = L3(n−m1 −m2 + 1) + L4(n−m1),
Var(L3) + ρ · E(L3) ≤ {Var(L1) + ρ · E(L1),Var(L2) + ρ · E(L2)}, where
L1 = L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) +L2(m
1 + 1), L2 = L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) + L4(n−m1),
and L3 = L3(n−m1 −m2) + L4(n−m1).
(4.29)
By varying m1 from zero to n and m2 from 0 to n −m1, if Equation (4.29)
holds for (m1,m2,m3 = n−m1 −m2), it is a pure risk-averse equilibrium.
Similar to the above approach, (m1,m2, n − m1 − m2) is a pure CVaRα
equilibrium if
E
[
L1
∣∣L1 ≥ v1α] ≤ {E[L2∣∣L2 ≥ v2α],E[L3∣∣L3 ≥ v3α]}, where
L1 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L2(m
1), L2 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L4(n−m1 + 1),
L3 = L3(n−m1 −m2 + 1) + L4(n−m1 + 1), and
P
(
L1 ≥ v1α
)
= P
(
L2 ≥ v2α
)
= P
(
L3 ≥ v3α
)
= α
E
[
L2
∣∣L2 ≥ v2α] ≤ {E[L1∣∣L1 ≥ v1α],E[L3∣∣L3 ≥ v3α]}, where
L1 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L2(m
1 + 1), L2 = L1(m
1 +m2) + L4(n−m1),
L3 = L3(n−m1 −m2 + 1) + L4(n−m1), and
P
(
L1 ≥ v1α
)
= P
(
L2 ≥ v2α
)
= P
(
L3 ≥ v3α
)
= α
E
[
L3
∣∣L3 ≥ v3α] ≤ {E[L1∣∣L1 ≥ v1α],E[L2∣∣L2 ≥ v2α]}, where
L1 = L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) +L2(m
1 + 1), L2 = L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1),
L3 = L3(n−m1 −m2) + L4(n−m1), and
P
(
L1 ≥ v1α
)
= P
(
L2 ≥ v2α
)
= P
(
L3 ≥ v3α
)
= α.
(4.30)
By varying m1 from zero to n and m2 from 0 to n −m1, if Equation (4.30)
holds for (m1,m2,m3 = n−m1 −m2), it is a pure CVaRα equilibrium.
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Figure 4.5: The pure risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ = 1), CVaRα (α = 0.1),
and Nash equilibria of the Braess network in Example 7 are denoted for
different numbers of players.
Note that the equilibrium in the Braess network in Example 7 is char-
acterized by m1 and m2, since m3 can be derived given m1 and m2. The
pure risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ = 1), and CVaRα (α = 0.1) equilibria are
found for the mentioned Braess network and the proportions of players who
select paths 1 and 2, i.e., m
1
n
and m
2
n
, are depicted in Figure 4.5 for different
values of n. Under the Nash equilibrium, no matter what the probability
distributions of latency over links look like, all players select path 2 as it has
less or equal latency in expectation. Hence, (0, n, 0) is the Nash equilibrium
for all n, which corresponds to m
2
n
= 1 and m
1
n
= m
3
n
= 0 as depicted in
Figure 4.5.
The social delay/latency defined as the expected average delay/latency
incurred by the n players in the Braess network in Example 7 under the pure
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Figure 4.6: The prices of anarchy for the risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ = 1),
CVaRα (α = 0.1), and Nash equilibria of the Braess network in Example 7
are plotted for different numbers of players.
strategy (m1,m2,m3 = n−m1 −m2) is
D(m1,m2) =
1
n
·
(
(m1 +m2) · (m
1 +m2)
n
+m1 + (n−m1 −m2)
+ (n−m1) · (n−m
1)
n
)
=
1
n2
·
(
2
(
m1
)2
+
(
m2
)2
+ 2m1m2 − 2nm1 − nm2 + 2n2
)
,
which is minimized when
(
m1 = bn
2
c,m2 = 0,m3 = n−m1) or (m1 = dn
2
e,
m2 = 0,m3 = n − m1). As a result, it is socially optimal that about half
of players take path p1 and the rest take path p3 to travel from source to
destination in the Braess network, which results in a social latency close to
3
2
for n 1. If players are risk-neutral and seek to minimize their expected
latency given the strategy of the rest of the players, which is how the Nash
equilibrium models games, the social latency in the mentioned Braess net-
work equals two for the Nash equilibrium (0, n, 0). In contrast, if players are
risk-averse in the different senses discussed in this chapter, the social latency
decreases compared to when players are risk-neutral; as a result, the price of
anarchy decreases as depicted in Figure 4.6. In this example, it is again to
the benefit of the society if players are risk-averse.
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Considering the Braess network in a non-atomic setting, which corre-
sponds to the case with infinite number of players, the socially optimal
strategy is (0.5, 0, 0.5) with social latency of 3
2
, where (u1, u2, u3) corre-
sponds to u1 fraction of players travel along path p1, u
2 fraction of play-
ers travel along path p2, and u
3 = 1 − u1 − u2 fraction of players travel
along path p3. We numerically calculate that the risk-averse equilibrium is
(0.2655, 0.4690, 0.2655) with PoA = 1.0733, the mean-variance equilibrium
with ρ = 1 is (0.1716, 0.6568, 0.1716) with PoA = 1.1438, the CVaRα equi-
librium with α = 0.1 is (0.3045, 0.3910, 0.3045) with PoA = 1.0509, and the
Nash equilibrium is (0, 1, 0) with PoA = 4
3
.
Although it is more prevalent to use pure equilibrium for congestion games,
we analyze the mixed equilibrium of the Pigou network in Example 6 for two
players. The underlying stochastic congestion game with the probability
distributions of players’ delays, the pure and mixed Nash, risk-averse, mean-
variance, and CVaR equilibria are depicted in Figure 4.7. Recall that the
(pure) price of anarchy of a congestion game is the maximum ratio D(p)/
D(o) over all equilibria p of the game, where o is the socially optimal strategy.
As mentioned earlier, the optimal strategy for the Pigou network with two
players is that one of the players travels along the top link and the other
player travels along the bottom link which corresponds to the social delay of
3
4
. As a result, the (pure) price of anarchy for the Nash equilibria is 4
3
. On the
other hand, the pure price of anarchy for the risk-averse, mean-variance, and
CVaR equilibria is equal to one. Furthermore, the price of anarchy among
both pure and mixed equilibria for the risk-averse, mean-variance, and CVaR
equilibria is 1.2405, 1.1689, and 1.2897, respectively.
In the following, we present extra examples with the purpose of shed-
ding light on drawbacks of the different equilibria in different scenarios and
motivating more work to be done on a unified risk-averse framework. Fur-
thermore, the following examples suggest that careful consideration should
be given to the choice of the equilibrium that best fits the application of the
interest.
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Figure 4.7: The pure and mixed risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ = 1), CVaRα
(α = 0.1), and Nash equilibria of the Pigou network in Example 6 for two
players.
4.3.1 Notes for Practitioners
The intention of this subsection is to direct the attention of practitioners plan-
ning to implement risk-averse in-vehicle navigation to cases in which each of
the proposed risk-averse equilibria may provide travelers with counterintu-
itive guidance. To this end, three examples are discussed in the following to
shed light on the implications of the three classes of risk-averse equilibria.
The examples are meant to be simple to convey the idea in a straightforward
manner.
Example 8. Consider a Pigou network with two parallel links, 1 and 2,
between source and destination. The travel times on links 1 and 2 are respec-
tively independent random variables L1 and L2 with pdfs
f1(x) = α
(
exp
(−100 (x− 14)2) · 1 {13 ≤ x ≤ 15}
+ exp
(−100 (x− 19)2) · 1 {18 ≤ x ≤ 20}),
f2(x) = β exp
(−100 (x− 20)2) · 1 {19 ≤ x ≤ 21} ,
where α and β are constants for which each of the two distributions integrate
to one.
84
In Example 8, the means and variances of travel times along links 1 and
2 are l1 = 16.5, Var(L1) = 6.255, l2 = 20.0, Var(L2) = 0.005, respectively,
and P (L1 ≤ L2) = 1.0. As a result, although link 1 has a higher variance
than link 2, not only is link 1 shorter than link 2 in expectation, but link 1 is
shorter than link 2 almost certainly. Hence, a rational traveler intends to take
link 1 for commute although its variance is higher than the variance of link
2. However, the mean-variance framework intends to keep a balance between
lower expected travel time and lower uncertainty in travel time assuming that
higher variance is against the spirit of risk-averse travelers. In Example 8, the
mean-variance framework guides travelers to travel along link 2 if ρ < 1.7857,
which is not optimal from the perspective of a risk-averse traveler. Note that
both risk-averse equilibrium and CVaRα equilibrium for any α ∈ [0, 1] guide
travelers to traverse along link 1 in this example.
Example 9. Consider a Pigou network with two parallel links, 1 and 2,
between source and destination. The travel times on links 1 and 2 are respec-
tively independent random variables L1 and L2 with pdfs
f1(x) = α
(
4 exp
(−100 (x− 5)2) · 1 {4 ≤ x ≤ 6}
+ exp
(−100 (x− 10)2) · 1 {9 ≤ x ≤ 11}),
f2(x) = β
(
4 exp
(−100 (x− 8)2) · 1 {7 ≤ x ≤ 9}
+ exp
(−100 (x− 10)2) · 1 {9 ≤ x ≤ 11}),
where α and β are constants for which each of the two distributions integrate
to one.
In Example 9, the means and variances of travel times along links 1 and
2 are l1 = 6.0, Var(L1) = 4.005, l2 = 8.4, Var(L2) = 0.645, respectively,
and P (L1 ≤ L2) = 0.82. Note that both distributions are the same over the
interval [9, 11]; however, the traveler has a better opportunity of experienc-
ing shorter travel time on the lower 0.8 quantile of the distribution of link 1
compared to that of link 2. Hence, a rational traveler intends to take link 1
for commute although its variance is higher than the variance of link 2. Fur-
thermore, E [L1|L1 ≥ α] = E [L2|L2 ≥ α] for α ∈ [0, 0.2]; hence, the CVaRα
framework is indifferent between the two links when α ∈ [0, 0.2], which can
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result in a counterintuitive route selection in Example 9. The mean-variance
framework also guides travelers to traverse along link 2 if ρ < 1.4, which is
not optimal from the perspective of a risk-averse traveler. Note that the risk-
averse equilibrium guides travelers to traverse along link 1 in this example
as P (L1 ≤ L2) = 0.82.
Example 10. Consider a Pigou network with two parallel links, 1 and 2,
between source and destination. The travel times on links 1 and 2 are respec-
tively independent random variables L1 and L2 with pdfs
f1(x) = β exp
(−100 (x− 7)2) · 1 {6 ≤ x ≤ 8} ,
f2(x) = α
(
7 exp
(−100 (x− 5)2) · 1 {4 ≤ x ≤ 6}
+ 3 exp
(−100 (x− 10)2) · 1 {9 ≤ x ≤ 11}),
where α and β are constants for which each of the two distributions integrate
to one.
In Example 10, the means and variances of travel times along links 1 and
2 are l1 = 7.0, Var(L1) = 0.005, l2 = 6.5, Var(L2) = 5.255, respectively,
and P (L2 ≤ L1) = 0.7. Although the expected travel time along link 2 is
less than that along link 1 and it is more likely that the travel time along
link 2 is shorter than travel time along link 1, the travel time along link
2 is concentrated around 10 with probability 0.3 which is somewhat larger
than the concentration of travel time around 7 when traveling along link 1.
Hence, a risk-averse traveler may prefer to take link 1 for commute although
its expected travel time is higher than the expected travel time of link 2 to
avoid a long travel time. However, the risk-averse equilibrium guides travelers
to traverse along link 2, which may not be optimal from the perspective of
a risk-averse traveler. Note that the CVaRα equilibrium for α < 0.748 and
mean-variance equilibrium for ρ < 10.5 guide travelers to traverse along link
1 in this example.
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Chapter 5
BLIND GB-PANDAS: A BLIND
THROUGHPUT-OPTIMAL LOAD
BALANCING ALGORITHM FOR
AFFINITY SCHEDULING
Affinity load balancing refers to allocation of computing tasks on computing
nodes in an efficient way to minimize a cost function, for example the mean
task completion time [199]. Due to the fact that different task types can have
different processing (service) rates on different computing nodes (servers), a
dilemma between throughput and delay optimality emerges which makes the
optimal affinity load balancing an open problem for more than three decades
if the task arrival rates are unknown. If the task arrival rates and the service
rates of different task types on different servers are known, the fluid model
planning algorithm by Harrison and Lopez [120,121], and Bell and Williams
[122, 123], is a delay optimal load balancing algorithm that solves a linear
programming optimization problem to determine task assignment on servers.
The same number of queues as the number of task types is needed for the fluid
model planning algorithm, so the queueing structure is fixed to the number of
task types and does not capture the complexity of the system model, which is
how heterogeneous the service rates of task types on different servers are. As
an example given in [134] and [201], for data centers with a rack structure that
use Hadoop for MapReduce data placement with three replicas of data chunks
on the M severs, the fluid model planning algorithm requires
(
M
3
)
queues,
while Xie et al. [134] propose a delay optimal algorithm that uses 3M queues.
As another extreme example, if the service rates of NT number of task types
on all servers are the same, the fluid model planning algorithm still considers
NT number of queues, while the First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) algorithm
uses a single queue and is both throughput and delay optimal. It is true that
in the last example all task types can be considered the same type, but this
is just an example to illuminate the reasoning behind the queueing structure
Portions of this chapter were previously published in Yekkehkhany and Nagi [131]
and are used here with permission. Furthermore, portions of this chapter were previously
published in Yekkehkhany et al. [200] and are used here with permission.
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for GB-PANDAS (Generalized Balanced Priority Algorithm for Near Data
Scheduling) presented in Subsection 5.4.1.
In the absence of knowledge on task arrival rates, Max-Weight [127] and
c-µ-rule [124] algorithms can stabilize the system by just knowing the service
rates of task types on different servers. None of these two algorithms are
delay optimal though. The c-µ-rule is actually cost optimal, where it assumes
convex delay costs associated with each task type, and minimizes the total
cost incurred by the system. Since the cost functions have to be strictly
convex, and so cannot be linear, c-µ-rule does not minimize the mean task
completion time. Since these two algorithms do not use the task arrival rates
and still stabilize the system, they are robust to any changes in task arrival
rate as long as it is in the capacity region of the system. Both Max-Weight
and c-µ-rule algorithms have the same issue as the fluid model planning
algorithm on considering one queue per task type which can make the system
model complicated as discussed in [134]. Note that Wang et al. [132] and
Xie et al. [134] study the load balancing problem for special cases of two and
three levels of data locality, respectively. In the former, delay optimality is
analyzed for a special traffic scenario and in the latter delay optimality is
analyzed for a general traffic scenario. In both cases there is no issue with
the number of queues, but as mentioned, these two algorithms are for special
cases of two and three levels of data locality. Hence, a unified algorithm that
captures the trade-off between the complexity of the queueing structure and
the complexity of the system model is lacking in the literature. Yekkehkhany
et al. [200] implicitly mention this trade-off in data center applications, but
the generalization is not crystal clear and needs more consideration of the
affinity setup, which is summarized in this work as a complementary note on
the Balanced-PANDAS algorithm.
The affinity scheduling problem appears in different applications from
data centers and modern processing networks that consist of heterogeneous
servers, where data-intensive analytics like MapReduce, Hadoop, and Dryad
are performed, to supermarket models, or even patient assignment to sur-
geons in big and busy hospitals and many more. Lack of dependable esti-
mates of system parameters, including task arrival rates and specially service
rates of task types on different servers, is a major challenge in constructing
an optimal load balancing algorithm for such networks [202]. All the algo-
rithms mentioned above at least require the knowledge of service rates of task
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types on different servers. In the absence of prior knowledge on service rates,
such algorithms can be fragile and perform poorly, resulting in huge waste
of resources. To address this issue, we propose a robust policy called Blind
GB-PANDAS that is totally blind to all system parameters, but is robust to
task arrival rate changes and learns the service rates of task types on different
servers, so it is robust to any service rate parameter changes as well. It is
natural that due to traffic load changes in data centers, the service rates of
tasks on remote servers change over time. In such cases, Blind GB-PANDAS
is capable of updating system parameters and taking action correspondingly.
Blind GB-PANDAS uses an exploration-exploitation approach to make the
system stable without any knowledge about the task arrival rates and the pro-
cessing rates. More specifically, it uses an exploration-exploitation method,
where in the exploration phase it takes action in a way to make the sys-
tem parameter estimations more accurate, and in the exploitation phase it
uses the estimated parameters to do an optimal load balancing based on
the estimates. Note that only the processing rates of task types on different
servers are the parameters that are estimated, and the task arrival rates are
not estimated. The reason is that task arrival rates change frequently, so
there is no point estimating them, whereas the service rates do not change
rapidly. Since Blind GB-PANDAS uses an estimate of the processing rates,
an incoming task is not necessarily routed to the server with the minimum
weighted-workload in the exploitation phase, which raises the complexity in
the throughput optimality proof of Blind GB-PANDAS using the Lyapunov-
based method. The throughput optimality result is proved under arbitrary
and unknown service time distributions with bounded means and bounded
supports that do not necessarily require the memoryless property.
As discussed in Subsection 5.4.1, the queueing structure used for Blind
GB-PANDAS shows the trade-off between the heterogeneity of the underly-
ing system model for processing rates and the complexity of the Blind GB-
PANDAS queueing structure. Blind GB-PANDAS can also use a one-queue-
per-server queueing structure, where the workload on servers is of interest
instead of the queue lengths, but for an easier explanation of the Blind GB-
PANDAS algorithm we use multiple symbolic sub-queues for each server. The
Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm is compared to FCFS, Max-Weight, and c-µ-
rule algorithms in terms of average task completion time through simulations,
where the same exploration-exploitation approach as Blind GB-PANDAS is
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used for Max-Weight and c-µ-rule. Our extensive simulations show that the
Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm outperforms the two other algorithms at high
loads by an obviously large difference.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 describes
the system model for data centers with a nested rack structure, Section
5.2 presents the GB-PANDAS algorithm for such a system, and Section 5.3
provides the throughput optimality proof for the GB-PANDAS algorithm.
Section 5.4 describes the system model, GB-PANDAS, and the queueing
structure of GB-PANDAS, in addition to deriving the capacity region of the
system. Section 5.5 presents the Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm and queueing
dynamics for this algorithm. Section 5.6 starts with some preliminary results
and lemmas and ends up with the throughput optimality proof for Blind
GB-PANDAS. Section 5.7 evaluates the performance of Blind GB-PANDAS
versus Max-Weight, c-µ-rule, and FCFS algorithms in terms of mean task
completion time. For the conclusion of this chapter and a discussion of op-
portunities for future work, refer to Chapter 6.
5.1 Data Centers with a Nested Rack Structure
In this section, we propose the Generalized-Balanced-Priority-Algorithm-for-
Near-Data-Scheduling (Generalized-Balanced-Pandas or GB-PANDAS) with
a new queueing structure for a data center with a nested rack structure as de-
scribed later. The GB-PANDAS algorithm does not require the arrival rates
of task types and is for a case with multiple levels of data localities. We estab-
lish the capacity region of the system with a nested rack structure and prove
the throughput optimality of the proposed algorithm. The service times
are assumed to be non-preemptive and they can have an arbitrary distri-
bution, not necessarily geometric distribution which is the main assumption
in [133, 134], so we have to use a different Lyapunov function than the ordi-
nary sum of cubic of the queue lengths to prove the throughput optimality
of the GB-PANDAS algorithm. We take the map task scheduling problem,
which is described in Subsection 1.2.5, as a platform to test the performance
of the proposed algorithm versus the state-of-the-art algorithms that are ei-
ther widely used in the industry or have theoretical guarantees for optimality
in some senses. The extensive simulation results show that the GB-PANDAS
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Figure 5.1: A typical data center architecture with four levels of data
locality.
algorithm performs better than other algorithms at heavy-traffic loads.
5.1.1 The System Model for a Data Center with a Nested
Rack Structure
A discrete time model for the system is studied, where time is indexed
by t ∈ N. The system consists of M servers indexed by 1, 2, · · · ,M . Let
M = {1, 2, · · · ,M} be the set of servers. In today’s typical data center ar-
chitecture, these servers are connected to each other through different levels
of switches or routers. A typical data center architecture is shown in Figure
5.1, which consists of servers, racks, super racks, top of the rack switches,
top of the super rack switches, and core switches.
Remark 8. Note that our theoretical analysis does not care about the rack
structure in data centers, so the result of throughput optimality of the GB-
PANDAS algorithm is proved for an arbitrary system with N levels of data
locality (as an example, recall the affinity scheduling problem). The rack
structure is only proposed as an incentive for this theoretical work, but the
result is more general.
Considering the MapReduce framework for processing large data-sets, the
data-set is split into small data chunks (typically of size 128 MB), and the
data chunks are replicated on d servers where the default for Hadoop is d = 3
servers. The bottleneck in MapReduce is the Map tasks, not the Reduce task,
so we only consider Map tasks in this chapter.
Task Type: In the Map stage, each task is associated with the processing
of a data chunk, and by convention we denote the type of the task by the
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label of the three servers where the data chunk is stored [106, 134]. As an
example, the task associated with processing data chunk A shown in Figure
5.1 has type L¯ = (1, 3, 5) since data chunk A is stored in these three servers.
The set of all task types L¯ is denoted by L defined as follows:
L¯ ∈ L = {(m1,m2,m3) ∈M3 : m1 < m2 < m3},
where m1,m2, and m3 are the three local servers.
1 A task of type L¯ =
(m1,m2,m3) receives faster average service from its local servers than from
servers that do not have the data chunk. The reason is that the server without
the data chunk has to fetch data associated to a task of type L¯ from any of
its local servers. According to the distance between the two servers, this
fetching of the data can cause different amounts of delay. This fact brings
the different levels of data locality into account. Obviously, the closer the
two servers, the shorter the delay. Hence, the communication cost through
the network and switches between two servers in the same rack is less than
that between two servers in the same super rack (but different racks), and
the cost for both is on average less than that between two servers in different
super racks. Generally speaking, we propose the N levels of data locality as
follows:
Service Process: The non-preemptive service (processing) time of a task of
type L¯ = (m1,m2,m3) ∈ L is a random variable with cumulative distribution
function (CDF)
• F1 with mean 1α1 if the task receives service from any server in the set
L¯ = {m1,m2,m3}, and we say that the task is 1-local to these servers.
• Fn with mean 1αn if the task receives service from any server in the set
L¯n, defined in the following, and we say that the task is n-local to these
servers, for n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , N},
where α1 > α2 > · · · > αN .
In the data center structure example in Figure 5.1, the set L¯2 is the set of all
servers that do not have the data saved on their own disk, but data is stored
in another server in the same rack; and the set L¯3 is the set of all servers that
1The analysis is not sensitive to the number of local servers. The default number of
local servers in Hadoop is three, so we choose three local servers, but this assumption can
be ignored without any change in the analysis.
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do not have the data saved on their own disk, but data is stored in another
server in another rack, but in the same super rack, and so on.
Remark 9. Note that the service time is not necessarily assumed to be geo-
metrically distributed and can be arbitrary as long as it satisfies the decreasing
property of the means mentioned above.
Arrival Process: The number of arriving tasks of type L¯ at the beginning
of time slot t is denoted by AL¯(t), which are assumed to be temporarily i.i.d.
with mean λL¯. The total number of arriving tasks at each time slot is assumed
to be bounded by a constant CA and is assumed to be zero with a positive
probability. The set of all arrival rates for different types of tasks is denoted
by the vector λ = (λL¯ : L¯ ∈ L).
5.1.2 An Outer Bound of the Capacity Region for a Data
Center with a Nested Rack Structure
The arrival rate of type L¯ tasks can be decomposed to (λL¯,m,m ∈M), where
λL¯,m denotes the arrival rate of type L¯ tasks that are processed by server m.
Obviously,
∑
m∈M λL¯,m = λL¯. A necessary condition for an arrival rate vector
λ to be supportable is that the total 1-local, 2-local, · · · , N -local load on
each server be strictly less than one for all servers as the following inequality
suggests:
∑
L¯:m∈L¯
λL¯,m
α1
+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯2
λL¯,m
α2
+ · · ·+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯N
λL¯,m
αN
< 1, ∀m ∈M. (5.1)
Given this necessary condition, an outer bound of the capacity region is given
by the set of all arrival rate vectors λ with a decomposition satisfying (5.1)
as follows.
Λ =
{
λ = (λL¯ : L¯ ∈ L)
∣∣ ∃λL¯,m ≥ 0,∀L¯ ∈ L,∀m ∈M, s.t.
λL¯ =
M∑
m=1
λL¯,m, ∀L¯ ∈ L,∑
L¯:m∈L¯
λL¯,m
α1
+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯2
λL¯,m
α2
+ · · ·+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯N
λL¯,m
αN
< 1, ∀m}.
(5.2)
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Figure 5.2: The queueing structure when the GB-PANDAS algorithm is
used.
It is clear that to find Λ, we should solve a linear programming optimization
problem. We will show in Section 5.3 that GB-PANDAS stabilizes the system
as long as the arrival rate vector λ is inside Λ, which means that this outer
bound of the capacity region is the capacity region itself. In the following,
Lemma 1 proposes a set which is equivalent to that in (5.2) which will be
used in the throughput optimality proof of GB-PANDAS.
Lemma 1. The following set Λ¯ is equivalent to Λ defined in equation (5.2):
Λ¯ =
{
λ = (λL¯ : L¯ ∈ L)
∣∣∣∃λL¯,n,m ≥ 0,∀L¯ ∈ L,∀n ∈ L¯,∀m ∈M, s.t.
λL¯ =
∑
n:n∈L¯
M∑
m=1
λL¯,n,m, ∀L¯ ∈ L,
∑
L¯:m∈L¯
∑
n:n∈L¯
λL¯,n,m
α1
+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯2
∑
n:n∈L¯
λL¯,n,m
α2
+
· · ·+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯N
∑
n:n∈L¯
λL¯,n,m
αN
< 1,∀m
}
,
(5.3)
where λL¯,n,m denotes the arrival rate of type L¯ tasks that are 1-local to server
n and is processed by server m. {λL¯,n,m : L¯ ∈ L, n ∈ L¯, and m ∈ M} is a
decomposition of the set of arrival rates {λL¯,m : L¯ ∈ L and m ∈ M}, where
λL¯,m =
∑
n∈M λL¯,n,m.
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix D.1.
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5.2 The GB-PANDAS Algorithm for a Data Center
with a Nested Rack Structure
The central scheduler keeps N queues per server as shown in Figure 5.2. The
N queues of the m-th server are denoted by Q1m, Q
2
m, · · · , QNm. Tasks that
are routed to server m and are n-local to this server are queued at queue
Qnm. The length of this queue, defined as the number of tasks queued in this
queue, at time slot t, is shown by Qnm(t). The central scheduler maintains
the length of all queues at all time slots, which is denoted by vector Q(t) =(
Q11(t), Q
2
1(t), · · · , QN1 (t), · · · , Q1M(t), Q2M(t), · · · , QNM(t)
)
. In the following,
the workload on a server is defined which will be used in the statement of
the GB-PANDAS algorithm.
Workload of Server m: Under the GB-PANDAS algorithm, server m
only processes tasks that are queued in itsN queues, that isQ1m, Q
2
m, · · · , QNm.
As the processing time of an n-local task follows a distribution with CDF
Fn and mean
1
αn
, the expected time needed for server m to process all tasks
queued in its queues at time slot t is given as follows:
Wm(t) =
Q1m(t)
α1
+
Q2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ Q
N
m(t)
αN
.
We name Wm(t) the workload on the m-th server.
A load balancing algorithm consists of two parts, routing and scheduling.
The routing policy determines the queue at which a new incoming task is
queued until it receives service from a server. When a server becomes idle
and so is ready to process another task, the scheduling policy determines
the task receiving service from the idle server. The routing and scheduling
policies of the GB-PANDAS algorithm are as follows:
• GB-PANDAS Routing (Weighted-Workload Routing): The in-
coming task of type L¯ is routed to the corresponding sub-queue of server
m∗ with the minimum weighted workload as defined in the following (ties
are broken randomly):
m∗ = arg min
m∈M
{
Wm(t)
α1
I{m∈L¯} +
Wm(t)
α2
I{m∈L¯2} + · · ·+
Wm(t)
αN
I{m∈L¯N}
}
.
If this task of type L¯ is 1-local, 2-local, · · · , N -local to server m∗, it is
queued at Q1m∗ , Q
2
m∗ , · · · , QNm∗ , respectively.
95
• GB-PANDAS Scheduling (Prioritized Scheduling): The idle server
m is only scheduled to process a task from its own queues, Q1m, Q
2
m, · · · ,
QNm. A task that is n-local to server m has a higher priority than a task
that is (n+1)-local to server m (for 1 ≤ n ≤ N−1). Hence, the idle server
m keeps processing a task from Q1m until there are no more tasks available
at this queue, then continues processing tasks queued at Q2m, and so on.
5.2.1 The Queueing Dynamics for a Data Center with a
Nested Rack Structure
Denote the number of arriving tasks at Qnm at time slot t by A
n
m(t), where
these tasks are n-local to server m. Recall the notation AL¯,m(t) for the
number of tasks of type L¯ that are scheduled to server m. Then, we have
the following relation between Anm(t) and AL¯,m(t):
A1m(t) =
∑
L¯:m∈L¯
AL¯,m(t),
Anm(t) =
∑
L¯:m∈L¯n
AL¯,m(t), for 2 ≤ n ≤ N,
(5.4)
where L¯ is the set of 1-local servers and L¯n for 2 ≤ n ≤ N is the set of
n-local servers to a task of type L¯. The number of tasks that receive service
from server m at time slot t and are n-local to the server is denoted by Snm(t)
which is the number of departures from Qnm (as a reminder, the service time
of a task that is n-local to a server has CDF Fn). Then, the queue dynamics
for any m ∈M are as follows:
Qnm(t+ 1) = Q
n
m(t) + A
n
m(t)− Snm(t), for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1,
QNm(t+ 1) = Q
N
m(t) + A
N
m(t)− SNm(t) + Um(t),
(5.5)
where Um(t) = max
{
0, SNm(t)−ANm(t)−QNm(t)
}
is the unused service of server
m.
Note that the set of queue lengths {Q(t), t ≥ 0} do not form a Markov
chain since not having the information about how long a server has been
processing a task and what type that task is, leads to Q(t + 1)|Q(t) 6⊥
Q(t − 1)|Q(t). Note that the processing time of a task has a general CDF,
not necessarily geometric distribution with memoryless property, so we do
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need to consider two parameters about the status of servers in the system as
follows to be able to define a Markov chain.
• Let Ψm(t) be the number of time slots at the beginning of time slot t that
server m has spent on the currently in-service task. Note that Ψm(t) is set
to zero when server m is done processing a task. Then the first working
status vector, Ψ (t), is defined as follows:
Ψ (t) =
(
Ψ1(t), Ψ2(t), · · · , ΨM(t)
)
.
• The second working status vector is f(t) = (f1(t), f2(t), · · · , fM(t)), where
fm(t)=

−1, if server m is idle,
1, if server m processes a 1-local task from Q1m,
2, if server m processes a 2-local task from Q2m,
...
N, if server m processes an N-local task from QNm.
Define ηm(t) as the scheduling decision for server m at time slot t. If server
m finishes the processing of an in-service task at time slot t, we have fm(t
−) =
−1 and the central scheduler makes the scheduling decision ηm(t) for the idle
server m. Note that ηm(t) = fm(t) as long as server m is processing a task.
Then, we define the following vector:
η(t) =
(
η1(t), η2(t), · · · , ηM(t)
)
.
As mentioned, since the service times have a general distribution with
arbitrary CDF but not necessarily geometrically distributed, the queueing
process — or even both the queueing and η(t) processes — do not form
a Markov chain (one reason is that the service time does not have the
memoryless property). Therefore, we consider the Markov chain
{
Z(t) =(
Q(t),η(t),Ψ (t)
)
, t ≥ 0} and show that it is irreducible and aperiodic. The
state space of this Markov chain is S = NNM×{1, 2, · · · , N}M×NM . Assume
the initial state of the Markov chain to be Z(0) =
{
0NM×1, NM×1, 0M×1
}
.
Irreducible: Since the CDF of the service times, Fn for 1 ≤ n ≤ N , are in-
creasing, there exists a positive integer τ such that Fn(τ) > 0 for 1 ≤ n ≤ N .
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Moreover, the probability of zero arrival tasks is positive. Hence, for any
state of the system, Z =
(
Q,η,Ψ
)
, the probability of the event that each
job gets processed in τ time slots and no tasks arrive at the system in
τ
∑M
m=1
∑N
n=1Q
n
m time slots is positive. As a result, the initial state is reach-
able from any state in the state space and
{
Z(t)
}
is irreducible.
Aperiodic: Since the probability of zero arriving tasks is positive, there is a
positive probability of transition from the initial state to itself. Then, given
that
{
Z(t)
}
is irreducible, it is also aperiodic.
5.3 Throughput Optimality of the GB-PANDAS
Algorithm for a Data Center with a Nested Rack
Structure
Theorem 8. The GB-PANDAS algorithm stabilizes a system with N levels
of data locality as long as the arrival rate is strictly inside the capacity region,
which means that the Generalized Balanced-Pandas algorithm is throughput
optimal.
Proof. The throughput optimality proof of the GB-PANDAS algorithm for a
system with N levels of data locality and a general service time distribution
follows an extension of the Foster-Lyapunov theorem as stated below.
Extended Version of the Foster-Lyapunov Theorem (Theorem 3.3.8
in [203]): Consider an irreducible Markov chain {Z(t)}, where t ∈ N, with
a state space S. If there exists a function V : S → R+, a positive integer
T ≥ 1, and a finite set P ⊆ S satisfying the following condition:
E [V (Z(t0 + T ))− V (Z(t0))|Z(t0) = z]
≤− θI{z∈Pc} + CI{z∈P},
(5.6)
for some θ > 0 and C < ∞, then the irreducible Markov chain {Z(t)} is
positive recurrent.
Consider the Markov chain
{
Z(t) =
(
Q(t),η(t),Ψ (t)
)
, t ≥ 0}. As long
as the arrival rate vector is strictly inside the outer bound of the capacity
region, λ ∈ Λ, and using the GB-PANDAS algorithm, if we can prove that
this Markov chain is positive recurrent, the distribution of Z(t) converges to
its stationary distribution when t→∞, which results in the stability of the
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system, so the throughput optimality of the GB-PANDAS algorithm will be
proved.
As shown before, the Markov chain Z(t) is irreducible and aperiodic for
any arrival rate vector strictly inside the outer bound of the capacity region,
λ ∈ Λ. Hence, if we can find a Lyapunov function V (.) satisfying the drift
condition in the extended version of the Foster-Lyapunov theorem when using
the GB-PANDAS algorithm, the stability of the system under this algorithm
is proved. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 followed by our choice of the Lyapunov
function presented afterwards complete the proof.
Since Λ is an open set, for any λ ∈ Λ there exists δ > 0 such that λ′ = (1+
δ)λ ∈ Λ which means that λ′ satisfies the conditions in (5.2) and specifically
the inequality (5.1). Then we have the following for any m ∈M:
∑
L¯:m∈L¯
λL¯,m
α1
+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯2
λL¯,m
α2
+ · · ·+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯N
λL¯,m
αN
<
1
1 + δ
. (5.7)
The load decomposition {λL¯,m} can be interpreted as one possibility of as-
signing the arrival rates to the M servers so that the system becomes stable.
We then define the ideal workload on each server m under the load decom-
position {λL¯,m} as
wm =
∑
L¯:m∈L¯
λL¯,m
α1
+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯2
λL¯,m
α2
+ · · ·+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯N
λL¯,m
αN
, ∀m ∈M. (5.8)
Let w = (w1, w2, · · · , wM), where Lemmas 3 and 4 use this ideal workload
on servers as an intermediary to later prove the throughput optimality of the
GB-PANDAS algorithm.
The dynamic of the workload on server m, Wm(.), is as follows:
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Wm(t+ 1) =
Q1m(t+ 1)
α1
+
Q2m(t+ 1)
α2
+ · · ·+ Q
N
m(t+ 1)
αN
(a)
=
Q1m(t) + A
1
m(t)− S1m(t)
α1
+
Q2m(t) + A
2
m(t)− S2m(t)
α2
+
· · ·+ Q
N
m(t) + A
N
m(t)− SNm(t) + Um(t)
αN
= Wm(t) +
(
A1m(t)
α1
+
A2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ A
N
m(t)
αN
)
−
(
S1m(t)
α1
+
S2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ S
N
m(t)
αN
)
+
Um(t)
αN
(b)
= Wm(t) + Am(t)− Sm(t) + U˜m(t),
where (a) follows from the queue dynamic in (5.5) and (b) is true by the
following definitions:
Am(t) =
A1m(t)
α1
+
A2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ A
N
m(t)
αN
, ∀m ∈M,
Sm(t) =
S1m(t)
α1
+
S2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ S
N
m(t)
αN
, ∀m ∈M,
U˜m(t) =
Um(t)
αN
, ∀m ∈M.
(5.9)
A = (A1, A2, · · · , AM), S = (S1, S2, · · · , SM), and U˜ = (U˜1, U˜2, · · · , U˜M)
are the pseudo task arrival, service and unused service processes, respectively.
The workload on servers, which is denoted by W = (W1,W2, · · · ,WM),
has the following dynamic
W (t+ 1) = W (t) +A(t)− S(t) + U˜(t). (5.10)
Lemmas 2, 3, 4, and 5 are proposed in the following. In this chapter, the
inner product between two vectors a and b is denoted by 〈a, b〉.
Lemma 2.
〈W (t), U˜(t)〉 = 0, ∀t.
The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix D.2.
Lemma 3. Under the GB-PANDAS routing policy, for any arrival rate vec-
tor strictly inside the outer bound of the capacity region, λ ∈ Λ, and the
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corresponding workload vector of servers w defined in (5.8), we have the
following for any t0:
E
[
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
∣∣∣Z(t0)] ≤ 0, ∀t ≥ 0.
The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix D.3.
Lemma 4. Under the GB-PANDAS routing policy, for any arrival rate vec-
tor strictly inside the outer bound of the capacity region, λ ∈ Λ, and the cor-
responding workload vector of servers w defined in (5.8) there exists T0 > 0
such that for any T ≥ T0 we have the following:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ0T ||Q(t0)||1 + c0, ∀t0 ≥ 0,
where the constants θ0, c0 > 0 are independent of Z(t0).
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix D.4.
Lemma 5. Under the GB-PANDAS routing policy, for any arrival rate vec-
tor strictly inside the outer bound of the capacity region, λ ∈ Λ, and any
θ1 ∈ (0, 1), there exists T1 > 0 such that the following is true for any T ≥ T1
and for any t0 ≥ 0:
E
[
||Ψ (t0 + T )||1 − ||Ψ (t0)||1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ1||Ψ (t0)||1 +MT,
where ||.||1 is L1-norm.
The proof of Lemma 5 is provided in Appendix D.6.
We choose the following Lyapunov function, V : P → R+:
V (Z(t)) = ||W (t)||2 + ||Ψ (t)||1,
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where ||.|| and ||.||1 are the L2 and L1-norm, respectively. Then,
E
[
V (Z(t0 + T ))− V (Z(t0))
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
= E
[
||W (t0 + T )||2 − ||W (t0)||2
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
||Ψ (t0 + T )||1 − ||Ψ (t0)||1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(a)
= E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
||W (t+ 1)||2 − ||W (t)||2
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
||Ψ (t0 + T )||1 − ||Ψ (t)||1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(b)
= E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
||A(t)− S(t) + U˜(t)||2
+ 2〈W (t),A(t)− S(t)〉+ 2〈W (t), U˜(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
||Ψ (t0 + T )||1 − ||Ψ (t)||1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(c)
≤ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),A(t)− S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
||Ψ (t0 + T )||1 − ||Ψ (t)||1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]+ c1
(d)
= 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
||Ψ (t0 + T )||1 − ||Ψ (t)||1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]+ c1,
(5.11)
where (a) is true by the telescoping property, (b) follows by the dynamic of
W (.) derived in (5.10), (c) follows by Lemma 2 and the fact that the task
arrival is assumed to be bounded and the service and unused service are also
bounded as the number of servers are finite, so the pseudo arrival, service,
and unused service are also bounded, and therefore there exists a constant
c1 such that ||A(t) − S(t) + U˜(t)||2 ≤ c1T , and (d) follows by adding and
subtracting the intermediary term 〈W (t),w〉.
By choosing T ≥ max{T0, T1, θ12θ0} and using Lemmas 3, 4, and 5, the drift
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of the Lyapunov function in (5.11) is the following:
E
[
V (Z(t0 + T ))− V (Z(t0))
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ1
(
||Q(t0)||1 + ||Ψ (t0)||1
)
+ c2, ∀t0,
where c2 = 2c0 + c1 +MT .
By choosing any positive constant θ2 > 0 let P =
{
Z =
(
Q,η,Ψ
) ∈ S :
||Q||1+||Ψ ||1 ≤ θ2+cθ1
}
, where P is a finite set of the state space. By this choice
of P , the condition (5.6) in the extended version of the Foster-Lyapunov
theorem holds by choices of θ = θ1 and C = c2, so the positive recurrence
proof of the Markov chain and the throughput optimality proof of the GB-
PANDAS algorithm are completed. Note that a corollary of this result is
that Λ is the capacity region of the system.
Note that in the proof of throughput optimality, we do not rely on the fact
of using prioritized scheduling. Therefore, for the purpose of throughput
optimality, an idle server can serve any task in its N sub-queues as 1-local,
2-local, · · · , and N -local tasks decrease the expected workload at the same
rate. The prioritized scheduling is to minimize the mean task completion time
experienced by tasks, which will be of interest in heavy-traffic optimality. If
fairness among jobs is of interest, we can assume sub-queues associated to
jobs in each server and schedule an idle server to serve a task of the job which
has the highest priority in terms of fairness. This does not affect the stability
of the system.
5.4 The Affinity System Model
Consider M unit-rate multi-skilled servers and NT number of task types as
depicted in Figure 5.3. The set of servers and task types are denoted by
M = {1, 2, · · · ,M} and L = {1, 2, · · · , NT}, respectively. Each task can be
processed by any of the M servers, but with possibly different rates. The
service times are assumed to be non-preemptive and discrete valued with an
unknown distribution. Non-preemptive service means that the central load
balancing algorithm cannot interrupt an in-service task, i.e. no other task
is scheduled to a server until the server completely processes the task that
is currently receiving service. The extension of the analysis for continuous
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Figure 5.3: Affinity scheduling setup with multi-type tasks and
multi-skilled servers.
service time, using approximation methods of continuous distributions with
discrete ones, is an interesting future work. In this discrete time model, time
is indexed by t ∈ N. In the following, service time distributions and task
arrivals are discussed, which are both unknown to the central scheduler.
Service time distribution: The service time offered by server m ∈ M
to task type i ∈ L is a discrete-type random variable with cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF) Fi,m with mean
1
µi,m
or correspondingly with rate
µi,m > 0. The service time distribution does not require the memoryless
property. We further assume that the support of the service time is bounded,
which is a realistic assumption and reduces the unnecessary complexity of
the proofs specially in Lemma 9. The extension of the analysis for service
times with unbounded supports is an interesting future work. Note that
the completion time for a task is the waiting time for that task until it is
scheduled to a server plus the service time of the task on the server. Waiting
time depends on the servers’ status, the queue lengths or more specifically
other tasks that are in the system or may arrive later, and the load balancing
algorithm that is used, while service time has the mentioned distribution.
Task arrival: The number of incoming tasks of type i ∈ L at the begin-
ning of time slot t is a random variable on non-negative integer numbers
that is denoted by Ai(t), which are temporarily identically distributed and
independent from each other. Denote the arrival rate of task type i by λi,
i.e. E[Ai(t)] = λi. In the stability proof of Blind GB-PANDAS we need λi
to be strictly positive, so without loss of generality we exclude task types
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with zero arrival rate from L. Furthermore, we assume that the number of
each incoming task type at a time slot is bounded by constant CA and is zero
with positive probability, i.e. P (Ai(t) < CA) = 1 and P (Ai(t) = 0) > 0 for
any i ∈ L. The set of arrival rates for all task types is denoted by vector
λ = (λi : i ∈ L).
Affinity scheduling problem refers to load balancing for such a system
described above. The fluid model planning algorithm [121], MaxWeight [127],
and cµ-rule [124] are the baseline algorithms for affinity scheduling. All these
algorithms in addition to GB-PANDAS use the rate of service times instead
of the CDF functions. Hence, the system model can be summarized as an
NT ×M matrix, where element (i,m) is the processing rate of task type i on
server m, µi,m, as follows:
Bµ =

µ1,1 µ1,2 µ1,3 . . . µ1,M
µ2,1 µ2,2 µ2,3 . . . µ2,M
...
...
...
. . .
...
µNT ,1 µNT ,2 µNT ,3 . . . µNT ,M

NT ,M
. (5.12)
If both the set of arrival rates λ = (λi : i ∈ L) and the service rate matrix Bµ
are known, the fluid model planning algorithm [121] derives the delay optimal
load balancing by solving a linear programming. However, if the arrival
rates of task types are not known, the delay optimal algorithm becomes an
open problem which has not been solved for more than three decades. Max-
Weight [127] and cµ-rule [124] can be used for different objectives when we
do not know the arrival rates, but none have delay optimality. In this work,
we are assuming that we lack knowledge of not only the arrival rates λ,
but also the service rate matrix Bµ. We take an exploration and exploitation
approach to make our estimation of the underlying model, which is the service
rate matrix, more accurate, and to keep the system stable.
5.4.1 The Queueing Structure of the GB-PANDAS Algorithm
in the Affinity Problem
Every algorithm has its own specific queueing structure. For example, there
is only a single central queue for the First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) algo-
rithm, but there are NT number of queues when using fluid model planning,
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Max-Weight, or cµ-rule. In the following, we present the queueing structure
used for GB-PANDAS that captures the trade-off between the complexity of
the system model and the complexity of the queueing structure very well.
What we mean by the complexity of the system model is the heterogeneity
of the service rate matrix, e.g. if all the elements of this matrix are the same
number, the system is less complex than the case where each element of the
matrix is different from other elements of the matrix.
The heterogeneity of the system from the perspective of server m is cap-
tured in the mth column of the service rate matrix. Consider the mth column
of the matrix has Nm distinct values, where Nm can be any number from 1 to
NT . It is obvious that any of the task types with the same service (processing)
rate on server m look the same from the perspective of this server. Denote
the Nm distinct values of the mth column of Bµ by {α1m, α2m, · · · , αNmm } and
without loss of generality assume that α1m > α
2
m > · · · > αNmm . We call all the
task types with a processing rate of αnm on the m
th server, the n-local tasks
to that server, and denote them by Lnm = {i ∈ L : µi,m = αnm}. For ease of
notation, we use both µi,m and α
n
m throughout the chapter interchangeably;
however, they are in fact capturing the same phenomenon, but with differ-
ent interpretations. Note that the n-local tasks to server m can be called
(n,m)-local tasks in order to place more emphasis on the pair n and m, so
the n-local tasks to server m are not necessarily the same as the n-local tasks
to server m′. We allocate Nm queues for server m, where the nth queue of
server m holds all task types that are routed to this server and are n-local
to it. As depicted in Figure 5.4, different servers can have different num-
bers of queues since the heterogeneity of the system model can be different
from the perspective of different servers. We may interchangeably use queue
or sub-queue to refer to the nth queue (sub-queue) of the mth server. The
Nm sub-queues of the mth server are denoted by Q1m, Q
2
m, · · · , QNmm and the
queue lengths of these sub-queues, defined as the number of tasks in these
sub-queues, at time slot t are denoted by Q1m(t), Q
2
m(t), · · · , QNmm (t).
In the next subsection, the GB-PANDAS algorithm is proposed when the
service rate matrix Bµ is known. Balanced-PANDAS for a data center with
three levels of data locality is proposed by [134], and here we are proposing the
Generalized Balanced-PANDAS algorithm from another perspective which is
of its own interest.
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Figure 5.4: The queueing structure for the GB-PANDAS algorithm.
5.4.2 The GB-PANDAS Algorithm with Known Service Rate
Matrix Bµ for the Affinity Problem
Before getting into the GB-PANDAS algorithm, we need to define the work-
load on server m.
Definition 19. The average time needed for server m to process all tasks
queued in its Nm sub-queues at time slot t is defined as the workload on the
server:
Wm(t) =
Q1m(t)
α1m
+
Q2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ Q
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
. (5.13)
A load balancing algorithm consists of two parts, routing and scheduling.
The routing policy determines the queue at which an incoming task is stored
until it is assigned to a server for service. When a server becomes idle, the
scheduling policy determines the next task that receives service on the idle
server. The routing and scheduling policies of the GB-PANDAS algorithm
are as follows:
GB-PANDAS Routing Policy: An incoming task of type i is routed
to the corresponding sub-queue of the server with the minimum weighted
workload, where ties are broken arbitrarily to the favor of the fastest server.
The server m∗ with the minimum weighted workload is defined as
m∗ = arg min
m∈M
Wm(t)
µi,m
.
The corresponding sub-queue of server m∗ for a task of type i is n if µi,m =
αnm.
GB-PANDAS Scheduling Policy: An idle server m at time slot t is
scheduled to process a task of sub-queue Q1m if there is any. If Q
1
m(t) = 0, a
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task of sub-queue Q2m is scheduled to the server, and so on. It is a common
assumption that servers do not have the option of processing the tasks queued
in front of other servers, so a server remains idle if all its sub-queues are
empty. Note that the routing policy is doing a sort of weighted water-filling
for workloads, so the probability that a server becomes idle goes to zero as
the load increases at heavy traffic regime. Remember that the tasks in sub-
queue Q1m are the fastest types of tasks for server m, the tasks in sub-queue
Q2m are the second fastest, and so on. Using this priority scheduling, the
faster tasks in the Nm sub-queues of server m are processed first. Given the
minimum weighted workload routing policy, the priority scheduling is optimal
as it minimizes the mean task completion time of all tasks in the Nm sub-
queues of server m. In the following, Max-Weight and cµ-rule algorithms are
discussed for the sake of completeness.
Remark 10. Prioritized scheduling has no effect in the throughput-optimality
proof of the GB-PANDAS algorithm and a work-conserving scheduling of a
server to its sub-queues suffices for the purpose of system’s stability. As a
result, the GB-PANDAS policy can be implemented by considering a single
queue per server at the expense of losing priority scheduling. In a single queue
per server structure, instead of maintaining a server’s sub-queue lengths, the
workload of the server defined in (5.13) is maintained. At the arrival of an
n-local task to server m, the server’s workload is increased by 1
αnm
, instead of
increasing the corresponding sub-queue’s length by one, and the workload is
decreased at the departure of a task by its corresponding load.
5.4.3 The Max-Weight and c-µ-Rule Algorithms with Known
Service Rate Matrix Bµ
The queueing structure used for Max-Weight and c-µ-rule is as depicted in
Figure 5.3, where there is a separate queue for each type of task. Denote
the NT queues by Q1, Q2, · · · , QNT , and their corresponding queue lengths
at time slot t by Q1(t), Q2(t), · · · , QNT (t). Note that the GB-PANDAS algo-
rithm requires M × NT number of queues in the worst case scenario, but it
can use the symmetry of specific real-world structures to decrease the num-
ber of queues dramatically. As an example, for servers with rack structures,
where Hadoop is used for MapReduce data placement with three replicas
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of data chunks on severs, Max-Weight and c-µ-rule require
(
M
3
)
= O(M3)
number of queues, while GB-PANDAS requires 3M queues. A task is routed
to a server at the time of its arrival under the GB-PANDAS algorithm, while
a task waits in its queue under both Max-Weight and c-µ-rule algorithms,
waiting to be scheduled for service, which is discussed below.
Max-Weight Scheduling Policy: An idle server m at time slot t is sched-
uled to process a task of type j from Qj, if there is any, such that
j ∈ arg max
i∈L
{µi,m ·Qi(t)}.
The Max-Weight algorithm is throughput-optimal, but it is not heavy-traffic
or delay optimal.
C-µ-rule Scheduling Policy: Consider that queue Qi incurs a cost of
Ci
(
Qi(t)
)
at time slot t, where Ci(.) is increasing and strictly convex. The
c-µ-rule algorithm maximizes the rate of decrease of the instantaneous cost
at all time slots by the following scheduling policy. An idle server m at time
slot t is scheduled to process a task of type j from Qj, if there is any, such
that
j ∈ arg max
i∈L
{
µi,m · C ′i
(
Qi(t)
)}
,
where C ′(.) is the first derivative of the cost function. The c-µ-rule algorithm
minimizes both instantaneous and cumulative queueing costs, asymptotically.
The mean task completion time corresponds to linear cost functions for all
task types, so c-µ-rule cannot minimize the mean task completion time, and
as the result, is not heavy-traffic optimal.
5.4.4 Capacity Region of the Affinity Problem
We propose a decomposition of the arrival rate vector λ = (λi : i ∈ L) as
follows. For any task type i ∈ L, λi is decomposed into (λi,m,m ∈M),
where λi,m is assumed to be the arrival rate of type i tasks for server m.
Hence, λi =
∑M
m=1 λi,m. By using the fluid model planning algorithm, the
affinity queueing system can be stabilized under a given arrival rate vector λ
as long as the necessary condition of total 1-local, 2-local, ..., and Nm local
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load on server m being strictly less than one for any server m is satisfied:
∑
i∈L
λi,m
µi,m
< 1, ∀m ∈M. (5.14)
Hence, the capacity region of the affinity problem is the set of all arrival rate
vectors λ that has a decomposition (λi,m, i ∈ L,m ∈M) satisfying (5.14):
Λ =
{
λ = (λi : i ∈ L)
∣∣ ∃λi,m ≥ 0,∀i ∈ L,∀m ∈M, s.t.
λi =
M∑
m=1
λi,m, ∀i ∈ L,
∑
i∈L
λi,m
µi,m
< 1,∀m ∈M}. (5.15)
A linear programming optimization problem can be solved to find the ca-
pacity region Λ. The GB-PANDAS algorithm stabilizes the system for any
arrival rate vector inside the capacity region by knowing the service rate ma-
trix. It is proved in Section 5.6 that the Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm is
throughput-optimal without the knowledge of the service rate matrix, Bµ.
5.5 The Blind GB-PANDAS Algorithm for the Affinity
Problem
The GB-PANDAS and Max-Weight algorithms need to know the precise
value of the service rate matrix, but this requirement is not realistic for real
applications. Furthermore, the service rate matrix can change over time,
which confuses the load balancing algorithm if it uses a fixed given service
rate matrix. In the Blind version of GB-PANDAS, the service rate matrix is
initiated randomly and is updated as the system is running. More specifically,
an exploration-exploitation framework is combined with GB-PANDAS. In the
exploration phase, the routing and scheduling are performed so as to allow
room for making the estimations of the system parameters more precise, and
in the exploitation phase the routing and scheduling are done based on the
available estimation of the service rate matrix so as to stabilize the system.
Here we assume that Nm is known as well as the locality level of a task
on servers that can be inferred from prior knowledge on the structure of
the system. This is not a necessary assumption for throughput-optimality
110
proof, but it makes the intuition behind Blind GB-PANDAS more clear. As
mentioned before, a single queue per server can be used when using Blind
GB-PANDAS, in which case, there is no need to know Nm as well as the
ordering of service rates offered by servers for different task types.
We first propose the updating method used for the service rate matrix
before getting into the routing and scheduling policies of the Blind GB-
PANDAS algorithm. The estimated service rate matrix at time slot t is
denoted as
B˜µ(t) =

µ˜1,1(t) µ˜1,2(t) µ˜1,3(t) . . . µ˜1,M(t)
µ˜2,1(t) µ˜2,2(t) µ˜2,3(t) . . . µ˜2,M(t)
...
...
...
. . .
...
µ˜NT ,1(t) µ˜NT ,2(t) µ˜NT ,3(t) . . . µ˜NT ,M(t)
 . (5.16)
Note that α˜1m(t), α˜
2
m(t), · · · , α˜Nmm (t), ∀m ∈ M, which are the estimates of
α1m(t), α
2
m(t), · · · , αNmm (t), ∀m ∈ M at time slot t, are nothing but the dis-
tinct values of the elements of the service rate matrix. More specifically,
those are the α˜nm, ∀m ∈ M, ∀n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nm} that are getting updated
and then mapped into their corresponding elements in the service rate matrix
to form B˜µ in (5.16) as mentioned in Subsection 5.4.1. Consider a random
initialization of α˜nm(0) > 0, ∀m ∈ M, ∀n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nm} at time slot
t = 0. If server m has processed n˜ − 1 tasks that are n-local to this server
by time t1, the estimate of α
n
m at this time slot is α˜
n
m(t1), and a new observa-
tion of service time for n-local task to server m is made at time slot t2 > t1
as T nm(t2), we have α˜
n
m(t) = α˜
n
m(t1) for t1 ≤ t < t2 and the update of this
parameter at time slot t2 is
α˜nm(t2) =
n˜− 1
n˜
· α˜nm(t1) +
1
n˜ · T nm(t2)
. (5.17)
Note that α˜nm is the service rate, not the service time mean, that is why
1
Tnm(t2)
is used above in the update of the service rate. In the following,
the routing and scheduling policies of Blind GB-PANDAS are presented,
where the exploration rate is chosen in such a way that infinitely many n-
local tasks are scheduled for service on server m for any m ∈ M and any
n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nm} so that by using the strong law of large numbers, the
parameter estimations in (5.17) converge to their real values almost surely.
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Blind GB-PANDAS Routing Policy: The estimated workload on server
m at time slot t is defined based on parameter estimations in (5.17) as
W˜m(t) =
Q1m(t)
α˜1m(t)
+
Q2m(t)
α˜2m(t)
+ · · ·+ Q
Nm
m (t)
α˜Nmm (t)
. (5.18)
The routing of an incoming task is based on the following exploitation policy
with probability pe = max(1 − p(t), 0), and is based on the exploration
policy otherwise, where p(t) → 0 as t → ∞ and ∑∞t=0 p(t) = ∞, e.g. the
exploitation probability can be chosen as pe = 1− 1tc for 0 < c ≤ 1.
• Exploitation phase: An incoming task of type i is routed to the
corresponding sub-queue of the server with the minimum estimated
weighted workload, where ties are broken arbitrarily. The server m˜∗
with the minimum weighted workload for task of type i is defined as
m˜∗ = arg min
m∈M
W˜m(t)
µ˜i,m(t)
.
The corresponding sub-queue of server m˜∗ for a task of type i is n if
µ˜i,m˜∗ = α˜
n
m˜∗ .
• Exploration phase: An incoming task of type i is routed to the
corresponding sub-queue of a server chosen uniformly at random among
{1, 2, · · · ,M}.
Blind GB-PANDAS Scheduling Policy: The scheduling of an idle server
is based on the following exploitation policy with probability pe, and is based
on the exploration policy otherwise.
• Exploitation phase: Priority scheduling is performed for an idle
server as discussed in Subsection 5.4.2. We emphasize that given the
routing policy, priority scheduling is the optimal scheduling policy in
terms of minimizing the average completion time of tasks.
• Exploration phase: An idle server is scheduled to one of its non-
empty sub-queues uniformly at random, and stays idle if all its sub-
queues are empty.
Since the arrival rate of any task type is strictly positive, infinitely many
of each task type arrives to system, and given the fact that the probabil-
ity of exploration in both routing and scheduling policies decays such that
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∑∞
t=0 p(t) = ∞, using the second Borel-Cantelli lemma (zero-one law), it is
obvious that n-local tasks to server m are scheduled to this server for in-
finitely many times for any locality level and any server, so B˜µ(t)→ Bµ as
t→∞ using the updates in (5.17).
Remark 11. There has been a debate in the queueing community whether
the exploration phase in a load balancing algorithm is required to stabilize a
queueing system with unknown processing rates or the processing rates are
learned through a natural learning phenomenon and, as a result, no explo-
ration is needed. We provide an example in Figure 5.5 that shows no explo-
ration can not only increase the mean task completion time, but it can also
make the system unstable when the arrival rates are inside the capacity re-
gion of the queueing system. Consider a queueing system as depicted on the
left-hand side of Figure 5.5, where the processing times of any tasks on any
servers are deterministic with the given rates and the arrival process of tasks
is deterministic as well with the rates shown in the figure. It is obvious that
the optimal load balancing is to process task type 1 on server 1 and task type
2 on server 2. However, if the processing rates are initialized as in the middle
queueing system of Figure 5.5, for any λ1 ≤ 0.5 and λ2 ≤ 0.5, task type 1
is processed by server 2 and task type 2 is processed by server 1 under the
GB-PANDAS and MaxWeight algorithms, resulting in a mean task comple-
tion time that is twice the optimal value. On the other hand, if the processing
rates are initialized as in the right-hand-side queueing system of Figure 5.5,
for any 0.5 < λ1 ≤ 1 and 0.5 < λ2 ≤ 1, the system is unstable under the
GB-PANDAS and MaxWeight algorithms, while such processing rates are in-
side the capacity region of the queueing system. As a result, exploration is
required in the load balancing algorithm in general for a queueing system with
unknown processing rates. Using the intuition of the given example, it is a
promising future work to find conditions for which exploration is not required
for the purpose of delay optimality and/or stability.
5.5.1 Queueing Dynamics under the Blind GB-PANDAS
Algorithm for the Affinity Problem
Denote the queue length vector at time slot t by Q(t) =
(
Q11(t), Q
2
1(t), · · · ,
QN
1
1 (t), · · · , QNMM (t)
)
. Let the number of incoming tasks of type i that are
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The true processing rates 
that are unknown.
Initialization of processing 
rates that results in a larger 
mean task completion time.
Initialization of processing rates 
that makes the system unstable.
Figure 5.5: This example shows that a queueing system with unknown
processing rates can even be unstable for some initialization of processing
rates if there is no exploration in the load balancing algorithm.
routed to their corresponding sub-queue of server m at the beginning of time
slot t be denoted as Ai,m(t). Then, by denoting the number of incoming
n-local tasks to server m that are routed to Qnm at the beginning of time slot
t by Anm(t), we have:
Anm(t) =
∑
i∈Lnm
Ai,m(t), ∀m ∈M, 1 ≤ n ≤ Nm. (5.19)
Denote the set of working status of servers by vector f(t) =
(
f1(t), f2(t),
· · · , fM(t)
)
, where
fm(t) =

−1, if server m is idle,
1, if server m processes a 1-local task from Q1m,
2, if server m processes a 2-local task from Q2m,
...
Nm, if server m processes an Nm-local task from QN
m
m .
If server m finishes processing a task at the end of time slot t−1, i.e. fm(t−) =
−1, a scheduling decision is taken for time t based on Q(t) and f(t). Denote
the scheduling decision for server m at time slot t by ηm(t) that is defined
as follows. For all busy servers, ηm(t) = fm(t), and when fm(t
−) = −1, i.e.
server m is idle, ηm(t) is determined by the scheduler according to the Blind
GB-PANDAS algorithm. Let η(t) =
(
η1(t), η2(t), · · · , ηM(t)
)
.
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Let Snm(t) denote the n-local service provided by server m, where such a
service has the rate of αnm if ηm(t) = n for 1 ≤ n ≤ Nm, and the rate is zero
otherwise. Then, the queue dynamics for any m ∈M is as follows:
Qnm(t+ 1) = Q
n
m(t) + A
n
m(t)− Snm(t), for 1 ≤ n ≤ Nm − 1,
QN
m
m (t+ 1) = Q
Nm
m (t) + A
Nm
m (t)− SN
m
m (t) + Um(t),
(5.20)
where Um(t) = max
{
0, SN
m
m (t) − ANmm (t) − QNmm (t)
}
is the unused service
offered by server m at time slot t.
Note that
{
Q(t), t ≥ 0} does not necessarily form a Markov chain, i.e.
Q(t + 1)|Q(t) 6⊥ Q(t − 1), since nothing can be said about locality of
an in-service task at a server by just knowing the queue lengths. Even{
(Q(t),η(t)) , t ≥ 0} is not a Markov chain since the service time distri-
butions do not necessarily have the memoryless property. In order to use
Foster-Lyapunov theorem for proving the positive recurrence of a Markov
chain, we need to consider another measurement of the status of servers as
follows.
• Let Ψm(t) denote the number of time slots at the beginning of time
slot t that server m has been allocated on the current in-service task
on server m. This parameter is set to zero when server m finishes
processing a task. Let Ψ (t) =
(
Ψ1(t), Ψ2(t), · · · , ΨM(t)
)
.
Lemma 6.
{
Z(t) =
(
Q(t),η(t),Ψ (t)
)
, t ≥ 0} forms an irreducible and
aperiodic Markov chain. The state space of the Markov chain {Z(t)} is
S = (∏m∈MNNm)× (∏m∈M{1, 2, · · · , Nm})× NM .
The proof of Lemma 6 is provided in Appendix D.7.
5.6 Throughput Optimality of the Blind GB-PANDAS
Algorithm for the Affinity Problem
Subsection 5.6.1 provides preliminaries on the workload dynamic of servers,
the ideal workload on servers, some lemmas, and an extended version of
the Foster-Lyapunov. The throughput-optimality theorem of the Blind GB-
PANDAS algorithm and its proof are presented in Subsection 5.6.2, where
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the proof is followed by using Lemmas 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Refer to Appendix
D for the proofs of all lemmas.
5.6.1 Preliminary Materials and Lemmas
The workload on server m evolves as follows:
Wm(t+ 1) =
Q1m(t+ 1)
α1m
+
Q2m(t+ 1)
α2m
+ · · ·+ Q
Nm
m (t+ 1)
αNmm
(a)
=
Q1m(t) + A
1
m(t)− S1m(t)
α1m
+
Q2m(t) + A
2
m(t)− S2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ Q
Nm
m (t) + A
Nm
m (t)− SNmm (t) + Um(t)
αNmm
= Wm(t) +
(
A1m(t)
α1m
+
A2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ A
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
)
−
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+
S2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ S
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
)
+
Um(t)
αNmm
(b)
= Wm(t) + Am(t)− Sm(t) + U˜m(t),
where (a) is true by using the queue dynamics in (5.20) and (b) follows from
defining the pseudo task arrival, service, and unused services of server m as
Am(t) =
A1m(t)
α1m
+
A2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ A
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
, ∀m ∈M,
Sm(t) =
S1m(t)
α1m
+
S2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ S
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
, ∀m ∈M,
U˜m(t) =
Um(t)
αNmm
, ∀m ∈M.
(5.21)
By defining the pseudo task arrival, service, and unused service processes
as A(t) =
(
A1(t), A2(t), · · · , AM(t)
)
, S(t) =
(
S1(t), S2(t), · · · , SM(t)
)
, and
U˜(t) =
(
U˜1(t), U˜2(t), · · · , U˜M(t)
)
, respectively, the vector of servers’ work-
loads defined by W = (W1,W2, · · · ,WM) evolves as
W (t+ 1) = W (t) +A(t)− S(t) + U˜(t). (5.22)
Lemma 7. For any arrival rate vector inside the capacity region, λ ∈ Λ,
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there exists a load decomposition {λi,m} and δ > 0 such that
∑
i∈L
λi,m
µi,m
<
1
1 + δ
, ∀m ∈M. (5.23)
The fluid model planning algorithm solves a linear programming to find the
load decomposition {λi,m} that is used in its load balancing on the M servers.
In other words, this load decomposition is a possibility of task assignment on
servers to stabilize the system.
The proof of Lemma 7 is provided in Appendix D.8. Lemma 7 is used in
the proof of Lemma 10.
Definition 20. The ideal workload on server m corresponding to the load
decomposition {λi,m} of Lemma 7 is defined as
wm =
∑
i∈L
λi,m
µi,m
, ∀m ∈M. (5.24)
Let w = (w1, w2, · · · , wM). The vector of servers’ ideal workload is used as
an intermediary term in Lemmas 9 and 10 which are later used for throughput
optimality proof of the Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm.
Lemma 8.
〈W (t), U˜(t)〉 = 0, ∀t.
The proof of Lemma 8 is provided in Appendix D.9.
The following lemma states that the sum over a time period of the inner
product of the workload and the pseudo arrival rate is dominated in an
expectation sense by the inner product of the workload and the ideal workload
plus constants depending on the initial state of the system.
Lemma 9. Under the exploration-exploitation routing policy of the Blind
GB-PANDAS algorithm, for any arrival rate vector inside the capacity region,
λ ∈ Λ, and the corresponding ideal workload vector w defined in (5.24), and
for any arbitrary small θ0 > 0, there exists T0 > t0 such that for any t0 ≥ 0
and T > T0:
E
[ t0+T−1∑
t=T0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)] ≤ θ0T‖Q(t0)‖1 + c0,
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where the constants θ0, c0 > 0 are independent of Z(t0).
The proof of Lemma 9 is provided in Appendix D.10. We emphasize that
θ0 in Lemma 9 can be made arbitrarily small, as can be seen in the proof,
which is used in the throughput optimality proof of Blind GB-PANDAS,
Theorem 9. Throughout the chapter, ‖.‖ and ‖.‖1 are the L2-norm and
L1-norm, respectively.
The following lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 9 for the pseudo service
process.
Lemma 10. Under the exploration-exploitation scheduling policy of the Blind
GB-PANDAS algorithm, for any arrival rate vector inside the capacity region,
λ ∈ Λ, and the corresponding ideal workload vector w in (5.24), there exists
T1 > 0 such that for any T > T1, we have:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ1T‖Q(t0)‖1 + c1, ∀t0 ≥ 0,
(5.25)
where the constants θ1, c1 > 0 are independent of Z(t0).
The proof of Lemma 10 is provided in Appendix D.11.
Lemma 11. Under the exploration-exploitation load balancing of the Blind
GB-PANDAS algorithm, for any arrival rate vector inside the capacity region,
λ ∈ Λ, and for any θ2 > 0, there exists T2 > 0 such that for any T > T2 and
for any t0 ≥ 0, we have:
E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t0)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)] ≤ −θ2‖Ψ (t0)‖1 +MT.
The proof of Lemma 11 is provided in Appendix D.12.
Theorem 3.3.8 in [203], an extended version of the Foster-Lyapunov theo-
rem: Consider an irreducible Markov chain {Z(t)}, where t ∈ N, with a state
space S. If there exists a function V : S → R+, a positive integer T ≥ 1,
and a finite set P ⊆ S satisfying the following condition:
E
[
V (Z(t0 + T ))− V (Z(t0))
∣∣Z(t0) = z]
≤− θ · I{z∈Pc} + C · I{z∈P},
(5.26)
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for some θ > 0 and C < ∞, then the irreducible Markov chain {Z(t)} is
positive recurrent.
5.6.2 Throughput Optimality Theorem and Proof
Theorem 9. The Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm is throughput-optimal for a
system with affinity setup discussed in Section 5.4, with general service time
distributions with finite means and supports, without prior knowledge on the
service rate matrix Bµ and the arrival rate vector λ.
Proof. We use the Foster-Lyapunov theorem for proving that the irreducible
and aperiodic Markov chain
{
Z(t) =
(
Q(t),η(t),Ψ (t)
)
, t ≥ 0} (Lemma 6)
is positive recurrent under the Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm, as far as the
arrival rate vector is inside the capacity region, λ ∈ Λ. This means that as
time goes to infinity, the distribution of Z(t) converges to its stationary dis-
tribution, which implies that the system is stable and Blind GB-PANDAS is
throughput-optimal. To this end, we choose the following Lyapunov function
V : S → R+ and use Lemmas 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 to derive its drift afterward:
V (Z(t)) = ‖W (t)‖2 + ‖Ψ (t)‖1. (5.27)
By choosing θ0 in Lemma 9 less than θ1 in Lemma 10, θ0 < θ1, we get T0
from Lemma 9, which is used in the drift of the Lyapunov function in Lemma
12.
Lemma 12. For any t0 ≤ T0 < T , specifically T0 from Lemma 9 that is
dictated by choosing θ0 < θ1, we have the following for the drift of the Lya-
punov function in (5.27), where T0 is used in the first summation after the
inequality:
E
[
V (Z(t0 + T ))− V (Z(t0))
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=T0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]+ c2‖Q(t0)‖1 + c3.
(5.28)
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The proof of Lemma 12 is provided in Appendix D.13. By choosing
T > max{T0, T1, T2, θ2+c22(θ1−θ0)}, where θ2 > 0 is the one in Lemma 11, and
substituting the terms on the right-hand side of the Lyapunov function drift
(D.35) in Lemma 12 from the corresponding inequalities in Lemmas 9, 10,
and 11, we have:
E
[
V (Z(t0 + T ))− V (Z(t0))
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ2
(
‖Q(t0)‖1 + ‖Ψ (t0)‖1
)
+ c, ∀t0,
where c = 2c0 + 2c1 + c3 +MT .
Let P = {Z = (Q,η,Ψ) ∈ S : ‖Q‖1 + ‖Ψ‖1 ≤ c¯+cθ2 } for any positive
constant c¯ > 0, where P is a finite set of the state space S. By this choice
of P for the Lyapunov function V (.) defined in (5.27), all the conditions of
the Foster-Lyapunov theorem are satisfied, which completes the throughput
optimality proof for the Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm.
Note that the priority scheduling in the exploitation phase of the Blind GB-
PANDAS algorithm is not used for the throughput optimality proof since the
expected workload of a server is decreased in the same rate no matter what
locality level is receiving service from the server. As long as an idle server
gives service to one of the tasks in its sub-queues continuously, the system
is stable. Given the routing policy, the priority scheduling is used in the
exploitation phase to minimize the mean task completion time.
5.7 Simulation Results
In this section, we first compare the simulated performance of the proposed
GB-PANDAS algorithm against those of Hadoop’s default FCFS scheduler,
Join-the-Shortest-Queue-Priority (JSQ-Priority), and JSQ-MaxWeight algo-
rithms. Consider a computing cluster with 5000 servers where each rack
consists of 50 servers and each super rack includes 10 of the racks (so four
levels of locality exist). We considered geometric and log-normal distribu-
tions for processing times and under both assumptions our algorithm out-
performs others. Due to the similarity of the results in the two cases we
only present the results for log-normal distribution. We assumed the i-local
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Figure 5.6: Capacity region comparison of the algorithms.
service time follows log-normal distribution with both mean and standard de-
viation equal to µi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, where µ1 = 1, µ2 = 109 , µ3 = 53 , and µ4 = 4
(remote service is on average slower than local service by a factor of two to
six times in data centers [108], and we have chosen four times slowdown in
our simulations). Figure 5.6 shows the throughput performance of the four
algorithms, where the y-axis shows the mean task completion time and the
x-axis shows the mean arrival rate, i.e.
∑
L¯ λL¯
M
. The GB-PANDAS and JSQ-
MaxWeight algorithms are throughput optimal while FCFS and JSQ-Priority
algorithms are not (note that JSQ-Priority is proven to be delay optimal for
two locality levels, but it is not even throughput optimal for more locality
levels). Figure 5.7 compares the performance of the GB-PANDAS and JSQ-
MaxWeight at high loads, where the first algorithm outperforms the latter
by twofold. This significant improvement over JSQ-MaxWeight algorithm
shows that JSQ-MaxWeight is not delay optimal and supports the possibil-
ity that the GB-PANDAS algorithm is delay optimal in a larger region than
the JSQ-MaxWeight algorithm.
By the intuition we got from the delay optimality proof of the JSQ-
MaxWeight algorithm for two locality levels in [132], [134], [201], and [204],
we simulated the system under a load for which we believe JSQ-MaxWeight
is delay optimal. Figure 5.8 shows the result for this specific load and we
see that both the GB-PANDAS and JSQ-MaxWeight algorithms have the
same performance at high loads, which again supports our guess on delay
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Figure 5.7: Heavy-traffic performance.
optimality of our proposed algorithm. Note that Wang et al. [132] showed
that the JSQ-MaxWeight algorithm outperforms the Hadoop Fair Scheduler
(HFS). Since our proposed algorithm outperforms JSQ-MaxWeight, we did
not bring the HFS algorithm into our simulations.
In the following, the simulated performance of the Blind GB-PANDAS
algorithm is compared with FCFS, Max-Weight, and c-µ-rule algorithms.
FCFS does not use system parameters for load balancing, but Max-Weight
and c-µ-rule use the same exploration-exploitation approach as Blind GB-
PANDAS. Convex cost functions Ci(Qi) = Q
1.01
i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} are used
for the c-µ-rule algorithm. Since the objective is to minimize the mean
task completion time, the convexities of the cost functions are chosen so
as to be close to a line for small values of Qi. Three types of tasks and
a computing cluster of three servers are considered with processing rates
depicted in Figure 5.9, which are not known from the perspective of the
load balancing algorithms. The task arrivals are Poisson processes with the
unknown rates determined in Figure 5.9 and the processing times are log-
normal that are heavy-tailed and do not have the memoryless property. Note
that this affinity structure does not have the rack structure mentioned in [134]
since from the processing rates of task type 2 on the three servers, servers 1
and 2 are in the same rack as server 3, but from the processing rates of task
type 3 on the three servers, the second server is in the same rack as the third
server, but not the first server. Hence, this affinity setup is more complicated
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Figure 5.8: Mean task completion time under a specific load.
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Figure 5.9: The affinity structure used for simulation with three types of
tasks and three multi-skilled servers.
than the one with a rack structure.
Inspired by the fluid model planning algorithm, the following linear pro-
gramming optimization should be solved to find the capacity region of the
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Figure 5.10: Capacity region comparison of the Blind GB-PANDAS,
Max-Weight, c-µ-rule, and FCFS algorithms.
simulated system.
maximize
λi,m
λ =
3∑
i=1
3∑
m=1
λi,m
subject to:
λ1,1 + 2λ2,1 + 4λ3,1 < 1, λ1,1 + λ1,2 + λ1,3 = 0.4λ,
λ1,2 + 2λ2,2 + 2λ3,2 < 1, λ2,1 + λ2,2 + λ2,3 = 0.2λ,
λ1,3 + λ2,3 + λ3,3 < 1, λ3,1 + λ3,2 + λ3,3 = 0.4λ,
λi,m ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The capacity region in terms of λ is found to be λ ∈ [0, 2.5). Figure 5.10
compares the throughput performance of the four algorithms, where the
mean task completion time versus the total task arrival rate, λ =
∑3
i=1 λi,
is plotted. The Blind GB-PANDAS, Max-Weight, and c-µ-rule algorithms
are throughput-optimal by stabilizing the system for λ < 2.5. Taking a
closer look at the performance of these algorithms at high loads, Blind GB-
PANDAS has a much lower mean task completion time compared to Max-
Weight and c-µ-rule algorithms as depicted in Figure 5.11.
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Figure 5.11: Heavy-traffic performance comparison.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
In this dissertation, risk-averse algorithms for multi-armed bandits, stochas-
tic games, and stochastic congestion games are studied. The classical ap-
proaches for multi-armed bandits and games only take the expected re-
wards/payoffs into account. Instead, we introduce probability statements
that use the reward/payoff distributions and propose a new definition of risk-
averse optimality for explore-then-commit finite bandit problems and new
risk-averse equilibria for stochastic games. We further used an exploration-
exploitation scheme for load balancing in an affinity problem with no knowl-
edge on task processing rates on servers and task arrival rates. The four chap-
ters of this dissertation on explore-then-commit finite bandits, risk-averse
stochastic games, stochastic congestion games, and blind load balancing are
concluded in more details in the following and directions for future research
are presented.
• The focus of Chapter 2 is on application domains, such as personal-
ized health-care and one-time investment, where an experimentation
phase of pure arm exploration is followed by a given finite number of
exploitations of the best identified arm. We show through an exam-
ple that the arm with maximum expected reward does not necessarily
maximize the probability of receiving the maximum reward. We study
the risk-averse explore-then-commit finite-exploitation bandits with or
without considering exploration costs. In the case in which the ex-
ploration cost is not considered, we propose the OTE-MAB and FTE-
MAB algorithms whose goals are to select the arm that maximizes the
probability of receiving the maximum reward. We define a new no-
tion of regret for our problem setup and find an upper bound on the
minimum number of experiments that should be done to guarantee an
upper bound on regret of our proposed algorithms. In the other case
that the exploration cost is considered, we propose the c-OTE-MAB
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algorithm for a two-armed bandit problem to determine an estimation
of the optimal number of explorations. The promising future works are
to introduce dynamic scores for a case where dynamic exploration is
utilized in the FTE/OTE-MAB algorithms and to extend the results
of the case with exploration costs to explore-then-commit multi-armed
bandits with finite-time exploitations.
• We have proposed a new equilibrium for stochastic games which is risk-
averse (the RAE) as a method for examining one-shot or limited-run
games with stochastic payoffs in Chapter 3. In such a setting, it makes
sense to consider players who want to maximize not the expected pay-
off but rather the likelihood of receiving the largest payoff. In doing
so, we draw parallels to prospect theory in economic decisions, where
consumers prefer an option with lower variance at the cost of lower
expected utility, rather than an option with higher expected utility at
the cost of higher variance when facing significant decisions. We then
propose the risk-averse equilibrium to address one-shot games in such
a situation and show it to exist in any N -player finite stochastic game.
We prove the existence of the risk-averse equilibrium independent of
Nash equilibrium along with familiar concepts such as strategy domi-
nance. We also define a probability tensor and show that the risk-averse
equilibria of a game are equivalent to the Nash equilibria of this tensor.
We next considered the risk-averse equilibrium in limited-run games by
examining M -time commit games, where players commit to a strategy
for the M rounds of the stochastic game.
Looking forward, the risk-averse equilibrium allows competition to be
incorporated into many traditional risk-averse settings. Election mod-
eling is one such example with a limited-run of interactions between
candidates, and each candidate wants to maximize not the expected
votes they receive, but rather their probability of winning. This is
one of the drawbacks to the widely used Hotelling-Downs model [205],
which assumes candidates merely want to maximize their expected
voter share. By instead maximizing their probability of making the
best response to other candidates, the risk-averse equilibrium will be
able to address this shortcoming while offering similar interpretability
and insight.
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• A stochastic atomic congestion game with incomplete information on
travel times along arcs of a traffic/telecommunication network is stud-
ied in Chapter 4 from a risk-averse perspective. Risk-averse travelers
intend to make decisions based on probability statements regarding
their travel options rather than simply taking the average travel time
into account. In order to put this into perspective, we propose three
classes of equilibria, i.e., risk-averse equilibrium (RAE), mean-variance
equilibrium (MVE), and CVaRα equilibrium (CVaRαE). The MV and
CVaRα equilibria are studied in the literature for networks with sim-
plifying assumptions such as that the probability distributions of link
delays are load independent or link delays are independent, which are
not the case in this work. The notions of best responses in risk-averse,
mean-variance, and CVaRα equilibria are based on maximizing the
probability of traveling along the shortest path, minimizing a linear
combination of mean and variance of path delay, and minimizing the
expected delay at a specified risky quantile of the delay distributions,
respectively. We prove that the risk-averse, mean-variance, and CVaRα
equilibria exist for any finite stochastic atomic congestion game. Al-
though proving bounds on the price of anarchy (PoA) is not the focus
of this work, we numerically study the impact of risk-averse equilibria
on PoA and observe that the Braess paradox may not occur to the ex-
tent presented originally and the PoA may improve upon using any of
the proposed equilibria in both Braess and Pigou networks. Promising
future directions are to study non-atomic, instead of atomic, stochastic
congestion games in the proposed three classes of equilibria in their
general case where the arc delay distributions are load dependent and
not necessarily independent of each other, to find bounds on the price
of anarchy for the proposed three classes of equilibria, and to find a uni-
fied class of equilibrium that captures risk-aversion for a broader class
of travel time distributions in traffic/telecommunication networks.
• The Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm is proposed in Chapter 5 for the
affinity load balancing problem where no knowledge of the task ar-
rival rates and the service rate matrix is available. An exploration-
exploitation approach is proposed for load balancing which consists of
exploration and exploitation phases. The system is proven to be stable
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under Blind GB-PANDAS and is shown empirically through simula-
tions to have a better delay performance than Max-Weight, c-µ-rule,
and FCFS algorithms. Investigating the subspace of the capacity re-
gion in which GB-PANDAS is delay optimal is a promising direction
for future work. In order to start with a simpler case, one can check
whether the GB-PANDAS algorithm is heavy-traffic optimal in the
same region that the JSQ-MaxWeight algorithm proposed by Wang et
al. [132] is heavy-traffic optimal in a system with a nested rack struc-
ture as proposed in Chapter 5.1. Note that both GB-PANDAS and
Max-Weight algorithms have high routing and scheduling computa-
tion complexity which can be alleviated using power-of-d-choices [206]
or join-idle-queue [207] algorithms which are interesting directions to
study as well. Another interesting future work is to consider a case
where there are precedence relations between several tasks of a job, i.e.
a departing task may join another queue.
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Appendix A
THEOREM AND COROLLARY PROOFS
OF THE OTE/FTE-MAB AND
C-OTE-MAB ALGORITHMS FOR
CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. For any 0 < r, ∆p < 1, if all of the K arms are experimented
jointly for N ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p2
times in the experimentation phase, the one-time
exploitation regret is bounded by r, i.e. r(∆p) ≤ r.
Proof. Consider the Bernoulli random variables Bk = 1{Rk ≥ R−k} and
their unknown means pk = E[Bk] = P(Rk ≥ R−k) for k ∈ K. Possessing N
independent observations from the joint rewards of the K arms in the pure
exploration phase, the confidence interval derived from Hoeffding’s inequality
for estimating pk based on Equation (2.4) with confidence level 1−2e−a
2
2 has
the property that
P
(
pk ∈
(
pˆk − a
2
√
N
, pˆk +
a
2
√
N
))
≥1− 2e−a
2
2 , ∀k ∈ K.
(A.1)
In order to find a bound on regret, defined in Equation (2.5) as r(∆p) =
P (pk∗ − pkˆ ≥ ∆p), note that
{pk∗ − pkˆ ≥ ∆p}
⊆
{
∃k ∈ K such that pk /∈
(
pˆk − ∆p
2
, pˆk +
∆p
2
)}
(a)
⊆
{
∃k ∈ K such that pk /∈
(
pˆk − a
2
√
N
, pˆk +
a
2
√
N
)}
,
(A.2)
where (a) is true if a
2
√
N
≤ ∆p
2
. By using union bound and Equation (A.1),
Portions of this appendix were previously published in Yekkehkhany et al. [176] and
are used here with permission.
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the probability of the right-hand side of the above equation can be bounded
as follows, which results in the following bound on regret:
r(∆p) = P (pk∗ − pkˆ ≥ ∆p) ≤ 2Ke−
a2
2 = r. (A.3)
The above upper bound on regret is derived under the condition that
a
2
√
N
≤ ∆p
2
, which by using a2 = 2 ln
(
2K
r
)
and simple algebraic calculations
results in N ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p2
.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. For any 0 < r, ∆p < 1, if all of the K arms are explored
jointly for N times in the experimentation phase such that bN
M
c ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p2
,
the finite-time exploitation regret is bounded by r, i.e. rM(∆p) ≤ r.
Proof. Consider the Bernoulli random variables BMk = 1{RMk ≥ RM−k} and
their unknown means pMk = E[B
M
k ] = P(RMk ≥ RM−k) for k ∈ K. Possessing
N independent observations from the joint rewards of the K arms in pure
exploration, there are exactly bN
M
c independent samples for estimation of
pMk . Due to the same reasoning in the proof of Theorem 1, the confidence
interval for estimating pMk based on Equation (2.9) or (2.12) with confidence
level 1− 2e−a22 has the property that
P
pMk ∈
pˆMk − a
2
√
bN
M
c
, pˆMk +
a
2
√
bN
M
c
≥ 1− 2e−a22 , (A.4)
for all k ∈ K.
In order to find a bound on regret, defined in Definition 1 as rM(∆p) =
P
(
pMk∗ − pMkˆ ≥ ∆p
)
, note that
{
pMk∗ − pMkˆ ≥ ∆p
}
⊆
{
∃k ∈ K s.t. pMk /∈
(
pˆMk −
∆p
2
, pˆMk +
∆p
2
)}
(a)
⊆
∃k ∈ K s.t. pMk /∈
ˆpMk − a
2
√
bN
M
c
, pˆMk +
a
2
√
bN
M
c
 ,
(A.5)
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where (a) is true if a
2
√
b N
M
c ≤
∆p
2
. By using union bound and Equation (A.4),
the probability of the right-hand side of the above equation can be bounded
as follows, which results in the following bound on regret:
rM(∆p) = P
(
pMk∗ − pMkˆ ≥ ∆p
) ≤ 2Ke−a22 = r. (A.6)
The above upper bound on regret is derived under the condition that
a
2
√
b N
M
c ≤
∆p
2
, which by using a2 = 2 ln
(
2K
r
)
and simple algebraic calculations
results in bN
M
c ≥ 2 ln(
2K
r
)
∆p2
.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. Possessing ne number of joint experiments for the two arms and
assuming that pk∗ ∈ [0.5 + p, 1] when p ∈ (0, 0.5] is an unknown parameter,
we have
Cr
(
Nˆ∗(ne), pk∗
)
− Cr (N∗, pk∗)
≤ Dp
2
√
ne
+∆Cr(Nˆ∗(ne), ne)
ne→∞−−−−→ 0
(A.7)
and
max
n∈I(ne)
(
Cr(n, pk∗)− Cr(N∗, pk∗)
)
≤ Dp√
ne
(A.8)
with confidence level 1− 2e−a22 , where Nˆ∗(ne), N∗, and I(ne) are defined in
Equations (2.15), (2.13), and (2.17), respectively, Dp is a constant as Dp =
a·α·2(4δp+1−
1
2 ln 2)√
2δp ln 2
, where δp =
1
2
(−2− log2(0.5 + p)− log2(0.5− p)) > 0, and
∆Cr(n, ne) =
a·α·√n+2·2−δp·(n−2)√
ne
≤ Dp
2
√
ne
for any n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }.
Proof. The maximum deviation that Crl(n, ne) and Cru(n, ne) can have from
Cr(n, pk∗) is investigated with an associated confidence level. To this end, the
maximum deviation of r∗(n, pˆ∗l (ne)) and r
∗(n, pˆ∗u(ne)) from r
∗(n, pk∗) is found
with the confidence level. First, the maximum deviation of pˆ∗l (ne) and pˆ
∗
u(ne)
from pk∗ with the associated confidence level is derived below. Equation
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(2.16) suggests that the following holds with confidence level 1− 2e−a22 :
pk∗ − pˆ∗l (ne) = pk∗ −max
{
pˆ∗(ne)− a
2
√
ne
, 0.5
}
≤ pk∗ − pˆ∗(ne) + a
2
√
ne
≤ a
2
√
ne
+
a
2
√
ne
=
a√
ne
.
(A.9)
On the other hand,
pk∗ − pˆ∗l (ne) =pk∗ − pˆ∗(ne) + pˆ∗(ne)−max
{
pˆ∗(ne)− a
2
√
ne
, 0.5
}
≥max
{ −a
2
√
ne
, 0.5− pˆ∗(ne)
}
+ min
{ a
2
√
ne
, pˆ∗(ne)−0.5
}
= 0.
(A.10)
The above two equations imply that 0 ≤ pk∗ − pˆ∗l (ne) ≤ a√ne with confidence
level 1− 2e−a22 . Similarly, it can be proved that 0 ≤ pˆ∗u(ne)− pk∗ ≤ a√ne with
the mentioned confidence level.
In the following, Lipschitz constant of function r∗(n, p) with respect to p is
calculated by differentiating the regret function presented in Equation (2.14)
with respect to p as
∂r∗(n, p)
∂p
=
n∑
i=bn
2
c+1
(
n
i
)
· (1− p)i · pn−i ·
(
n− i
p
− i
1− p
)
+
1
2
·
(
n
n
2
)
· (1− p)n2 · pn2 · n
2
·
(1
p
− 1
1− p
)
· 1{n is even}.
(A.11)
Since 0.5 ≤ p ≤ 1, it is easy to verify that ∂r∗(n,p)
∂p
≤ 0, so r∗(n, p) is decreasing
in terms of p. The derivative of r∗(n, p) with respect to p calculated above
can be written as follows by algebraic manipulations:
∂r∗(n, p)
∂p
=
−n
(
n−1
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1− p)n−12 , if n is odd,
−(n− 1)(n−2n−2
2
)
p
n−2
2 (1− p)n−22 , if n is even.
(A.12)
Note that ∂r
∗(n,p)
∂p
= ∂r
∗(n+1,p)
∂p
when n is an odd number and p ∈ [0.5, 1]. On
the other hand, it is obvious that r∗(n, 1) = r∗(n+ 1, 1), so
r∗(n, p) = r∗(n+ 1, p), if n is odd. (A.13)
As a result, in terms of regret, it is not worth it to perform even number of
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experiments since the last experiment does not improve regret.
It is easy to verify that ∂r
∗(n,p)
∂p
∣∣
p=0.5
can get arbitrarily large by increasing
n. Hence, it is assumed that pk∗ ∈ [0.5 + p, 1], where p can be any small
number in the interval (0, 0.5]. In the following, the logarithm in base two of∣∣∣∂r∗(n,p)∂p ∣∣∣ is taken when n is an odd number, and as mentioned earlier, when
n is even, the answer is the same as for n− 1 which is an odd number.
log2
∣∣∣∣∂r∗(n, p)∂p
∣∣∣∣ = log2 n+ log2 (n− 1)!((n−1
2
)
!
)2 + n− 12 ( log2 p+ log2(1− p))
(a)
≤ log2 n+
[
(n− 1
2
) log2(n− 1)− (n− 1) log2 e+ log2 e
− 2
(n
2
log2
n− 1
2
− n− 1
2
log2 e+
1
2
log2 2pi
)]
− (n− 1)(1 + δp) ≤ 1
2
log2(n+ 2)− δp(n− 1),
(A.14)
where (a) follows by Stirling’s approximation, (n − 1)! ≤ (n − 1)n− 12 e−n+2
and
(
n−1
2
)
! ≥ √2pi (n−1
2
)n
2 e−(
n−1
2
), and defining δp as follows:
δp =
1
2
(−2− log2(0.5 + p)− log2(0.5− p)) > 0.
As a result, ∣∣∣∣∂r∗(n, p)∂p
∣∣∣∣ ≤ √n+ 2 · 2−δp(n−1),
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∂r∗(n, p)∂p
∣∣∣∣ = 0. (A.15)
Also note that
∣∣∣∂r∗(n,p)∂p ∣∣∣ given by Equation (A.12) is finite for any given n,
so Equation (A.15) suggests that
∣∣∣∂r∗(n,p)∂p ∣∣∣ is finite for any n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }
and any p ∈ [0.5 + p, 1].
Equations (A.9), (A.10), (A.15), and the fact that r∗(n, p) is decreasing
in terms of p result in the following equation for any n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . } with
confidence level 1− 2e−a22 :
0 ≤ Cr (n, pk∗)− Crl (n, ne)
= α · [r∗ (n, pk∗)− r∗ (n, pˆ∗u(ne)) ]
≤ a · α ·
√
n+ 2 · 2−δp·(n−1)√
ne
.
(A.16)
134
The above equation is true when n is odd, but recall that r∗(n, p) = r∗(n +
1, p) for an odd number n. In order to come up with a unified formula for
Cr (n, pk∗)− Crl (n, ne) for even and odd numbers n, define ∆Cr(n, ne) as
∆Cr(n, ne) ,
a · α · √n+ 2 · 2−δp·(n−2)√
ne
, (A.17)
where lim
ne→∞
∆Cr(n, ne) = 0, ∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · }. The same bounds can be
found for Cru(n, ne)− Cr(n, pk∗), so
0 ≤ Cr(n, pk∗)− Crl(n, ne) ≤ ∆Cr(n, ne),
0 ≤ Cru(n, ne)− Cr(n, pk∗) ≤ ∆Cr(n, ne).
(A.18)
Alternatively, the Gaussian approximation with continuity correction can
be used for r∗(n, p) to find an approximation for ∆Cr(n, ne) as
r∗(n, p)≈
P
(
r˜ ≥ n
2
)
, if n is odd
1
2
[
P
(
r˜ ≥ n+1
2
)
+ P
(
r˜ ≥ n−1
2
)]
, if n is even
, (A.19)
where r˜ ∼ N (n(1− p), np(1− p)). Then,
r∗(n, p) ≈

Q
(√
n(p−0.5)√
p(1−p)
)
, if n is odd,
1
2
[
Q
(√
n(p−0.5)√
p(1−p) +
1
2
√
np(1−p)
)
+
Q
(√
n(p−0.5)√
p(1−p) −
1
2
√
np(1−p)
)]
, if n is even.
(A.20)
The following approximation is followed for n that is odd:
∂r∗(n, p)
∂p
≈ −
√
n
4
√
2pip3(1− p)3 · exp
(−n(p− 0.5)2
2p(1− p)
)
. (A.21)
It is easy to verify that the above approximation of ∂r
∗(n,p)
∂p
for p ∈ [0.5+p, 1]
approaches to zero as n goes to infinity and it is maximized at n = b p(1−p)
(p−0.5)2 c
or n = d p(1−p)
(p−0.5)2 e. Hence, the approximation of the partial derivative of
r∗(n, p) is finite for any n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }. As a result, ∆Cr(n, ne) can be
135
estimated by a·α·
√
n
4
√
2pip3
k∗ (1−pk∗ )3·ne
· exp
(
−n(pk∗−0.5)2
2pk∗ (1−pk∗ )
)
, where pk∗ ∈ [0.5 + p, 1].
This result is consistent with the one in Equation (A.15).
The upper bound in Equation (2.18) with confidence level 1 − 2e−a22 is
proved as follows. Equation (A.18) results in the following for any n ∈
{1, 2, 3, . . . }:
Cr (n, pˆ∗(ne))−∆Cr(n, ne) ≤ Cr (n, pk∗) ≤ Cr (n, pˆ∗(ne)) +∆Cr(n, ne).
(A.22)
Taking minimum from all sides of the above inequality results in
Cr
(
Nˆ∗(ne), pˆ∗(ne)
)
−max
n
{∆Cr(n, ne)}
≤ Cr (N∗, pk∗) ≤ Cr
(
Nˆ∗(ne), pˆ∗(ne)
)
+ max
n
{∆Cr(n, ne)} .
(A.23)
Using Equations (A.22) and (A.23) concludes as
Cr
(
Nˆ∗(ne), pk∗
)
− Cr (N∗, pk∗)
≤max
n
{∆Cr(n, ne)}+∆Cr(Nˆ∗(ne), ne)
≤ Dp
2
√
ne
+∆Cr(Nˆ∗(ne), ne),
(A.24)
where Dp =
a·α·2(4δp+1−
1
2 ln 2)√
2δp ln 2
is a constant that is derived as follows. For
a given ne, the function ∆Cr(n, ne) is increasing in terms of n when n <
1
2δp ln 2
− 2 and is decreasing when n > 1
2δp ln 2
− 2. Hence, max
n
∆Cr(n, ne) ≤
∆Cr( 1
2δp ln 2
− 2, ne) = a·α·2(
4δp− 12 ln 2)√
2δpne ln 2
.
In the following, the upper bound in Equation (2.19) with confidence level
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1− 2e−a22 is derived as
max
n∈I(ne)
(
Cr(n, pk∗)− Cr(N∗, pk∗)
)
(a)
≤ max
n∈I(ne)
(
Crl(n, ne)− Cr(N∗, pk∗) +∆Cr(n, ne)
)
(b)
= max
n∈I(ne)
(
Crl(n, ne)− Cru(N∗u , ne)︸ ︷︷ ︸
it is non-positive due to Equation (2.17)
+ Cru(N
∗
u , ne)− Cr(N∗, pk∗) +∆Cr(n, ne)
)
(c)
≤ max
n∈I(ne)
(
Cru(N
∗, ne)− Cr(N∗, pk∗) +∆Cr(n, ne)
)
(d)
≤ max
n∈I(ne)
2∆Cr(n, ne) ≤ max
n
2∆Cr(n, ne) ≤ Dp√
ne
,
(A.25)
where (a) follows by Equation (A.18), (b) is true by subtracting and adding
the term Cru(N
∗
u , ne), (c) uses the fact that N
∗
u = arg min
n
Cru(n, ne), so
Cru(N
∗
u , ne) ≤ Cru(N∗, ne), and (d) again follows by Equation (A.18).
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3
Corollary 3.
lim
ne→∞
E
[
Nˆ∗(ne)
]
= N∗. (A.26)
Proof. Equation (2.20) follows by the Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence
Theorem since pˆ∗(ne) converges almost surely to pk∗ and r∗(n, .) is positive
and dominated by one half almost surely for any ne, so Nˆ
∗(ne) is uniformly
bounded by min
{
n : C(m) ≥ C(1) + α
2
,∀m ≥ n} that always exists and is
bounded due to the fact that limn→∞ =∞, then
lim
ne→∞
E
[
Nˆ∗(ne)
]
= E
[
lim
ne→∞
Nˆ∗(ne)
]
= E [N∗] = N∗. (A.27)
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A.5 Proof of Corollary 4
Corollary 4. The set of optimal stopping points N∗ defined in Equation
(2.13) is a subset of the set I(ne) defined in Equation (2.17) with the as-
sociated confidence level, i.e. N∗ ⊆ I(ne) with confidence level 1 − 2e−a
2
2 .
Furthermore, I(ne) = N∗ with the mentioned confidence level for ne >
D2p(
Cr(N∗,pk∗ )− min
n/∈N∗
Cr(n,pk∗ )
)2 .
Proof. The first part of the corollary is proved by contradiction. Assume by
contradiction that N∗ 6⊆ I(ne) with the associated confidence level, which
means that
Crl (N
∗, ne) > Cru (N∗u , ne) . (A.28)
Furthermore,
Cr(N∗, pk∗) ≥ Crl(N∗, ne),
Cr(N∗u , pk∗) ≥ Cr(N∗, pk∗),
(A.29)
where the first inequality is true by Equation (A.18) and the second one is
true due to the fact that N∗ minimizes the function Cr(n, pk∗). Equations
(A.28) and (A.29) result in
Cr(N∗u , pk∗) > Cru (N
∗
u , ne) , (A.30)
which is a contradiction to Equation (A.18), which means that N∗ ⊆ I(ne)
with the associated confidence level.
The second part of the corollary follows by Equation (2.19) and the fact
that N∗ ⊆ I(ne) with the associated confidence level. If Dp√ne < Cr(N∗, pk∗)−
min
n/∈N∗
Cr(n, pk∗), no n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }\N∗ can satisfy Equation (2.19), but any
n ∈ N∗ satisfies Equation (2.19) and N∗ ⊆ I(ne) which prove the second
part of the corollary.
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Appendix B
THEOREM PROOF OF THE
RISK-AVERSE EQUILIBRIUM FOR
CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. For any finite N -player game, a risk-averse equilibrium exists.
Proof. Consider the risk-averse best response function RB : Σ → Σ defined
as RB(σ) =
(
RB(σ−1), RB(σ−2), . . . , RB(σ−N)
)
. The existence of a risk-
averse equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a fixed point σ∗ ∈ Σ such
that σ∗ ∈ RB(σ∗). Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem is used to prove the
existence of a fixed point forRB(σ). In order to use Kakutani’s theorem, the
four conditions listed below should be satisfied, which are proven as follows.
1. Σ is a nonempty subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space, compact,
and convex: Σ is nonempty and convex since it is the Cartesian product of
nonempty simplices as each player has at least one feasible pure strategy.
Σ is bounded since each of its elements is between zero and one, and is
closed since it is the Cartesian product of simplices, so Σ contains all its
limit points.
2. RB(σ) is nonempty for all σ ∈ Σ: RB(σ−i) is the set of all probability
distributions over the set specified in Equation (3.2), where the mentioned
set is nonempty since maximum always exists for finite number of values.
3. RB(σ) is a convex set for all σ ∈ Σ: It suffices to prove that RB(σ−i) is
a convex set for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i. Consider σ′i, σ′′i ∈ RB(σ−i) and λ ∈ [0, 1].
Define the supports of σ′i and σ
′′
i as supp(σ
′
i) = {si ∈ Si : σ′i(si) > 0} and
supp(σ′′i ) = {si ∈ Si : σ′′i (si) > 0}, respectively. From the definition of
risk-averse best response in Definition 2,
supp(σ′i), supp(σ
′′
i ) ⊆ arg max
si∈Si
P
(
U i (si,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
.
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As a result,
supp(σ′i) ∪ supp(σ′′i ) ⊆ arg max
si∈Si
P
(
U i (si,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
,
and again due to definition of risk-averse best response, any probability
distribution over the set supp(σ′i) ∪ supp(σ′′i ) is also a best response to
σ−i. The mixed strategy λσ′i + (1− λ)σ′′i is obviously a valid probability
distribution over the set supp(σ′i)∪supp(σ′′i ), so λσ′i+(1−λ)σ′′i ∈ RB(σ−i)
that completes the proof for convexity of the set RB(σ−i).
4. RB(σ) has a closed graph: RB(σ) has a closed graph if for any se-
quence {σn, σ̂n} → {σ, σ̂} with σ̂n ∈ RB(σn) for all n ∈ N, we have
σ̂ ∈ RB(σ). The fact that RB(σ) has a closed graph is proved by con-
tradiction. Consider that RB(σ) does not have a closed graph. Then,
there exists a sequence {σn, σ̂n} → {σ, σ̂} with σ̂n ∈ RB(σn) for all
n ∈ N, but σ̂ /∈ RB(σ). This means there exists some i ∈ [N ] such
that σ̂i /∈ RB(σ−i). As a result, due to the definition of risk-averse best
response in Definition 2, there exists ŝi ∈ supp(σ̂i), s′i ∈ Si, where s′i can
be any of the strategies in the set supp(RB(σ−i)), and some  > 0 such
that
P
(
U i (s
′
i,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i,σ−i)
)
>P
(
U i (ŝi,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ ŝi,σ−i)
)
+ 3.
(B.1)
Given that payoffs are continuous random variables and σn−i → σ−i, for
a sufficiently large n we have
P
(
U i
(
s′i,σ
n
−i
) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i,σn−i) )
>P
(
U i (s
′
i,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i,σ−i)
)
− .
(B.2)
By combining Equations (B.1) and (B.2), for a sufficiently large n we have
P
(
U i
(
s′i,σ
n
−i
) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i,σn−i) )
>P
(
U i (ŝi,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ ŝi,σ−i)
)
+ 2.
(B.3)
Due to the same reasoning as for Equation (B.2), for a sufficiently large
140
n we have
P
(
U i
(
ŝni ,σ
n
−i
) ≥ U i (Si \ ŝni ,σn−i) )
<P
(
U i (ŝi,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ ŝi,σ−i)
)
+ ,
(B.4)
where ŝni ∈ supp(RB(σn−i)). Combining Equations (B.3) and (B.4), for a
sufficiently large n we have
P
(
U i
(
s′i,σ
n
−i
) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i,σn−i) )
>P
(
U i
(
ŝni ,σ
n
−i
) ≥ U i (Si \ ŝni ,σn−i) )+ . (B.5)
However, Equation (B.5) contradicts the fact that ŝni ∈ supp(RB(σn−i)).
The above four properties of the risk-averse best response function RB(σ)
fulfil the conditions for Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem. This means that for
a finite N -player game, there always exists σ∗ ∈ Σ such that σ∗ ∈ RB(σ∗),
where by definition σ∗ is a mixed strategy risk-averse equilibrium.
B.2 Extra Notes on the Risk-Averse Equilibrium
The risk-averse best response of player i to the strategy profile σ−i is pre-
sented in Definition 2 as the set of all probability distributions over the set
arg max
si∈Si
P
(
U i (si,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
. (B.6)
The same randomness on the action of players [N ] \ i is considered in the
random variable U i(si,σ−i) for all si ∈ Si in this work. That is why for si 6=
s′i ∈ Si, the random variables U i(si,σ−i) and U i(s′i,σ−i) are not independent
of each other in a single play of the game. On the other hand, independent
randomness on the action of players [N ] \ i can be considered in U i(si,σ−i)
for all si ∈ Si. In that case, U i(si,σ−i) is independent from U i(s′i,σ−i) for
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all si 6= s′i ∈ Si, so
P
(
U i (si,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
(a)
=
∫
· · ·
∫
xsi≥xSi\si
∏
s′i∈Si
f¯i(xs′i |(s′i,σ−i))dxs′i

(b)
=
∫
· · ·
∫
xsi≥xSi\si
∏
s′i∈Si
∑
s−i∈S−i
(
fi(xs′i |(s′i, s−i)) · σ(s−i)
)
dxs′i

(c)
=
∑
s
1:|Si|
−i ∈S
|Si|
−i
 |Si|∏
k=1
σ(sk−i)
 · P(Ui(si, s1−i) ≥ U i(Si \ si, s2:|Si|−i ))
 ,
(B.7)
where (a) follows by the fact that all payoff distributions are independent of
each other, so the pdf functions can be multiplied together to get the joint
distribution of U i(si,σ−i) for all si ∈ Si, (b) follows by Equation (3.1), (c) is
true by expanding the product and reformulating the product of the sum as
the sum of products. If Equation (B.7) is used in Equation (3.6) to find the
equilibrium of the game, we come up with a different equilibrium than that
presented in Chapter 3. Let the equilibrium derived from Equations (3.6) and
(B.7) be called RAE2, where following the same proof of Theorem 4, RAE2
exists for any finite N -player game. Finding a strictly dominated strategy in
the framework of RAE2 is not as straightforward as for the Nash and RAE
equilibria. In the following definition, the strict dominance is described for
RAE2.
Definition 21. A pure strategy si ∈ Si of player i strictly dominates a second
pure strategy s′i ∈ Si of the player if
P
(
Ui
(
si, s
1
−i
) ≥ U i (Si \ si, s2:|Si|−i ))
>P
(
Ui
(
s′i, s
1
−i
) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i, s2:|Si|−i )),∀s1:|Si|−i ∈ S|Si|−i , (B.8)
where what we mean by Ui
(
si, s
1
−i
)
being greater than or equal to U i
(
Si \
si, s
2:|Si|
−i
)
is that Ui
(
si, s
1
−i
)
is greater than or equal to Ui
(
ŝi, s
k
−i
)
for all
ŝi ∈ Si \ si, where each ŝi ∈ Si \ si is associated with a possibly different
pure strategy of other players sk−i ∈ S−i for all 2 ≤ k ≤ |Si|. Note that the
associations of ŝi ∈ Si and sk−i ∈ S−i on both sides of Equation (B.8) remain
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the same except for si and s
′
i for which the associations are switched with
each other.
Note that the strictly dominated strategies of a player cannot be found
from the risk-averse probably matrix, but finding a strictly dominated strat-
egy needs more sophisticated calculations described in Definition 21. A
strictly dominated strategy cannot be the risk-averse best response to any
mixed strategy profile of other players due to the following reason. Consider
that s′i ∈ Si is strictly dominated by si ∈ Si for player i as is stated in
Definition 21. Then, for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i, we have
P
(
U i (si,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ si,σ−i)
)
(a)
=
∑
s
1:|Si|
−i ∈S
|Si|
−i
 |Si|∏
k=1
σ(sk−i)
 · P(Ui(si, s1−i) ≥ U i(Si \ si, s2:|Si|−i ))

(b)
>
∑
s
1:|Si|
−i ∈S
|Si|
−i
 |Si|∏
k=1
σ(sk−i)
 · P(Ui(s′i, s1−i) ≥ U i(Si \ s′i, s2:|Si|−i ))

(c)
=P
(
U i (s
′
i,σ−i) ≥ U i (Si \ s′i,σ−i)
)
,
(B.9)
where (a) is true by Equation (B.7), (b) is true by the assumption that
the pure strategy s′i is strictly dominated by the pure strategy si and using
Equation (B.8) in Definition 21 on strict dominance, and (c) follows the
backward direction of steps (a), (b), and (c) for pure strategy s′i in Equation
(B.7). By Equation (B.9) and Equation (3.2) in Definition 2 on the best
response to a mixed strategy profile of other players, a strictly dominated
pure strategy can never be a best response to any mixed strategy profile
of other players. As a result, a strictly dominated pure strategy can be
removed from the set of strategies of a player, and iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies can be applied to a game under the framework
of RAE2 as well.
In order to get more insight into the new framework, the mixed strategy
RAE2 is worked out for Example 4. Consider that the first player selects U
with probability σU and selects D otherwise. Given the first player’s mixed
strategy (σU , 1 − σU), with a little misuse of notation, denote the random
variables denoting the second player’s payoffs by selecting L or R with L and
R, respectively. As a result, for two independent games, where in both of
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them the first player independently plays according to the mixed strategy
(σU , 1 − σU) and the second player selects L and R in the first and second
games, respectively, using the law of total probability,
L ∼ fL(u) = σU · f4(u) + (1− σU) · f3(u),
R ∼ fR(v) = σU · f3(v) + (1− σU) · f1(v).
(B.10)
The second player is indifferent between selecting L and R if P (L ≥ R) =
P (R ≥ L). Since payoffs are continuous random variables, P (R ≥ L) =
1 − P (L ≥ R); as a result, the second player is indifferent between the
strategies in two independent games if P (L ≥ R) = 0.5. By Equation (B.10)
and the fact that payoffs are independent from each other, P (L ≥ R) can be
computed as
P (L ≥ R) =
∫ ∞
∞
∫ ∞
v
fL(u) · fR(v) dudv
=
∫ ∞
∞
∫ ∞
v
(
σU · f4(u) + (1− σU) · f3(u)
)
×(
σU · f3(v) + (1− σU) · f1(v)
)
dudv
= σ2U
∫ ∞
∞
∫ ∞
v
f4(u) · f3(v) dudv + σU(1− σU)
∫ ∞
∞
∫ ∞
v
f4(u) · f1(v) dudv
+ σU(1− σU)
∫ ∞
∞
∫ ∞
v
f3(u) · f3(v) dudv
+ (1− σU)2
∫ ∞
∞
∫ ∞
v
f3(u) · f1(v) dudv
= σ2UP
(
U2(U,L) ≥ U2(U,R)
)
+ σU(1− σU)P
(
U2(U,L) ≥ U2(D,R)
)
+
σU(1− σU)P
(
U2(D,L) ≥ U2(U,R)
)
+ (1− σU)2P
(
U2(D,L) ≥ U2(D,R)
)
=
2
5
σ2U + σU(1− σU) +
1
2
σU(1− σU) + (1− σU)2 = − 1
10
σ2U −
1
2
σU + 1.
(B.11)
Letting P (L ≥ R) = 0.5, then − 1
10
σ2U − 12σU + 12 = 0 whose solution
is the mixed strategy RAE2. It can be computed that σU =
−5+√45
2
≈
0.854. As a result, due to symmetry,
(
σ1(U), σ1(D)
)
= (0.854, 0.146) and(
σ2(L), σ2(R)
)
= (0.854, 0.146) form the mixed strategy RAE2 of the game
in Example 4.
The risk-averse best response under the RAE2 framework is compared
against the risk-averse best response under the RAE framework by simulation
for Example 5. The mixed strategy RAE and RAE2 exist no matter what
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Figure B.1: The mixed strategy RAE and RAE2 are determined by the
value of σ1(U) in Example 5. The mixed strategies depend on the value of
the constant a, where σ1(U) is plotted above as a function of the constant a.
the value of the positive constant a is in this example, but these equilibria
depend on the value of the constant a. As described in Section 3.7, the mixed
strategy RAE and RAE2 are characterized by σ1(U) that is plotted in Figure
B.1.
A game according to Example 5 is simulated for 106 rounds for a fixed
constant a. In each realization of the game, the first player selects a strategy
according to the mixed strategy RAE, then the payoffs of the second player
for the two strategies are compared to see which is larger. After the 106
games, the proportion of the games in which playing strategy L outperforms
playing strategy R by having a larger payoff is computed and plotted in
Figure B.2 as a function of the constant a. The same procedure is performed
for the mixed strategy RAE2 and the result is plotted in the same figure. As
shown in the figure, under the RAE framework, the likelihood that playing
strategy L has a larger payoff than playing strategy R is the same as that
of observing heads on the flip of a fair coin, which makes the second player
indifferent between the two strategies. However, if the first player selects
the strategy according to the mixed strategy RAE2, it is more likely for
the second player to get a larger payoff by selecting L or R except for two
specific values of the constant a as shown in the figure. As a result, the risk-
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Figure B.2: The likelihood that playing strategy L outperforms playing
strategy R by having a larger payoff in a single play of the game.
averse equilibrium presented in Chapter 3 makes the second player indifferent
between the two strategies since the chances of receiving a larger payoff from
either strategy are the same in a single play of the game.
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Appendix C
THEOREM PROOFS OF THE
RISK-AVERSE EQUILIBRIUM FOR
CHAPTER 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. For any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, a risk-averse
equilibrium exists.
Proof. Let RB : Σ → Σ be the risk-averse best response function where
RB(σ) =
(
RB(σ−1), RB(σ−2), . . . , RB(σ−N)
)
. It is easy to see that the
existence of a fixed point σ∗ ∈ Σ for the risk-averse best response function,
i.e., σ∗ ∈ RB(σ∗), proves the existence of a risk-averse equilibrium. The
following four conditions of the Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem are shown
to be satisfied for the function RB(σ) to prove the existence of a fixed point
for the function.
1. The domain of function RB(.) is a non-empty, compact, and convex sub-
set of a finite dimensional Euclidean space: Σ is the Cartesian product
of non-empty simplices as each player has at least one strategy to play;
furthermore, each of the elements of Σ is between zero and one, so Σ is
non-empty, convex, bounded, and closed containing all its limit points.
2. RB(σ) 6= ∅, ∀σ ∈ Σ: The set in Equation (4.3) is non-empty as max-
imum exists over a finite number of values. As a result, RB(σ−i) is
non-empty for all i ∈ [n] since it is the set of all probability distributions
over the corresponding mentioned non-empty set.
3. The co-domain of function RB(.) is a convex set for all σ ∈ Σ: It
suffices to prove that RB(σ−i) is a convex set for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i and
for all i ∈ [n]. For any i ∈ [n], if σi, σ′i ∈ RB(σ−i), we need to prove
that λσi + (1 − λ)σ′i ∈ RB(σ−i) for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and for any σ−i ∈
Σ−i. Let the supports of σi and σ′i be defined as supp(σi) = {pi ∈ Pi :
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σi(pi) > 0} and supp(σ′i) = {pi ∈ Pi : σ′i(pi) > 0}, respectively. It is
concluded from the definition of the risk-averse best response in Definition
11 that supp(σi), supp(σ
′
i) ⊆ arg max
pi∈Pi
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
,
which results in
supp(σi) ∪ supp(σ′i) ⊆ arg max
pi∈Pi
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
.
As a result, using the definition of risk-averse best response, any prob-
ability distribution over the set supp(σi) ∪ supp(σ′i) is a risk-averse best
response to σ−i. It is trivial that the mixed strategy λσi + (1 − λ)σ′i is
a valid probability distribution over the set supp(σi) ∪ supp(σ′i) for any
λ ∈ [0, 1], so λσi + (1 − λ)σ′i ∈ RB(σ−i) for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and for any
σ−i ∈ Σ−i that completes the convexity proof of the set RB(σ−i).
4. RB(σ) has a closed graph: RB(σ) has a closed graph if for any se-
quence {σm, σ̂m} → {σ, σ̂} with σ̂m ∈ RB(σm) for all m ∈ N, we
have σ̂ ∈ RB(σ). Proof by contradiction is used to show that RB(σ)
has a closed graph. Consider by contradiction that RB(σ) does not
have a closed graph, so there exists a sequence {σm, σ̂m} → {σ, σ̂} with
σ̂m ∈ RB(σm) for all m ∈ N, but σ̂ /∈ RB(σ). As a result, there
exists some i ∈ [n] such that σ̂i /∈ RB(σ−i). Using the definition of risk-
averse best response in Definition 11, there exists p′i ∈ supp(RB(σ−i)),
p̂i ∈ supp(σ̂i), and some  > 0 such that
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i) ≤ L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σ−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ 3.
(C.1)
Since the latencies over edges are continuous random variables and σm−i →
σ−i, for any  > 0, there exists a sufficiently large m1 such that we have
the following for m ≥ m1:
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i) ≤ L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σm−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i) ≤ L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σ−i)
)
− .
(C.2)
By adding inequalities with the same direction in Equations (C.1) and
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(C.2), for m ≥ m1 we have
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i) ≤ L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σm−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ 2.
(C.3)
For the same reason as of Equation (C.2), for any  > 0, there exists a
sufficiently large m2 such that we have the following for m ≥ m2:
P
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i) ≤ Li(Pi \ p̂i,σ−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i) ≤ L
i
(Pi \ p̂mi ,σm−i)
)
− ,
(C.4)
where p̂mi ∈ supp(RB(σm−i)). By adding the inequalities with the same
direction in Equations (C.3) and (C.4), for m ≥ max{m1,m2} we have
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i) ≤ L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σm−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i) ≤ L
i
(Pi \ p̂mi ,σm−i)
)
+ .
(C.5)
Equation (C.5) contradicts the fact that p̂mi ∈ supp(RB(σm−i)), which
completes the proof that RB(σ) has a closed graph.
As listed above, the risk-averse best response function RB(σ) satisfies the
four conditions of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem. As a direct result, for
any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, there exists σ∗ ∈ Σ such
that σ∗ ∈ RB(σ∗), which completes the existence proof of a risk-averse
equilibrium for such games.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6. For any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, a mean-
variance equilibrium exists.
Proof. Let MB : Σ → Σ be the mean-variance best response function
where MB(σ) =
(
MB(σ−1),MB(σ−2), . . . ,MB(σ−N)
)
. It is easy to see
that the existence of a fixed point σ∗ ∈ Σ for the mean-variance best re-
sponse function, i.e., σ∗ ∈MB(σ∗), proves the existence of a mean-variance
equilibrium. The following four conditions of the Kakutani’s Fixed Point
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Theorem are shown to be satisfied for the function MB(σ) to prove the
existence of a fixed point for the function.
1. The domain of function MB(.) is a non-empty, compact, and convex
subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space: Σ is the Cartesian product
of non-empty simplices as each player has at least one strategy to play;
furthermore, each of the elements of Σ is between zero and one, so Σ is
non-empty, convex, bounded, and closed containing all its limit points.
2. MB(σ) 6= ∅, ∀σ ∈ Σ: The set in Equation (4.9) is non-empty as
minimum exists over a finite number of values. As a result, MB(σ−i) is
non-empty for all i ∈ [n] since it is the set of all probability distributions
over the corresponding mentioned non-empty set.
3. The co-domain of function MB(.) is a convex set for all σ ∈ Σ: It
suffices to prove that MB(σ−i) is a convex set for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i and for
all i ∈ [n]. For any i ∈ [n], if σi, σ′i ∈ MB(σ−i), we need to prove that
λσi + (1− λ)σ′i ∈MB(σ−i) for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i. Let
the supports of σi and σ
′
i be defined as supp(σi) = {pi ∈ Pi : σi(pi) > 0}
and supp(σ′i) = {pi ∈ Pi : σ′i(pi) > 0}, respectively. It is concluded
from the definition of the mean-variance best response in Definition 14
that supp(σi), supp(σ
′
i) ⊆ arg min
pi∈Pi
Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i), which
results in
supp(σi) ∪ supp(σ′i) ⊆ arg min
pi∈Pi
Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i).
As a result, using the definition of mean-variance best response, any prob-
ability distribution over the set supp(σi)∪supp(σ′i) is a mean-variance best
response to σ−i. The mixed strategy λσi + (1− λ)σ′i is obviously a valid
probability distribution over the set supp(σi)∪ supp(σ′i) for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
so λσi + (1 − λ)σ′i ∈ MB(σ−i) for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i
that completes the convexity proof of the set MB(σ−i).
4. MB(σ) has a closed graph: MB(σ) has a closed graph if for any se-
quence {σm, σ̂m} → {σ, σ̂} with σ̂m ∈ MB(σm) for all m ∈ N, we
have σ̂ ∈MB(σ). Proof by contradiction is used to show that MB(σ)
has a closed graph. Consider by contradiction that MB(σ) does not
have a closed graph, so there exists a sequence {σm, σ̂m} → {σ, σ̂} with
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σ̂m ∈MB(σm) for all m ∈ N, but σ̂ /∈MB(σ). As a result, there exists
some i ∈ [n] such that σ̂i /∈ MB(σ−i). Using the definition of mean-
variance best response in Definition 14, there exists p′i ∈ supp(MB(σ−i)),
p̂i ∈ supp(σ̂i), and some  > 0 such that
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i)
<Var
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂i,σ−i)− 3.
(C.6)
Since the latencies over edges are continuous random variables and σm−i →
σ−i, for any  > 0, there exists a sufficiently large m3 such that we have
the following for m ≥ m3:
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σm−i)
<Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i) + .
(C.7)
By adding inequalities with the same direction in Equations (C.6) and
(C.7), for m ≥ m3 we have
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σm−i)
<Var
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂i,σ−i)− 2.
(C.8)
For the same reason as of Equation (C.7), for any  > 0, there exists a
sufficiently large m4 such that we have the following for m ≥ m4:
Var
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂i,σ−i)
<Var
(
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂mi ,σm−i) + ,
(C.9)
where p̂mi ∈ supp(MB(σm−i)). By adding the inequalities with the same
direction in Equations (C.8) and (C.9), for m ≥ max{m3,m4} we have
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σm−i)
<Var
(
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂mi ,σm−i)− .
(C.10)
Equation (C.10) contradicts the fact that p̂mi ∈ supp(MB(σm−i)), which
completes the proof that MB(σ) has a closed graph.
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As listed above, the mean-variance best response function MB(σ) satisfies
the four conditions of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem. As a direct result,
for any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, there exists σ∗ ∈ Σ such
that σ∗ ∈MB(σ∗), which completes the existence proof of a mean-variance
equilibrium for such games.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7. For any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, a CVaRα
equilibrium exists.
Proof. Let CB : Σ → Σ be the CVaRα best response function where
CB(σ) =
(
CB(σ−1), CB(σ−2), . . . , CB(σ−N)
)
. It is easy to see that the
existence of a fixed point σ∗ ∈ Σ for the CVaRα best response function, i.e.,
σ∗ ∈ CB(σ∗), proves the existence of a CVaRα equilibrium. The following
four conditions of the Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem are shown to be sat-
isfied for the function CB(σ) to prove the existence of a fixed point for the
function.
1. The domain of function CB(.) is a non-empty, compact, and convex sub-
set of a finite dimensional Euclidean space: Σ is the Cartesian product
of non-empty simplices as each player has at least one strategy to play;
furthermore, each of the elements of Σ is between zero and one, so Σ is
non-empty, convex, bounded, and closed containing all its limit points.
2. CB(σ) 6= ∅, ∀σ ∈ Σ: The set in Equation (4.19) is non-empty as
minimum exists over a finite number of values. As a result, CB(σ−i) is
non-empty for all i ∈ [n] since it is the set of all probability distributions
over the corresponding mentioned non-empty set.
3. The co-domain of function CB(.) is a convex set for all σ ∈ Σ: It suffices
to prove that CB(σ−i) is a convex set for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i and for all i ∈ [n].
For any i ∈ [n], if σi, σ′i ∈ CB(σ−i), we need to prove that λσi+(1−λ)σ′i ∈
CB(σ−i) for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i. Let the supports of
σi and σ
′
i be defined as supp(σi) = {pi ∈ Pi : σi(pi) > 0} and supp(σ′i) =
{pi ∈ Pi : σ′i(pi) > 0}, respectively. It is concluded from the definition
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of the CVaRα best response in Definition 17 that supp(σi), supp(σ
′
i) ⊆
arg min
pi∈Pi
E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)], which results in
supp(σi) ∪ supp(σ′i) ⊆ arg min
pi∈Pi
E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i) ≥ viα(pi,σ−i)] .
As a result, using the definition of CVaRα best response, any probability
distribution over the set supp(σi)∪ supp(σ′i) is a CVaRα best response to
σ−i. The mixed strategy λσi + (1 − λ)σ′i is obviously a valid probability
distribution over the set supp(σi)∪supp(σ′i) for any λ ∈ [0, 1], so λσi+(1−
λ)σ′i ∈ CB(σ−i) for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i that completes
the convexity proof of the set CB(σ−i).
4. CB(σ) has a closed graph: CB(σ) has a closed graph if for any se-
quence {σm, σ̂m} → {σ, σ̂} with σ̂m ∈ CB(σm) for all m ∈ N, we
have σ̂ ∈ CB(σ). Proof by contradiction is used to show that CB(σ)
has a closed graph. Consider by contradiction that CB(σ) does not
have a closed graph, so there exists a sequence {σm, σ̂m} → {σ, σ̂} with
σ̂m ∈ CB(σm) for all m ∈ N, but σ̂ /∈ CB(σ). As a result, there exists
some i ∈ [n] such that σ̂i /∈ CB(σ−i). Using the definition of CVaRα best
response in Definition 17, there exists p′i ∈ supp(CB(σ−i)), p̂i ∈ supp(σ̂i),
and some  > 0 such that
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σ−i) ≥ viα(p′i,σ−i)]
<E
[
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p̂i,σ−i) ≥ viα(p̂i,σ−i)]− 3. (C.11)
Since the latencies over edges are continuous random variables and σm−i →
σ−i, for any  > 0, there exists a sufficiently large m5 such that we have
the following for m ≥ m5:
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σm−i) ≥ viα(p′i,σm−i)]
<E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σ−i) ≥ viα(p′i,σ−i)]+ . (C.12)
By adding inequalities with the same direction in Equations (C.11) and
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(C.12), for m ≥ m5 we have
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σm−i) ≥ viα(p′i,σm−i)]
<E
[
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p̂i,σ−i) ≥ viα(p̂i,σ−i)]− 2. (C.13)
For the same reason as of Equation (C.12), for any  > 0, there exists a
sufficiently large m6 such that we have the following for m ≥ m6:
E
[
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p̂i,σ−i) ≥ viα(p̂i,σ−i)]
<E
[
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i)
∣∣∣Li(p̂mi ,σm−i) ≥ viα(p̂mi ,σm−i)]+ , (C.14)
where p̂mi ∈ supp(CB(σm−i)). By adding the inequalities with the same
direction in Equations (C.13) and (C.14), for m ≥ max{m5,m6} we have
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σm−i) ≥ viα(p′i,σm−i)]
<E
[
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i)
∣∣∣Li(p̂mi ,σm−i) ≥ viα(p̂mi ,σm−i)]− . (C.15)
Equation (C.15) contradicts the fact that p̂mi ∈ supp(CB(σm−i)), which
completes the proof that CB(σ) has a closed graph.
As listed above, the CVaRα best response function CB(σ) satisfies the four
conditions of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem. As a direct result, for any
finite n-player stochastic congestion game, there exists σ∗ ∈ Σ such that
σ∗ ∈ CB(σ∗), which completes the existence proof of a CVaRα equilibrium
for such games.
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Appendix D
LEMMA PROOFS OF THE BLIND
GB-PANDAS ALGORITHM FOR
CHAPTER 5
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. The following set Λ¯ is equivalent to Λ defined in equation (5.2):
Λ¯ =
{
λ = (λL¯ : L¯ ∈ L)
∣∣∣∃λL¯,n,m ≥ 0,∀L¯ ∈ L,∀n ∈ L¯,∀m ∈M, s.t.
λL¯ =
∑
n:n∈L¯
M∑
m=1
λL¯,n,m, ∀L¯ ∈ L,
∑
L¯:m∈L¯
∑
n:n∈L¯
λL¯,n,m
α1
+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯2
∑
n:n∈L¯
λL¯,n,m
α2
+
· · ·+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯N
∑
n:n∈L¯
λL¯,n,m
αN
< 1,∀m
}
,
(D.1)
where λL¯,n,m denotes the arrival rate of type L¯ tasks that are 1-local to server
n and is processed by server m. {λL¯,n,m : L¯ ∈ L, n ∈ L¯, and m ∈ M} is a
decomposition of the set of arrival rates {λL¯,m : L¯ ∈ L and m ∈ M}, where
λL¯,m =
∑
n∈M λL¯,n,m.
Proof. We show that Λ¯ ⊂ Λ and Λ ⊂ Λ¯, which results in the equality of
these two sets.
• Λ¯ ⊂ Λ: If λ ∈ Λ¯, there exists a decomposition {λL¯,n,m : L¯ ∈ L, n ∈
L¯, and m ∈ M} such that the load on each server is less than one under
this decomposition. Defining λL¯,m ≡
∑
n:n∈L¯ λL¯,n,m, the arrival rate de-
composition {λL¯,m : L¯ ∈ L and m ∈M} obviously satisfies the conditions
in the definition of the set Λ, so λ ∈ Λ which means that Λ¯ ⊂ Λ.
Portions of this appendix were previously published in Yekkehkhany and Nagi [131]
and are used here with permission. Furthermore, portions of this appendix were previously
published in Yekkehkhany et al. [200] and are used here with permission.
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• Λ ⊂ Λ¯: If λ ∈ Λ, there exists a decomposition {λL¯,m : L¯ ∈ L and m ∈M}
such that the load on each server is less than one under this decomposition.
Defining λL¯,n,m ≡ λL¯,m|L¯| , the arrival rate decomposition {λL¯,n,m : L¯ ∈ L, n ∈
L¯, and m ∈ M} obviously satisfies the conditions in the definition of the
set Λ¯, so λ ∈ Λ¯ which means that Λ ⊂ Λ¯.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2.
〈W (t), U˜(t)〉 = 0, ∀t.
Proof. The expression simplifies as follows:
〈W (t), U˜(t)〉 =
∑
m
(
Q1m(t)
α1
+
Q2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ Q
N
m(t)
αN
)
Um(t)
αN
.
Note that for any server m, Um(t) is either zero or positive. For the first case
it is obvious that
(
Q1m(t)
α1
+ Q
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · · + QNm(t)
αN
)
Um(t)
αN
= 0. In the latter case
where Um(t) > 0, all sub-queues of server m are empty which again results
in
(Q1m(t)
α1
+ Q
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ QNm(t)
αN
)Um(t)
αN
= 0. Therefore, 〈W (t), U˜(t)〉 = 0 for all
time slots.
D.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. Under the GB-PANDAS routing policy, for any arrival rate
vector strictly inside the outer bound of the capacity region, λ ∈ Λ, and
the corresponding workload vector of servers w defined in (5.8), we have the
following for any t0:
E
[
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
∣∣∣Z(t0)] ≤ 0, ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof. The minimum weighted workload for type L¯ task, where L¯ ∈ L, at
time slot t is defined as follows:
W ∗¯L(t) = minm∈M
{
Wm(t)
α1
I{m∈L¯},
Wm(t)
α2
I{m∈L¯2}, · · · ,
Wm(t)
αN
I{m∈L¯N}
}
.
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According to the routing policy of the GB-PANDAS algorithm, an incoming
task of type L¯ at the beginning of time slot t is routed to the corresponding
sub-queue of server m∗ with the minimum weighted workload W ∗¯
L
. Therefore,
for any type L¯ task we have the following:
Wm(t)
α1
≥ W ∗¯L(t), ∀m ∈ L¯,
Wm(t)
αn
≥ W ∗¯L(t), ∀m ∈ L¯n, for 2 ≤ n ≤ N.
(D.2)
In other words, a type L¯ task does not join a server with a weighted work-
load greater than W ∗¯
L
. Using the fact that W (t) and A(t) are conditionally
independent of Z(t0) given Z(t), and also following the definitions of pseudo
task arrival process A(t) in (5.9) and the arrival of an n-local type task to
the m-th server Anm(t) in (5.4), we have the following:
E
[〈W (t),A(t)〉|Z(t0)]
= E
[
E
[〈W (t),A(t)〉|Z(t)]∣∣∣Z(t0)]
= E
[
E
[∑
m
Wm(t)
(A1m(t)
α1
+
A2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ A
N
m(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t)]∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
= E
[
E
[∑
m
Wm(t)
(
1
α1
∑
L¯:m∈L¯
AL¯,m(t) +
1
α2
∑
L¯:m∈L¯2
AL¯,m(t)
+ · · ·+ 1
αN
∑
L¯:m∈L¯N
AL¯,m(t)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t)]∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(a)
= E
[
E
[∑
L¯∈L
( ∑
m:m∈L¯
Wm(t)
α1
AL¯,m(t) +
∑
m:m∈L¯2
Wm(t)
α2
AL¯,m(t)+
· · ·+
∑
m:m∈L¯N
Wm(t)
αN
AL¯,m(t)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t)]∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(b)
= E
[
E
[∑
L¯∈L
W ∗¯L(t)AL¯(t)
∣∣∣Z(t)] ∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
=
∑
L¯∈L
W ∗¯L(t)λL¯,
(D.3)
where (a) is true by changing the order of the summations, and (b) follows by
the GB-PANDAS routing policy which routes type L¯ task to the server with
the minimum weighted workload, W ∗¯
L
. Furthermore, using the definition of
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the ideal workload on a server in (5.8) we have the following:
E
[〈W (t),w〉|Z(t)]
=
M∑
m=1
Wm(t)wm
=
∑
m
Wm(t)
( ∑
L¯:m∈L¯
λL¯,m
α1
+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯2
λL¯,m
α2
+ · · ·+
∑
L¯:m∈L¯N
λL¯,m
αN
)
(a)
=
∑
L¯∈L
( ∑
m:m∈L¯
Wm(t)
α1
λL¯,m +
∑
m:m∈L¯2
Wm(t)
α2
λL¯,m+
· · ·+
∑
m:m∈L¯N
Wm(t)
αN
λL¯,m
)
(b)
≥
∑
L¯∈L
∑
m∈M
W ∗¯L(t)λL¯,m
=
∑
L¯∈L
W ∗¯L(t)λL¯,
(D.4)
where (a) is true by changing the order of summations, and (b) follows from
(D.2). Lemma 3 is concluded from equations (D.3) and (D.4).
D.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. Under the GB-PANDAS routing policy, for any arrival rate
vector strictly inside the outer bound of the capacity region, λ ∈ Λ, and
the corresponding workload vector of servers w defined in (5.8) there exists
T0 > 0 such that for any T ≥ T0 we have the following:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ0T ||Q(t0)||1 + c0, ∀t0 ≥ 0,
where the constants θ0, c0 > 0 are independent of Z(t0).
Proof. By our assumption on boundedness of arrival and service processes,
there exists a constant CA such that for any t0, t, and T with t0 ≤ t ≤ t0 +T ,
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we have the following:
Wm(t0)− T
αN
≤ Wm(t) ≤ Wm(t0) + TCA
αN
, ∀m ∈M. (D.5)
On the other hand, by (5.7) the ideal workload on a server defined in (5.8)
can be bounded as follows:
wm ≤ 1
1 + δ
, ∀m ∈M. (D.6)
Hence,
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
= E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
M∑
m=1
Wm(t)wm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
(a)
≤ T
M∑
m=1
(
Wm(t0)wm
)
+
MT 2CA
αN
(b)
≤ T
1 + δ
∑
m
Wm(t0) +
MT 2CA
αN
,
(D.7)
where (a) is true by bringing the inner summation onm out of the expectation
and using the boundedness property of the workload in equation (D.5), and
(b) is true by Equation (D.6).
Before investigating the second term, E
[ ∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
〈W (t),S(t)〉
) ∣∣∣Z(t0)],
we propose the following lemma which will be used in lower bounding this
second term.
Lemma 13. For any server m ∈M and any t0, we have the following:
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1
+ S
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ SNm(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
= 1.
The proof of Lemma 13 is provided in Appendix D.5. We then have the
following:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
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= E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
M∑
m=1
(
Wm(t)
(
S1m(t)
α1
+
S2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ S
N
m(t)
αN
))∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
(a)
≥
M∑
m=1
(
Wm(t0)E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1
+
S2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ S
N
m(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
])
− T
αN
M∑
m=1
E
[ t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1
+
S2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ S
N
m(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)],
(D.8)
where (a) follows by bringing the inner summation on m out of the expecta-
tion and using the boundedness property of the workload in equation (D.5).
Using Lemma 13, for any 0 < 0 <
δ
1+δ
, there exists T0 such that for any
T ≥ T0, we have the following for any server m ∈M:
1− 0 ≤
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1
+ S
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ SNm(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
≤ 1 + 0.
Then continuing on equation (D.8) we have the following:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≥ T (1− 0)
M∑
m=1
Wm(t0)− MT
2(1 + 0)
αN
.
(D.9)
Then, Lemma 4 is concluded as follows by using equations (D.7) and (D.9)
and picking c0 =
MT 2
αN
(CA+1+0) and θ0 =
1
α1
(
δ
1+δ
− 0
)
, where by our choice
of 0 we have θ0 > 0:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− T
(
δ
1 + δ
− 0
) M∑
m=1
Wm(t0) +
MT 2
αN
(CA + 1 + 0)
(a)
≤ − T
α1
(
δ
1 + δ
− 0
) M∑
m=1
(
Q1m(t0) +Q
2
m(t0) + · · ·+QNm(t0)
)
+ c0
≤− θ0T ||Q(t0)||1 + c0, ∀t0 ≥ 0,
where (a) is true as Wm(t0) ≥ Q1m(t0)+Q2m(t0)+···+QNm(t0)α1 .
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D.5 Proof of Lemma 13
Lemma 13. For any server m ∈M and any t0, we have the following:
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1
+ S
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ SNm(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
= 1.
Proof. Let t∗m be the first time slot after or at time slot t0 at which server m
becomes idle, and so is available to serve another task; that is,
t∗m = min{τ : τ ≥ t0, Ψm(τ) = 0}, (D.10)
where, as a reminder, Ψm(τ) is the number of time slots that the m-th server
has spent on the task that is receiving service from this server at time slot
τ . Note that the CDF of the service time distributions are given by Fn, n ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} where they all have finite means αn < ∞; therefore, t∗m < ∞.
We then have the following by considering the bounded service:
E
t∗m+T−1∑
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1
+
S2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ S
N
m(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
− t∗m − t0
αN
+
1
α1
/T
≤
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1
+ S
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ SNm(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
≤E
t∗m+T−1∑
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1
+
S2m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ S
N
m(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
+ 1
αN
/T,
(D.11)
where by boundedness of t∗m, α1, and αN , it is obvious that limT→∞
− t
∗
m−t0
αN
+ 1
α1
T
= 0 and limT→∞
1
αN
T
= 0. Hence, by taking the limit of the terms in equation
(D.11) as T goes to infinity, we have the following:
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1
+ S
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ SNm(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
= lim
T→∞
E
[∑t∗m+T−1
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1
+ S
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ SNm(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
.
(D.12)
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Considering the service process as a renewal process, given the scheduling
decisions at the end of the renewal intervals in [t∗m, t
∗
m + T − 1], all holding
times for server m to give service to tasks in its queues are independent. We
elaborate on this in the following.
We define renewal processes, Nnm(t), n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, as follows, where
t is an integer valued number: Let Hnm(l) be the holding time (service time)
of the l-th task that is n-local to server m after time slot t∗m receiving service
from serve m, and call {Hnm(l), l ≥ 1} the holding process of n-local type
task (n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}). Then define Jnm(l) =
∑l
i=1 H
n
m(l) for l ≥ 1, and
let Jnm(0) = 0. In the renewal process, J
n
m(l) is the l-th jumping time, or the
time at which the l-th occurrence happens, and it has the following relation
with the renewal process, Nnm(t):
Nnm(t) =
∞∑
l=1
I{Jnm(l)≤t} = sup{l : Jnm(l) ≤ t}.
Another way to define Nnm(t) is as below:
1: Set τ = t∗m, cntr = 0, N
n
m(t) = 0
2: while cntr < t do
3: if ηm(τ) = n then
4: cntr + +
5: Nnm(t) + = S
n
m(τ)
6: end if
7: τ + +
8: end while
By convention, Nnm(0) = 0.
In the following, we define another renewal process, Nm(t):
Nm(t) =
t∗m+t−1∑
u=t∗m
(
I{S1m(u)=1} + I{S2m(u)=1} + · · ·+ I{SNm(u)=1}
)
.
Similarly, let Hm(l) be the holding time (service time) of the l-th task
after time slot t∗m receiving service from serve m, and call {Hm(l), l ≥ 1}
the holding process. Then define Jm(l) =
∑l
i=1Hm(l) for l ≥ 1, and let
Jm(0) = 0. In the renewal process, Jm(l) is the l-th jumping time, or the
time at which the l-th occurrence happens, and it has the following relation
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with the renewal process, Nm(t):
Nm(t) =
∞∑
l=1
I{Jm(l)≤t} = sup{l : Jm(l) ≤ t}.
Note that the central scheduler makes scheduling decisions for server m
at time slots {t∗m + Jm(l), l ≥ 1}. We denote these scheduling decisions by
Dm(t
∗
m) =
(
ηm(t
∗
m + Jm(l)) : l ≥ 1
)
.
Consider the time interval [t∗m, t
∗
m + T − 1] when T goes to infinity. Define
ρnm as the fraction of time that server m is busy giving service to tasks that
are n-local to this server, in the mentioned interval. Obviously,
∑N
n=1 ρ
n
m = 1.
Then equation (D.12) is followed by the following:
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t∗m+T−1
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1
+ S
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ SNm(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
= lim
T→∞
{
E
[
E
[
t∗m+T−1∑
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1
+
S2m(t)
α2
+
· · ·+ S
N
m(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Dm(t∗m), Z(t0)
]∣∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]}/
T
=
N∑
n=1
lim
T→∞
(
E
[
1
αn
E
[
t∗m+T−1∑
t=t∗m
(
Snm(t)
)∣∣∣∣Dm(t∗m), Z(t0)
]∣∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
])/
T
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
1
αn
lim
T→∞
E
[
Nnm
(
ρnmT
)∣∣∣Dm(t∗m), Z(t0)]
T
∣∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
.
(D.13)
Note that given {Dm(t∗m), Z(t0)}, the holding times {Hnm(l), l ≥ 1} are in-
dependent and identically distributed with CDF Fn. If ρ
n
m = 0, then we
do not have to worry about those tasks that are n-local to server m since
they receive service from this server for only a finite number of times in time
interval [t∗m, t
∗
m + T − 1] as T →∞, so
lim
T→∞
E
[
Nnm
(
ρnmT
)∣∣Dm(t∗m), Z(t0)]
T
= 0.
But if ρnm > 0, we can use the strong law of large numbers for renewal process
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Nnm to conclude the following:
lim
T→∞
E
[
Nnm
(
ρnmT
)∣∣Dm(t∗m), Z(t0)]
T
= ρnm ·
1
E[Hnm(1)]
, (D.14)
where the holding time (service time) Hnm(1) has CDF Fn with expectation
1
αn
. Combining equations (D.15) and (D.14), Lemma 13 is concluded as
follows:
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t∗m+T−1
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1
+ S
2
m(t)
α2
+ · · ·+ SNm(t)
αN
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
1
αn
· ρnm · αn
∣∣∣∣Z(t0)] = N∑
n=1
ρnm = 1.
(D.15)
D.6 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5. Under the GB-PANDAS routing policy, for any arrival rate
vector strictly inside the outer bound of the capacity region, λ ∈ Λ, and any
θ1 ∈ (0, 1), there exists T1 > 0 such that the following is true for any T ≥ T1
and for any t0 ≥ 0:
E
[
||Ψ (t0 + T )||1 − ||Ψ (t0)||1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ1||Ψ (t0)||1 +MT,
where ||.||1 is L1-norm.
Proof. For any server m ∈ M, let t∗m be the first time slot after or at time
slot t0 at which the server is available (t
∗
m is also defined in (D.10)); that is,
t∗m = min{τ : τ ≥ t0, Ψm(τ) = 0}, (D.16)
where it is obvious that Ψm(t
∗
m) = 0.
Note that for any t, we have Ψm(t + 1) ≤ Ψm(t) + 1, that is true by the
definition of Ψ(t), which is the number of time slots that serverm has spent on
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the currently in-service task. From time slot t to t+1, if a new task comes in
service, then Ψm(t+1) = 0 which results in Ψm(t+1) ≤ Ψm(t)+1; otherwise, if
server m continues giving service to the same task, then Ψm(t+1) = Ψm(t)+1.
Thus, if t∗m ≤ t0 +T , it is easy to find out that Ψm(t0 +T ) ≤ t0 +T − t∗m ≤ T .
In the following we use t∗m to find a bound on E[Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0)|Z(t0)]:
E
[
||Ψ (t0 + T )||1 − ||Ψ (t0)||1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
=
M∑
m=1
E
[(
Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
=
M∑
m=1
{
E
[(
Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0), t∗m ≤ t0 + T]
× P (t∗m ≤ t0 + T ∣∣Z(t0))
+ E
[(
Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0), t∗m > t0 + T]
× P (t∗m > t0 + T ∣∣Z(t0))}
(a)
≤
M∑
m=1
{(
T − Ψm(t0)
)
× P (t∗m > t0 + T ∣∣Z(t0))
+ T × P (t∗m > t0 + T ∣∣Z(t0))}
=−
M∑
m=1
(
Ψm(t0) · P
(
t∗m > t0 + T
∣∣Z(t0)))+MT,
(D.17)
where (a) is true as given that t∗m ≤ t0 + T we found that Ψm(t0 + T ) ≤ T ,
so Ψm(t0 + T ) − Ψm(t0) ≤ T − Ψm(t0), and given that t∗m > t0 + T , it is
concluded that server m is giving service to the same task over the whole
interval [t0, t0 + T ], which results in Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0) = T .
Since service time of an n-local task has CDF Fn with finite mean, we have
the following:
lim
T→∞
P
(
t∗m ≤ t0 + T
∣∣∣Z(t0)) = 1, ∀m ∈M.
Therefore, for any θ1 ∈ (0, 1) there exists T1 such that for any T ≥ T1, we
have P
(
t∗m ≤ t0 + T
∣∣∣Z(t0)) ≥ θ1, for any m ∈M, so equation (D.17) follows
as below which completes the proof:
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E
[
||Ψ (t0 + T )||1 − ||Ψ (t0)||1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ1
M∑
m=1
Ψm(t0) +MT
=− θ1||Ψ (t0)||1 +MT.
(D.18)
D.7 Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6.
{
Z(t) =
(
Q(t),η(t),Ψ (t)
)
, t ≥ 0} forms an irreducible and
aperiodic Markov chain. The state space of this Markov chain is S =(∏
m∈MNN
m)× (∏m∈M{1, 2, · · · , Nm})× NM .
Proof. Consider Z(0) =
{
0(∑m∈MNm)×1,∏m∈MNm, 0M×1} as the initial
state of the Markov chain Z(t).
Irreducible: Since Fi,m is increasing for any task-server pair, we can find an
integer τ > 0 such that Fi,m(τ) > 0 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ Nm and m ∈ M.
Furthermore, probability of zero task arrival is positive in each time slot.
Hence, for any state Z = (Q,η,Ψ ), there is a positive probability that each
task receives service in τ time slots and no new task arrives at the system
in τ
∑
m∈M
∑Nm
n=1Q
n
m time slots. Accordingly, the initial state of the Markov
chain is reachable from any states of the system. Conversely, using the same
approach, it is easy to see that any states of the system is reachable from the
initial state, Z(0). Consequently, the Markov chain Z(t) is irreducible.
Aperiodic: Since Markov chain Z(t) is irreducible, in order to show that it
is also aperiodic, it suffices to show that there is a positive probability for
transition from a state to itself. Due to the fact that there is a positive
probability that zero task arrives to the system, the Markov chain stays at
the initial state with a positive probability. Hence, the Markov chain Z(t) is
aperiodic.
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D.8 Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7. For any arrival rate vector inside the capacity region, λ ∈ Λ,
there exists a load decomposition {λi,m} and δ > 0 such that
∑
i∈L
λi,m
µi,m
<
1
1 + δ
, ∀m ∈M. (D.19)
The fluid model planning algorithm solves a linear programming to find the
load decomposition {λi,m} that is used in its load balancing on the M servers.
In other words, this load decomposition is a possibility of task assignment
on servers to stabilize the system.
Proof. The capacity region Λ is an open set, so for any λ ∈ Λ, there exists
δ > 0 such that (1 + δ)λ = λ′ ∈ Λ. On that account, (5.15) follows by∑
i∈L
λ′i,m
µi,m
=
∑
i∈L
(1+δ)λi,m
µi,m
< 1,∀m ∈M, which completes the proof:
∑
i∈L
λi,m
µi,m
<
1
1 + δ
,∀m ∈M.
D.9 Proof of Lemma 8
Lemma 8.
〈W (t), U˜(t)〉 = 0, ∀t.
Proof.
〈W (t), U˜ (t)〉 =
∑
m∈M
(
Q1m(t)
α1m
+
Q2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ Q
N
m(t)
αNmm
)
Um(t)
αNmm
.
If the unused service for server m is zero, Um(t) = 0, the corresponding
term for server m is zero in the above summation. Alternatively, the unused
service of server m is positive if and only if all Nm sub-queues of the server
are empty, which again makes the corresponding term for server m in the
above summation equal to zero.
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D.10 Proof of Lemma 9
Lemma 9. Under the exploration-exploitation routing policy of the Blind
GB-PANDAS algorithm, for any arrival rate vector inside the capacity region,
λ ∈ Λ, and the corresponding ideal workload vector w defined in (5.24), and
for any arbitrary small θ0 > 0, there exists T0 > t0 such that for any t0 ≥ 0
and T > T0:
E
[ t0+T−1∑
t=T0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤θ0T‖Q(t0)‖1 + c0,
where the constants θ0, c0 > 0 are independent of Z(t0).
Proof. By the choice of exploration rate for Blind GB-PANDAS, which is
independent of the system state, and the fact that exploration exists in both
routing and scheduling, any task that is n-local to server m is scheduled
on this server for infinitely many times in the interval [t0,∞) only due to
exploration, regardless of the initial system state. Processing time of an n-
local task on server m has a finite mean. Hence, due to strong law of large
numbers, using the update rule (5.17) for the elements of the service rate
matrix, we have:
∀ 0 <  < 1
2
×min{ min
n6=n′,m
∣∣αnm − αn′m∣∣,min
m,n
αnm, 0.5
}
and ∀δ′ > 0,∃T ′0 > t0, such that for any Z(t0)
P
(∣∣α˜nm(t)− αnm∣∣<, 1−< αnmα˜nm(t) < 1+
∣∣∣∣Z(t0))> 1− δ′,
∀t > T ′0, ∀m ∈M, ∀n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nm}.
(D.20)
By the above choice of , for t > T ′0, the different locality levels are distinct
from each other with at least 1 − δ′ probability. Let E be the event that∣∣α˜nm(t)− αnm∣∣ <  and 1−  < αnmα˜nm(t) < 1 +  for t ≥ T ′0.
For an incoming task of type i ∈ L at time slot t, define the exact (but
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not known) and estimated minimum weighted workloads as
W
∗
i (t) = min
m∈M
Wm(t)
µi,m
,
W˜
∗
i (t) = min
m∈M
W˜m(t)
µ˜i,m(t)
,
(D.21)
where Wm(t) and W˜m(t) are defined in (5.13) and (5.18), respectively. Wm(t)
and W˜m(t) are related to each other as follows:
W˜m(t) =
Q1m(t)
α˜1m(t)
+
Q2m(t)
α˜2m(t)
+ · · ·+ Q
Nm
m (t)
α˜Nmm (t)
=
α1m
α˜1m(t)
· Q
1
m(t)
α1m
+ · · ·+ α
Nm
m
α˜Nmm (t)
· Q
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
.
Hence, using (D.20), for any t > T ′0 and any m ∈M, we have
P
(
(1− )Wm(t) < W˜m(t) < (1 + )Wm(t)
∣∣∣∣Z(t0), E) = 1, (D.22)
and using (D.21) and (D.22), we have
P
(
Wm(t)
µi,m
≥ W ∗i (t) >
1
(1 + )2
W˜
∗
i (t)
∣∣∣∣Z(t0), E) = 1. (D.23)
Using the conditional independence of W˜ (t) and A(t) from Z(t0) given
Z(t), for any T > T ′0 − t0, we have the following for T ′0 ≤ t ≤ t0 + T − 1:
E
[〈W (t),A(t)〉|Z(t0)]
(a)
= E
[ ∑
m∈M
Wm(t)
(A1m(t)
α1m
+
A2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ A
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(b)
= E
[∑
m
Wm(t)
(
1
α1m
∑
i∈L1m
Ai,m(t) +
1
α2m
∑
i∈L2m
Ai,m(t)
+ · · ·+ 1
αNmm
∑
i∈LNmm
Ai,m(t)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(c)
= E
[∑
i∈L
∑
m∈M
(
Wm(t)
µi,m
Ai,m(t)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
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(d)
≤ E
[∑
i∈L
∑
m∈M
(
1
(1− )2 ·
W˜m(t)
µ˜i,m
Ai,m(t)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0), E]
+ δ′·E
[∑
i∈L
∑
m∈M
(
Q1m(t)+ · · ·+QNmm (t)
min
i,m
{µi,m}·min
i
{µi,m}Ai,m(t)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0), Ec]
(e)
< E
[
E
[∑
i∈L
(
pe · 1
(1− )2 · W˜
∗
i (t)Ai(t) +
1− pe
(1− )2
×
∑
m
∑Nm
n=1 Q
n
m(t0) +NT (T − t0)CA
min
i,m
{µ˜i,m(t)} ·min
i
{µ˜i,m(t)} ·CA
)∣∣∣∣Z(t)]∣∣∣∣Z(t0)E]
+ δ′ · E
[∑
i∈L
(∑
m
∑Nm
n=1 Q
n
m(t0) +NT (T − t0)CA
mini,m{µi,m} ·mini{µi,m} · CA
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0), Ec]
(f)
<
1
(1−)2
∑
i∈L
E
[
W˜
∗
i(t)
∣∣∣∣Z(t0), E]λi+( 1tδ′′+δ′
)
c′′0‖Q(t0)‖1+c′0,
(D.24)
where (a) and (b) are simply followed by the definitions of pseudo task arrival
process in (5.21) and Anm(t) in (5.19), respectively. The order of summations
is changed in (c). By the law of total probability, (D.20), and (D.22), (d) is
true, and (e) follows by the routing policy of Blind GB-PANDAS, where an
incoming task at the beginning of time slot t is routed to the corresponding
sub-queue of the server with the minimum estimated weighted workload with
probability pe = max(1 − p(t), 0) and is routed to the corresponding sub-
queue of a server chosen uniformly at random with probability 1− pe. Also
note that the number of arriving tasks at a time slot is assumed to be upper
bounded by CA. The last step, (f), is true by using (D.20), upper bounding
the exploration probability 1− pe by 1tδ′′ given that δ′′ > 0 is a constant, and
doing simple calculations, where c′′0 and c
′
0 are constants independent ofZ(t0).
Note that minimum value of the estimated service rates, mini,m{µ˜i,m(t)}, is
lower bounded for any t ≥ t0 by a constant which is the minimum of the
initialization of service rates and the inverse of the maximum support of
CDF functions Fi,m. We also have
E
[〈W (t),w〉|Z(t0)]
= E
[∑
m∈M
Wm(t)wm
∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
(a)
= E
[∑
m∈M
(
Wm(t)
∑
i∈L
λi,m
µi,m
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
170
(b)
= E
[∑
i∈L
m∈M
Wm(t)
µi,m
λi,m
∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
(c)
≥
∑
i∈L
m∈M
1− δ′
(1 + )2
E
[
W˜
∗
i (t)
∣∣∣∣Z(t0), E]λi,m
=
1− δ′
(1 + )2
∑
i∈L
E
[
W˜
∗
i (t)
∣∣∣∣Z(t0), E]λi,
(D.25)
where (a) is true by the definition of the ideal workload on a server in (5.24),
note that the ideal workload is not state dependent but Wm(t) is, the order
of summations is changed in (b), and (c) is followed by the law of total
probability, ignoring the second term, and Equation (D.23).
Putting (D.24) and (D.25) together, for T > T0 > T
′
0, we have
E
[ t0+T−1∑
t=T0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
<
t0+T−1∑
t=T0
((
1
(1− )2 −
1− δ′
(1 + )2
)∑
i∈L
E
[
W˜
∗
i (t)
∣∣∣∣Z(t0), E]λi
+
(
1
tδ′′
+ δ′
)
c′′0‖Q(t0)‖1 + c′0
)
(a)
<
16
9
(4+ δ′) ·
(
t0+T−1∑
t=T0
∑
i∈L
E
[
W˜
∗
i (t)
∣∣∣∣Z(t0), E]λi
)
+ T
(
1
T δ
′′
0
+ δ′
)
c′′0‖Q(t0)‖1 + Tc′0
(b)
<
16
9
(4+ δ′)TNT max
i
{λi}
×
(
E
[∑
m
∑Nm
n=1 Q
1
m(t0) +NT (T − t0)CA
mini,m{µ˜i,m(t)} ·mini{µ˜i,m(t)}
∣∣∣∣Z(t0), E]
)
+ T
(
1
T δ
′′
0
+ δ′
)
c′′0‖Q(t0)‖1 + Tc′0
(c)
<
(
+ δ′ +
1
T δ
′′
0
)
Tc1‖Q(t0)‖1 + c0 = θ0T‖Q(t0)‖1 + c0,
where (a) follows by upper bounding 1 − , 1
(1−)2(1+)2 , and
1
tδ′′ by 1,
16
9
,
and 1
T δ
′′
0
, respectively, and (b) is true by the fact that the number of arriving
tasks is bounded by CA, the number of task types is NT , and the maximum
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arrival rate of task types, maxi{λi}, is bounded by the number of servers.
Inequality (c) is true by doing simple calculations and using the fact that
mini,m{µ˜i,m(t)} is lower bounded by a constant for any t ≥ t0 as discussed in
(f) of (D.24).
Remark 12. θ0 can be made arbitrary small by choosing  and δ
′ small and
T0 large enough.
D.11 Proof of Lemma 10
Lemma 10. Under the exploration-exploitation scheduling policy of the
Blind GB-PANDAS algorithm, for any arrival rate vector inside the capacity
region, λ ∈ Λ, and the corresponding ideal workload vectorw in (5.24), there
exists T1 > 0 such that for any T > T1, we have:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ1T‖Q(t0)‖1 + c1, ∀t0 ≥ 0,
(D.26)
where the constants θ1, c1 > 0 are independent of Z(t0).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4 and is presented for
the sake of completeness. By the assumption on boundedness of arrival and
service processes, there exists a constant CA such that for any t0, t, and T
with t0 ≤ t ≤ t0 + T , we have the following for all m ∈M:
Wm(t0)− T
minn{αnm}
≤ Wm(t) ≤ Wm(t0) + TCA
minn{αnm}
. (D.27)
On the other hand, by Lemma 7, the ideal workload on a server defined in
(5.24) can be bounded as follows:
wm ≤ 1
1 + δ
, ∀m ∈M. (D.28)
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Hence,
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
= E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
M∑
m=1
Wm(t)wm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
(a)
≤ T
M∑
m=1
(
Wm(t0)wm +
MT 2CA
minn{αnm}
)
(b)
≤ T
1 + δ
∑
m
Wm(t0) +
MT 2CA
minm,n{αnm}
,
(D.29)
where (a) is true by bringing the inner summation onm out of the expectation
and using the boundedness property of the workload in Equation (D.27), and
(b) is true by Equation (D.28).
Before investigating the second term on the left-hand side of Equation
(D.26), E
[ ∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
〈W (t),S(t)〉
) ∣∣∣Z(t0)], we propose the following lemma
which will be used in lower bounding this second term.
Lemma 14. For any server m ∈M and any t0, we have the following:
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ S
2
m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ SN
m
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
= 1.
The proof of Lemma 14 is provided in Appendix D.14. We then have the
following:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
= E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
M∑
m=1
(
Wm(t)
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+
S2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ S
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
))∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
(a)
≥
M∑
m=1
(
Wm(t0)E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+
S2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ S
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
])
−
M∑
m=1
(
T
minn{αnm}
E
[ t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+
S2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ S
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
)
,
(D.30)
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where (a) follows by bringing the inner summation on m out of the expecta-
tion and using the boundedness property of the workload in Equation (D.27).
Using Lemma 14, for any 0 < 0 <
δ
1+δ
, there exists T1 such that for any
T ≥ T1, we have the following for any server m ∈M:
1− 0 ≤
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ S
2
m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ SN
m
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
≤ 1 + 0.
Then continuing on Equation (D.30), we have the following:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≥ T (1− 0)
M∑
m=1
Wm(t0)− MT
2(1 + 0)
minm,n{αnm}
.
(D.31)
Then Lemma 10 is concluded as follows by using equations (D.29) and
(D.31) and picking c1 =
MT 2
minm,n{αnm}(CA+1+0) and θ1 =
1
maxm,n{αnm}
(
δ
1+δ
− 0
)
,
where by our choice of 0 we have θ1 > 0:
E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− T
(
δ
1 + δ
− 0
) M∑
m=1
Wm(t0) +
MT 2
minm,n{αnm}
(CA + 1 + 0)
(a)
≤ − T
maxm,n{αnm}
(
δ
1 + δ
− 0
) M∑
m=1
(
Q1m(t0) +Q
2
m(t0)
+ · · ·+QNmm (t0)
)
+ c1
≤− θ1T‖Q(t0)‖1 + c1, ∀T ≥ T0,
where (a) is true as Wm(t0) ≥ Q1m(t0)+Q2m(t0)+···+QN
m
m (t0)
maxm,n{αnm} .
D.12 Proof of Lemma 11
Lemma 11. Under the exploration-exploitation load balancing of the Blind
GB-PANDAS algorithm, for any arrival rate vector inside the capacity region,
λ ∈ Λ, and for any θ2 > 0, there exists T2 > 0 such that for any T > T2 and
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for any t0 ≥ 0, we have:
E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t0)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ2‖Ψ (t0)‖1 +MT.
Proof. For any server m ∈ M, let t∗m be the first time slot after or at time
slot t0 at which the server is available; that is,
t∗m = min{τ : τ ≥ t0, Ψm(τ) = 0}, (D.32)
where it is obvious that Ψm(t
∗
m) = 0. Note that for any t ≥ t0, we have
Ψm(t + 1) ≤ Ψm(t) + 1, which is true by the definition of Ψ(t) that is the
number of time slots that server m has spent on the currently in-service task.
From time slot t to t+ 1, if a new task comes in service, then Ψm(t+ 1) = 0
which results in Ψm(t+1) ≤ Ψm(t)+1; otherwise, if server m continues giving
service to the same task, then Ψm(t + 1) = Ψm(t) + 1. Thus, if t
∗
m ≤ t0 + T ,
it is easy to find out that Ψm(t0 + T ) ≤ t0 + T − t∗m ≤ T . In the following,
we use t∗m to find a bound on E[Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0)|Z(t0)]:
E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t0)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
=
M∑
m=1
E
[(
Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
=
M∑
m=1
{
E
[(
Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0), t∗m ≤ t0 + T]
× P (t∗m ≤ t0 + T ∣∣Z(t0))
+ E
[(
Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0), t∗m > t0 + T]
× P (t∗m > t0 + T ∣∣Z(t0))}
(a)
≤
M∑
m=1
{(
T − Ψm(t0)
)
× P (t∗m > t0 + T ∣∣Z(t0))
+ T × P (t∗m > t0 + T ∣∣Z(t0))}
= −
M∑
m=1
(
Ψm(t0) · P
(
t∗m > t0 + T
∣∣Z(t0)))+MT,
(D.33)
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where (a) is true as given that t∗m ≤ t0 + T we found that Ψm(t0 + T ) ≤ T ,
so Ψm(t0 + T ) − Ψm(t0) ≤ T − Ψm(t0), and given that t∗m > t0 + T , it is
concluded that server m is giving service to the same task over the whole
interval [t0, t0 + T ], which results in Ψm(t0 + T )− Ψm(t0) = T .
Since the CDF of service time of an n-local task on server m has finite
mean, we have the following:
lim
T→∞
P
(
t∗m ≤ t0 + T
∣∣∣Z(t0)) = 1, ∀m ∈M.
Therefore, for any θ2 ∈ (0, 1) there exists T2 such that for any T ≥ T2,
we have P
(
t∗m ≤ t0 + T
∣∣∣Z(t0)) ≥ θ2, for any m ∈ M, so Equation (D.33)
follows as below which completes the proof:
E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t0)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤− θ2
M∑
m=1
Ψm(t0) +MT = −θ2‖Ψ (t0)‖1 +MT.
(D.34)
D.13 Proof of Lemma 12
Lemma 12. For any t0 ≤ T0 < T , specifically T0 from Lemma 9 that
is dictated by choosing θ0 < θ1, we have the following for the drift of the
Lyapunov function in (5.27), where T0 is used in the first summation after
the inequality:
E
[
V (Z(t0 + T ))− V (Z(t0))
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=T0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]+ c2‖Q(t0)‖1 + c3.
(D.35)
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Proof.
E
[
V (Z(t0 + T ))− V (Z(t0))
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
= E
[
‖W (t0 + T )‖2 − ‖W (t0)‖2
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t0)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(a)
= E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
‖W (t+ 1)‖2 − ‖W (t)‖2
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(b)
= E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
‖A(t)− S(t) + U˜ (t)‖2
+ 2〈W (t),A(t)− S(t)〉+ 2〈W (t), U˜(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
(c)
≤ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),A(t)− S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]+ c′3
(d)
= 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]+ c′3,
(D.36)
where (a) is true by the telescoping series, (b) follows by using (5.22) to
substitute W (t + 1), (c) follows by Lemma 8 and the fact that the task
arrival is assumed to be bounded and the service and unused service are also
bounded as the number of servers are finite, so the pseudo arrival, service,
and unused service are also bounded, and therefore there exists a constant
c1 such that ‖A(t) − S(t) + U˜(t)‖2 ≤ c
′
3
T
, and (d) follows by adding and
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subtracting the intermediary term 〈W (t),w〉. On the other hand,
2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
≤ 2E
[
T0−1∑
t=t0
〈W (t),A(t)〉
∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
+ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=T0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
(a)
≤ 2E
[
(T0 − t0) · CA
(minm,n{αnm})2
∑
m∈M
(
Q1m(t0) + · · ·+QN
m
m (t0)
+Nm · CA · (T0 − t0)
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
+ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=T0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
≤ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=T0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
+ c2‖Q(t0)‖1 + c′′3,
(D.37)
where (a) is true by the fact that at most CA tasks arrive at system in each
time slot, and by using the definition of pseudo task arrival in (5.21). Putting
(D.36) and (D.37) together, Lemma 12 is proved as follows:
E
[
V (Z(t0 + T ))− V (Z(t0))
∣∣∣Z(t0)]
≤ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=T0
(
〈W (t),A(t)〉 − 〈W (t),w〉
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
+ 2E
[
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
(
〈W (t),w〉 − 〈W (t),S(t)〉
)∣∣∣Z(t0)]
+ E
[
‖Ψ (t0 + T )‖1 − ‖Ψ (t)‖1
∣∣∣Z(t0)]+ c2‖Q(t0)‖1 + c3,
where c3 = c
′
3 + c
′′
3.
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D.14 Proof of Lemma 14
Lemma 14. For any server m ∈M and any t0, we have the following:
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ S
2
m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ SN
m
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
= 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 13 and is presented for
the sake of completeness. Let t∗m be the first time slot after or at time slot
t0 at which server m becomes idle, and so is available to serve another task
(t∗m is also defined in (D.32)); that is,
t∗m = min{τ : τ ≥ t0, Ψm(τ) = 0}, (D.38)
where, as a reminder, Ψm(τ) is the number of time slots that the m-th server
has spent on the task that is receiving service from this server at time slot τ .
Denote the CDF of service time of an n-local task on server m by F nm that
has finite mean αnm <∞; therefore, t∗m <∞. We then have the following by
considering the bounded service:E
t∗m+T−1∑
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ · · ·+ S
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
− t∗m − t0
αNmm
+
1
α1m
/T
≤
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ S
2
m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ SN
m
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
≤
E
t∗m+T−1∑
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ · · ·+ S
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
+ 1
αNmm
/T,
(D.39)
where by boundedness of t∗m, α
1
m, and α
Nm
m , it is obvious that
lim
T→∞
− t∗m−t0
αNmm
+ 1
α1m
T
= 0 and lim
T→∞
1
αNmm
T
= 0.
Hence, by taking the limit of the terms in Equation (D.39) as T goes to
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infinity, we have the following:
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t0+T−1
t=t0
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ S
2
m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ SN
m
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
= lim
T→∞
E
[∑t∗m+T−1
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ S
2
m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ SN
m
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
.
(D.40)
Considering the service process as a renewal process, given the scheduling
decisions at the end of the renewal intervals in [t∗m, t
∗
m+T−1], all holding times
for server m to give service to tasks in its sub-queues are independent. We
elaborate on this in the following. We define renewal processes, Nnm(t), n ∈
{1, 2, · · · , Nm}, as follows, where t is an integer valued number:
Let Hnm(l) be the holding time (service time) of the l-th task that is n-
local to server m after time slot t∗m receiving service from server m, and call
{Hnm(l), l ≥ 1} the holding process of n-local task type, n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nm}.
Then define Jnm(l) =
∑l
i=1H
n
m(l) for l ≥ 1, and let Jnm(0) = 0. In the
renewal process, Jnm(l) is the l-th jumping time, or the time at which the
l-th occurrence happens, and it has the following relation with the renewal
process, Nnm(t):
Nnm(t) =
∞∑
l=1
I{Jnm(l)≤t} = sup{l : Jnm(l) ≤ t}.
Another way to define Nnm(t) is as shown in the following algorithm, where
by convention, Nnm(0) = 0.
1: Set τ = t∗m, cntr = 0, N
n
m(t) = 0
2: while cntr < t do
3: if ηm(τ) = n then
4: cntr + +
5: Nnm(t) + = S
n
m(τ)
6: end if
7: τ + +
8: end while
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Another renewal process, Nm(t), is defined as
Nm(t) =
t∗m+t−1∑
u=t∗m
(
I{S1m(u)=1} + I{S2m(u)=1} + · · ·+ I{SNmm (u)=1}
)
.
Similarly, let Hm(l) be the holding time (service time) of the l-th task after
time slot t∗m receiving service from server m, and call {Hm(l), l ≥ 1} the
holding process. Then define Jm(l) =
∑l
i=1Hm(l) for l ≥ 1, and let Jm(0) =
0. In the renewal process, Jm(l) is the l-th jumping time, or the time at
which the l-th occurrence happens, and it has the following relation with the
renewal process, Nm(t):
Nm(t) =
∞∑
l=1
I{Jm(l)≤t} = sup{l : Jm(l) ≤ t}.
Note that the central scheduler makes scheduling decisions for server m
at time slots {t∗m + Jm(l), l ≥ 1}. We denote these scheduling decisions by
Dm(t
∗
m) =
(
ηm(t
∗
m+Jm(l)) : l ≥ 1
)
. Consider the time interval [t∗m, t
∗
m+T−1]
when T goes to infinity. Define ρnm as the fraction of time that server m is
busy giving service to tasks that are n-local to this server, in the mentioned
interval. Obviously,
∑Nm
n=1 ρ
n
m = 1. Then Equation (D.40) is followed by
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t∗m+T−1
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ S
2
m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ SN
m
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
= lim
T→∞
{
E
[
E
[
t∗m+T−1∑
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+
S2m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ S
Nm
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Dm(t∗m),Z(t0)
]∣∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]}/
T
=
Nm∑
n=1
lim
T→∞
(
E
[
1
αnm
E
[
t∗m+T−1∑
t=t∗m
(
Snm(t)
)∣∣∣∣Dm(t∗m),Z(t0)
]∣∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
])/
T
=
Nm∑
n=1
E
[
1
αnm
lim
T→∞
E
[
Nnm
(
ρnmT
)∣∣∣Dm(t∗m),Z(t0)]
T
∣∣∣∣∣Z(t0)
]
.
(D.41)
Note that given {Dm(t∗m),Z(t0)}, the holding times {Hnm(l), l ≥ 1} are in-
dependent and identically distributed with CDF F nm. If ρ
n
m = 0, then we
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do not have to worry about those tasks that are n-local to server m since
they receive service from this server for only a finite number of times in time
interval [t∗m, t
∗
m + T − 1] as T →∞, so
lim
T→∞
E
[
Nnm
(
ρnmT
)∣∣Dm(t∗m),Z(t0)]
T
= 0.
But if ρnm > 0, we can use the strong law of large numbers for renewal process
Nnm to conclude the following:
lim
T→∞
E
[
Nnm
(
ρnmT
)∣∣Dm(t∗m),Z(t0)]
T
= ρnm ·
1
E[Hnm(1)]
, (D.42)
where the holding time (service time) Hnm(1) has CDF F
n
m with expectation
1
αnm
. Combining equations (D.41) and (D.42), Lemma 14 is concluded as
follows:
lim
T→∞
E
[∑t∗m+T−1
t=t∗m
(
S1m(t)
α1m
+ S
2
m(t)
α2m
+ · · ·+ SN
m
m (t)
αNmm
)∣∣∣∣Z(t0)]
T
=
Nm∑
n=1
E
[
1
αnm
· ρnm · αnm
∣∣∣∣Z(t0)] = Nm∑
n=1
ρnm = 1.
(D.43)
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